McDaniel v. Greenville-Carolina Power Co.
| Citation | 78 S.E. 980,95 S.C. 268 |
| Parties | McDANIEL v. GREENVILLE-CAROLINA POWER CO. |
| Decision Date | 22 July 1913 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina |
Appeal from Common Pleas Circuit Court of Pickens County; S.W. G Shipp, Judge.
Action by Luvicy D. McDaniel against the Greenville-Carolina Power Company. From a judgment sustaining a demurrer and dismissing the complaint, plaintiff appeals. Reversed and remanded for new trial.
Ansel & Harris, of Greenville, for appellant. Haynsworth & Haynsworth, of Greenville, Carey & Carey, of Pickens, and H K. Osborne, of Spartanburg, for respondent.
This action was brought to recover damages. The complaint alleges that in 1907 the defendant power company erected across Saluda river a dam, which obstructed the natural flow of sand and water in the channel, causing the channel to fill with sand and mud, and thus causing the plaintiff appellant's land lying above the dam to be overflowed with mud, and sand and water. There is no allegation that the dam was wrongfully or negligently constructed. The respondent interposed a demurrer to the complaint on the ground that the same did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action "in that the defendant was authorized by the statutes of this state to construct the dam in question across Saluda river, which is navigable at said point, and inasmuch as the complaint does not charge that the said dam was negligently constructed." His honor, Judge Shipp, sustained the demurrer and dismissed the complaint, and from this order appellant appeals, and by 11 exceptions questions the correctness of this ruling.
The first three exceptions question the correctness in holding that the acts of the Legislature of this state make Saluda river a navigable stream. These exceptions are overruled, as the acts of the Legislature declare Saluda river to be a navigable stream as far up as McElhaney ford (Act Dec. 16, 1797, 5 St. at Large, p. 322), and it is conceded that McElhaney's ford is several miles above the land alleged to be damaged. The other exceptions raise the question that the building of the dam, even under authority of the Legislature, did not excuse or exempt it from liability for damages to riparian landowners above the dam for injuries done to their land by reason of the erection of the dam, and that the Legislature only had the power over the stream to allow dams and locks built for navigation purposes, and that the respondent is a private corporation, engaged in the business of generating electric power for sale, and liable for all damages done to lands above it which naturally flow from the erection of the dam, even though the act of the Legislature authorizing the building of the dam did not provide for such compensation.
We think these exceptions should be sustained. The Legislature had the authority to authorize and allow the respondent to build the dam in question across Saluda river, which had been declared to be a navigable stream; but it had no right to give them the power to build the dam and exempt from liability to any landowners on the stream, either above or below the dam, that might suffer any injury to their property by reason of the erection of the dam, even though by authority of the state. They could only be permitted to put the dam across the river, and, if by so doing they injured any landowners on the stream, they should be required to respond in damages for such injury. If in the erection of the dam they exercised the highest degree of care, and were in no manner negligent, and conducted it in the most skillful manner, yet, if by the building and maintenance of the dam they injuriously affect their neighbors, they are liable in damages. In other words, the Legislature had the right to grant permission to erect the dam, and respondent had the right to build and maintain the dam, yet, if by so doing they injure landowners on the stream, and the erection and maintenance of the dam is the direct and proximate cause of the injury to the landowners, they must pay damage; otherwise it would deprive property holders of their property and take it from them without compensation, and would be unlawful, unjust, and contrary, not only to all law, but all reason and justice. It may be that when a dam is first built that it will not injuriously affect land some distance from it, and for a long time there will be no cause for them to complain, but when the pond, made by the dam, fills with mud, sand, trash, and other things, causes overflows and injury to lands, then the parties injured have a cause of action, if the building and maintenance of the dam is the direct and proximate cause of their injury.
The complainant in this case alleges that the water from this dam backed up on her lands, and overflowed them with water, mud sand, and other deleterious deposits. The complaint states a good cause of action. The fact that respondent's act in building the dam was sanctioned by the state, and it did it under authority of law, and committed no fault in the erection of its dam, does not relieve it, if by so doing it injures or destroys other people's property without compensating them. I know of no law that will permit a corporation or an officer thereof, even though he is authorized by the state, to take the property of an individual for any purpose whatsoever, however beneficial it may be to the public or an individual without compensation; such pretended authority would be void and could afford no protection to any one. If the appellant has been injured as a natural result by the erection and operation of this dam, and the operation of the same is the direct and proximate cause of injury to her land, then she is entitled to such damages as would compensate her for such injury. My views are that it does not make any difference whether Saluda river is navigable or not, as the same rule of damages follows, as laid down in Ward v. Ford, 58 S.C. 560, 36 S.E. 916, and White v. Manf. Co., 60 S.C. 265, 38 S.E. 456. When the dam in question was erected, the waters from the pond in no manner affected appellant's land. She was at that time in no manner affected, and could not foresee that later she would suffer damage, and for that reason could not demand compensation for she then suffered no...
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