McDaniel v. McDaniel
| Decision Date | 23 October 1936 |
| Docket Number | 29197 |
| Citation | 269 N.W. 380,131 Neb. 639 |
| Parties | JAMES MCDANIEL, APPELLEE, v. WILLIAM MCDANIEL ET AL., APPELLANTS |
| Court | Nebraska Supreme Court |
APPEAL from the district court for Saunders county: HARRY D. LANDIS JUDGE. Affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
Syllabus by the Court.
1. In an equity case, where the evidence adduced on the trial is not preserved by bill of exceptions duly allowed, the only question presented on appeal is whether the decree entered in the trial court is supported by the pleadings.
2. The question of a defect of parties arising from nonjoinder, where the petition states a cause of action against the defendants properly made parties thereto, cannot be successfully urged for the first time in this court.
3. Where no reply is filed, and a cause is tried and submitted on the theory that a material allegation of the answer is in issue, a claim that such allegation stands admitted by failure to reply comes too late if made for the first time on appeal.
4. Pleadings construed, and held to support the decree entered by the trial court.
Appeal from District Court, Saunders County; Landis, Judge.
Action by James McDaniel against William McDaniel, and others. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendants appeal.
Affirmed.
Charles H. Slama, for appellants.
Schiefelbein & Donato, contra.
Heard before GOSS, C. J., ROSE, GOOD, EBERLY, DAY, PAINE and CARTER, JJ.
This is an action in equity between James McDaniel, as plaintiff, and William McDaniel, his wife Mary McDaniel, and Ernest S. Schiefelbein, as defendants, tried in the district court for Saunders county. The purpose of the action was to secure the cancelation and annulment of a certain deed executed by plaintiff and his wife, and by them delivered to defendant Ernest S. Schiefelbein in escrow; and also to obtain the cancelation of an agreement in writing entered into by the plaintiff and wife with the defendant William McDaniel and his wife pertaining only to the deed constituting the escrow, and for other relief.
After a trial "on the amended petition of the plaintiff, and the answer thereto of the defendants William McDaniel and Mary McDaniel, and the evidence," decree was entered for plaintiff as prayed. From the order of the trial court denying their motion for a new trial, defendants appeal.
It may further be said that the bill of exceptions containing the testimony adduced on the trial of the case was quashed by order of this court entered on March 5, 1936.
This situation materially restricts the limits of the review to which appellants are entitled.
In an equity case, where the evidence adduced on the trial is not preserved by bill of exceptions duly allowed, the only question presented by the record is whether the decree is supported by the pleadings. Pettibone v. Fitzgerald, 62 Neb. 869, 88 N.W. 143; Beatrice Savings Bank v. Beatrice Chautauqua Assembly, 54 Neb. 592, 74 N.W. 1065; Grove v. Dineen, 4 Neb. (Unof.) 722, 96 N.W. 253; McIntyre v. Mote, 77 Neb. 418, 109 N.W. 763.
The appellants challenge the right to maintain the action because of an alleged defect of parties defendant. The record does not disclose that this question was in any manner presented to the trial court. We are committed to the rule, viz.:
"The question of a defect of parties and of the legal capacity of the plaintiff to maintain an action cannot be successfully urged for the first time in this court." Taylor v. Weckerly, 69 Neb. 739, 96 N.W. 618. See, also, 20 Standard Ency. of Procedure, 998.
Appellants also challenge the correctness of the decree because of the failure of plaintiff to file a reply to the answer of the defendant and to new matter set forth therein. However, the decree entered by its terms fairly discloses that the court tried the cause on the theory that the material allegations of the answer were in issue. This decree was not challenged by the appellants in their motion for a new trial on the ground here presented. We are committed to the rule that, where no reply is filed, and a cause is tried and submitted on the theory that a material allegation of the answer is in issue, a claim that such allegation stands admitted comes too late when made for the first time after verdict or decree entered, or if made for the first time after verdict or decree entered, or if made for the first time on appeal. In re Estate of Cheney, 78 Neb. 274, 110 N.W. 731; Moore v. Moore, 104 Neb. 122, 175 N.W. 665; Hunter v. Weiner, 103 Neb. 538, 172 N.W. 521; Schuster v. Carson, 28 Neb. 612, 44 N.W. 734.
Lastly, appellants complain that paragraph 4 of the amended petition, on which the case was tried in the district court, to the effect that "it was fully understood and agreed by all the parties to said agreement that if the terms of said agreement to be performed by said William McDaniel and Mary McDaniel, or any of them, were disregarded or broken, that, in that event, the plaintiff under the provisions of said agreement giving him a lien on said real estate for sums of money therein provided, remaining unpaid, could at his option demand payment of said unpaid amount or proceed to repossess himself of the real estate in said agreement described," was at complete variance with a copy of exhibit "A" attached to plaintiff's petition.
It will be noted that, in reference to the additional agreement so pleaded, it is not alleged as an "oral agreement." The language employed was equally applicable to a written agreement, if such it was. We have no bill of exceptions to determine this fact. In the absence of affirmative proof to the contrary, the finding and judgment of the trial court must be deemed correct.
However waiving this point for the present, exhibit "A" is a written contract, signed by James McDaniel and his wife, as parties of the first part, and William McDaniel and his wife, as parties of the second part. It is not executed by Ernest S. Schiefelbein, the holder of...
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