McDaniel v. Employers Mut. Liability Ins. Co., 38985
| Decision Date | 06 September 1961 |
| Docket Number | No. 1,No. 38985,38985,1 |
| Citation | 104 Ga.App. 340,121 S.E.2d 801 |
| Parties | Mrs. Mavis K. McDANIEL v. EMPLOYERS MUTUAL LIABILITY INSURANCE COMPANY et al |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Syllabus by the Court.
1. Insufficiency of the statement of the findings in an award by the State Board of Workmen's Compensation does not necessitate the recommittal of the case to the board in order for it to state its findings upon the evidence previously taken where the facts as disclosed by the record are undisputed and the evidence demands the award made by the board.
2. Where an employee, under the Workmen's Compensation Act, dies as the result of a 'heart attack' which occurs three days after an accidental injury sustained on the job, the award of the director denying compensation to the claimant, being demanded by the evidence, was correctly affirmed by the superior court.
Mrs. Mavis K. McDaniel, widow of Arthur G. McDaniel, filed a claim for workmen's compensation with the State Board of Workmen's Compensation in which she sought to recover for the death of her husband who had been an employee of Lockheed Aircraft Corp. Employers Mutual Liability Insurance Co. was the insurer. The board director who heard the case rendered an award denying compensation, which award was, in effect, affirmed by the full board, one director dissenting. On appeal to the Superior Court of Cobb County the award of the board was affirmed, and it is to this judgment that the claimant excepts.
Clarence J. Jackson, Atlanta, for plaintiff in error.
Smith, Swift, Currie, McGhee & Hancock, Glover McGhee, Frank M. Swift Atlanta, for defendant in error.
1. The findings of fact of the director, which the plaintiff in error contends are but a bare conclusion unsupported by facts, consists only of the statement, 'I find that the claimant has failed to show that her decedent suffered an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment which either caused or contributed to his death.' Code § 114-707 provides in part that 'the award, together with a statement of the findings of fact and other matters pertinent to the questions at issue, shall be filed with the record of the proceedings.' Southeastern Express Co. v. Edmondson, 30 Ga.App. 697, 699, 119 S.E. 39, 40. This holding is further clarified by a later case which holds that it is not improper for the commission to give its conclusion in the language of the statute, where the findings of fact as stated are sufficient to justify such conclusion, but that 'a mere statement that the commission finds that the injury arose out of and in the course of the employment is not such a finding of fact as would justify an award, when it stands unsupported by any other findings of fact to justify it as a conclusion.' [Italics ours] American Mutual Liability Insurance Co. v. Hardy, 36 Ga.App. 487, 490, 137 S.E. 113, 115.
As to the effect of an insufficient statement by the board of its findings, the Southeastern case, supra, holds that The court then added, by way of obiter dictum, that '* * * even this may not be necessary in a case where the facts [as] disclosed by the record are undisputed.' Southeastern Express Co. v. Edmondson, supra, 30 Ga.App. at pages 699, 700, 119 S.E. at page 41. This last statement seems to be the logical result in a case such as the one sub judice. The law does not require the doing of a useless act, and to recommit the case so that the board might state its findings upon the evidence previously taken, would cause unnecessary delay if the facts as disclosed by the record are undisputed and the evidence demands the award made by the board.
2. The evidence was substantially as follows: The deceased was employed by Lockheed Aircraft Corp. as a lathe machinist, and his duties included the tightening of a chuck, which required substantial strength. Three days before his death, he wrenched his shoulder in this operation, and he took the next day off from work, complaining of pain in his shoulder. The day before his death, deceased returned to work, but complained of 'indigestion.' On March 6, 1959, the day of his death, he became nauseated. Upon his arrival at home that evening, his wife took him to the doctor when he developed pain in his elbows, vomiting and turned a 'peculiar color.' He died at about 10:30 p. m., during the examination by the doctor, who diagnosed the cause of death as coronary thrombosis. There was evidence that the deceased had been under certain emotional strain in relation to his job security, lack of work in the shop, and his relations with his supervisors. Decedent had no history of heart trouble prior to his alleged injury on March 3, 1959, but had been under treatment by a chiropractor for some months for a back strain sustained at home. While there was some medical testimony to the effect that the exertion or strain on the job by the deceased might have contributed to the heart attack, there was also medical testimony by a heart specialist to the effect that there was no causal connection and that the attack developed from a pre-existing heart disease. The following testimony of the physician who was examining deceased at the time of his death indicates his opinion as to the causal connection:
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