McDaniel v. New Mexico Bd. of Medical Examiners
Decision Date | 02 August 1974 |
Docket Number | No. 9798,9798 |
Citation | 525 P.2d 374,86 N.M. 447,1974 NMSC 62 |
Parties | Joseph C. McDANIEL, Petitioner-Appellee and Cross-Appellant, v. NEW MEXICO BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS, Respondent-Appellant and Cross-Appellee. |
Court | New Mexico Supreme Court |
Howard F. Houk, Albuquerque, for respondent-appellant.
George P. Jones III, Albuquerque, for petitioner-appellee.
This appeal arises out of a judgment entered on an appeal by appellee to the District Court of Bernalillo County from two decisions and an order of the Board of Medical Examiners, (the Board), revoking the license of the appellee to practice medicine in New Mexico. The lower court, after considering the record of the proceedings before the Board, entered its judgment reversing the decisions and order of the Board. The Board appeals.
In July of 1970, pursuant to a Notice of Contemplated Action filed by the Board against the appellee under the provisions of the Uniform Licensing Act (§§ 67--26--1 to 67--26--31, N.M.S.A.1953), the appellee appeared before the Board and admitted that he had illegally and falsely prescribed, for the alleged use of another, the dangerous and habit-forming drug Demerol, when in truth and in fact the prescriptions were intended for his own use. He also admitted that he had habitually and excessively used Demerol; whereupon the Board found the appellee guilty of unprofessional conduct, entered its decision revoking his license to practice medicine, reinstated said license, and placed him on probation upon certain terms and conditions included among which were:
* * *'
Thereafter, pursuant to an Order to Show Cause filed by the Board as to why appellee's license to practice medicine should not be revoked because of his having violated the terms of his probation, a hearing was held. In August 1972, the Board made findings of fact and conclusions of law and entered its decision, finding appellee to have violated the terms and conditions of his probation, and entered an order revoking appellee's license to practice medicine.
Appellee appealed to the District Court of Bernalillo County. The district court ultimately entered a judgment reversing the decisions and order of the Board, concluding as a matter of law that substantial rights of the appellee had been prejudiced because the Board's findings, inferences, conclusions, and decisions were unsupported by substantial evidence on the entire record and were arbitrary.
The court based its reversal of the Board's decision on the lack of sufficient evidence upon which to establish its findings:
(3) that Dr. McDaniel violated any supervisory instructions of Dr. Brown.
This appeal followed.
The court below in its review of the Board's actions was governed by § 67--26--20, N.M.S.A.1953. The first paragraph of that statute provides in part:
The court may not substitute its judgment for that of the board. In Llano, Inc. v. Southern Union Gas Company, 75 N.M. 7, 399 P.2d 646 (1964) it is stated:
In Moyston v. New Mexico Public Service Commission, 76 N.M. 146, 412 P.2d 840 (1966), this court observed:
'The power of the trial court to review and overturn an administrative body's decision is stated in Ferguson-Steere Motor Co. v. State Corporation Commission, 63 N.M. 137, 314 P.2d 894:
* * *"
To the same effect also see Seidenberg v. New Mexico Board of Medical Examiners, 80 N.M. 135, 452 P.2d 469 (1969); Hardin v. State Tax Commission, 78 N.M. 477, 432 P.2d 833 (1967); S.I.C. Finance-Loans of Menaul, Inc. v. Upton, 75 N.M. 780, 411 P.2d 755 (1966); Ingram v. Malone Farms, Inc., 72 N.M. 256, 382 P.2d 981 (1963); Continental Oil Co. v. Oil Conservation Com'n, 70 N.M. 310, 373 P.2d 809 (1962); Johnson v. Sanchez, 67 N.M. 41, 351 P.2d 449 (1960).
As to what constitutes 'arbitrary and capricious action' by an administrative board, the case of Smith v. Hollenbeck, 48 Wash.2d 461, 294 P.2d 921 (1956) states:
Also to be taken into account is § 67--26--11, N.M.S.A.1953 which provides in part:
'* * * Boards may utilize their experience, technical competence and specialized knowledge in the evaluation of evidence presented to them. * * *'
The Board naturally contends that the district court erred in holding its decision to be unsupported by substantial evidence. There is really no dispute about the appellee's actions. These matters were largely admitted. In this respect the Board found:
'That the respondent, Joseph C. McDaniel, M.D., * * * for a period of time, from February 7, 1972, up through July 20, 1972, * * * illegally and falsely prescribed for the alleged use of Mrs. Elizabeth Burns, or Mrs. E. Burns, 1821 Sue Drive, Birmingham, Alabama, approximately 1410 Ritalin 20-mg. tablets, when in truth and in fact the prescription for said * * * Schedule II drug Ritalin was not prescribed for the sole use of Mrs. Burns, in that respondent, according to his own admission, kept for his own use approximately 500 of the said Ritalin tablets without the knowledge or consent of his psychiatrist, Warren T. Brown, M.D., and without said psychiatrist's having authorized or prescribed said * * * drug Ritalin for the personal use of the respondent.
In essence, the argument centers on whether there was substantial evidence that Ritalin is a 'dangerous drug.' Indeed, under the quoted terms of appellee's probation and the undisputed evidence bearing upon appellee's actions, this is the question upon which the issues of this appeal turn.
The original hearing dealt to some degree with the nature and characteristics of Ritalin, which seems to be a proprietary name for menthylphenidate. After entry of the Board's first decision, the case was remanded to the Board at the behest of appellee for the purpose, inter alia, of permitting 'evidence as to any narcotic or dangerous qualities of the drug Ritalin.' Following that hearing, the Board affirmed its prior decision and, as to Ritalin, found:
'The Board further finds that said respondent was not authorized to write prescriptions for the dangerous drug Ritalin, it being designated as a Schedule II drug under the Controlled Substances Act of both Federal and state governments.'
We will not repeat our oft-stated criteria for determining whether a finding is supported by substantial evidence. For a statement of the rule in an opinion upon an appeal from the actions of an administrative body, see Rinker v. State Corporation Commission, 84 N.M. 626, 506 P.2d 783 (1973). Upon reading the...
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