Smith v. Hollenbeck, 33488
| Decision Date | 08 March 1956 |
| Docket Number | No. 33488,33488 |
| Citation | 294 P.2d 921,48 Wn.2d 461 |
| Parties | Cleo SMITH and Mabel L. Rittenhouse, Respondents and Cross-Appellants, v. George M. HOLLENBECK, Acting Director of the Department of Public Assistance of the State of Washington, Appellant and Cross-Respondent. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Don Eastvold Moksha W. Smith, John F. Hansler, Olympia, for appellant.
George E. Clark, Yakima, for respondents.
This is an appeal from a judgment entered by the superior court after reviewing, pursuant to Laws of 1953, chapter 174, § 31, p. 363 [cf. RCW 74.08.080], a decision of the director of the department of public assistance rendered in consolidated causes, following a 'fair hearing' as provided by Laws of 1953, chapter 174, § 30, p. 362 [cf. RCW 74.08.070].
The facts with reference to the first of the consolidated causes are as follows:
The respondent Cleo Smith was seventy-six years of age and was a recipient of old age assistance. From April 1, 1953, to May 1, 1954, he resided in an apartment and was paying $30 per month for rent. He had reported to the department's visitor that he expected to have an apartment with a refrigerator and that his rent would be $35 per month. However, for some reason not disclosed in the record, the apartment which he occupied had no refrigerator, which reduced the rent $5 a month. May 1, 1954, he voluntarily moved into a four-room dwelling with Mrs. Mabel L. Rittenhouse, pursuant to an agreement between them that the rent would be shared. When this change of living arrangement was called to the attention of the department, his basic need allowance for rent was reduced, in accordance with the department's regulation 424.221, to $17.50 per month, being one half of the maximum unit shelter allowance.
The department determined that, for the months of May and June, while he was sharing the apartment with Mrs. Rittenhouse, respondent Smith had been overpaid a total of $33.20, and that, for thirteen months prior thereto, while occupying an apartment without a refrigerator, he had been overpaid $5 per month, making a grand total of $98.20. Respondent Smith was notified, in writing, that the department would recover this amount by deductions of $6.99 per month from his revised basic need grant.
The facts with reference to the second of the consolidated causes are as follows:
Mrs. Mabel L. Rittenhouse was seventy-two years of age. Prior to March 31, 1953, she had been paid a lump sum of $140 Federal old age and survivor's insurance, and was awarded $25 per month thereafter. March 31, 1953, she paid the $140 thus received to the department of public assistance. May 1, 1953, the department granted to her a basic need allowance of $90.10 per month. The department had notice that she was receiving old age and survivor's insurance in the sum of $25 per month, but failed to deduct this amount from the $90.10 monthly award. Thus from May 1, 1953, through June, 1954, she was overpaid by the department a total of $383.20, which included the overpayment of rental allowance while she shared the apartment with Mr. Smith. The department notified her, in writing, that this sum would be recovered by deductions of $8.52 from her monthly basic need allowance until the amount was repaid.
The respondents, feeling aggrieved by these rulings, appealed to the director of the department of public assistance. The director sustained the rulings. The respondents then appealed to the superior court. After a hearing on the record, the court filed a written memorandum opinion. The department's petition for rehearing was denied. The court entered findings of fact, and affirmed the decision of the director in part and reversed it in part. The director, on behalf of the department, has appealed, and respondents have cross-appealed.
The trial court did not see and hear the witnesses, but based its findings upon the record of the hearing before the director. Consequently, this court will evaluate the same evidence considered by the trial court.
Was the department of public assistance arbitrary and capricious in reducing the rental allowances to $17.50 and in ordering deductions from respondents' basic need allowances to reimburse the department for overpayments made?
Arbitrary and capricious action on the part of an administrative agency has been defined as willful and unreasoning action, without consideration and in disregard of facts or circumstances. Where there is room for two opinions, action is not arbitrary or capricious when exercised honestly and upon due consideration, even though it may be believed that an erroneous conclusion has been reached. Straub v. Department of Public Welfare, 1948, 31 Wash.2d 707, 198 P.2d 817; Lillions v. Gibbs, Wash.1955, 289 P.2d 203, and case cited.
Laws of 1953, chapter 174, § 18, p. 355 [cf. RCW 74.08.040] requires the department to award basic need grants on a uniform state-wide basis, and to make actual living cost studies for the determination of standards of assistance. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, public officers are presumed to have performed their duties regularly and legally, in compliance with controlling statutory provisions. Barbee Mill Co. v. State, 1953, 43 Wash.2d 353, 261 P.2d 418.
Since there is no evidence in the record that the surveys and studies were not properly made, we must assume that the department, in conformity with the statutory mandates, adopted maximum standards for rented shelter, based upon studies of actual living costs in Yakima county. During the period in question, the maximum standard shelter allowance was $35 per month.
Laws of 1953, chapter 174, § 5, p. 345 [cf. RCW 74.08.090] provides:
Laws of 1953, chapter 174, § 18, p. 355 [cf. RCW 74.08.040] provides, in part:
'* * * The standards of assistance shall take into account the economy of joint living arrangements, and the department may, by rule and regulation, prescribe maximums for grants. * * *'
Accordingly, by regulation 424.221-R, subd. 2, the department provided that, when two or more assistance units live together and the rent cost is shared, the grant to each cannot exceed his or her proportionate share of the maximum standard. There is no evidence that the joint living regulation was not uniform state-wide, or that the respondents' shelter award was not in accordance with it.
Respondent Smith contends that the department acted arbitrarily and capriciously when, because of his skin condition which required baths three times a day, and because he had been advised by a doctor to live in a ground floor apartment, the department failed to classify his condition specially and to award him $35 per month for rent, even though he shared an apartment with another pensioner.
The evidence does not disclose that respondent Smith was entitled to a special rating. The statute provides that, as an old-age pensioner, he is entitled to benefits only upon a uniform state-wide basis. In this respect, there is no proof that he was granted assistance different from other persons of his classification, under the statewide standards as determined by the...
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