McDaniel v. State

Decision Date08 September 1987
Docket NumberNo. 44685,44685
PartiesMcDANIEL v. STATE.
CourtGeorgia Supreme Court

Franklin N. Biggins (Court-appointed), Atlanta, for Albert mCdaniel.

Lewis R. Slaton, Dist. Atty., Atlanta, Benjamin H. Oehlert III, Asst. Dist. Atty., Michael J. Bowers, Atty. Gen., J. Michael Davis, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

HUNT, Justice.

The defendant, Albert McDaniel, was convicted of the murder of Andrew Starke, and sentenced to life in prison. 1 At trial, the defendant claimed that the victim had controlled him by a voo-doo or "roots" spell over him for the past ten to twenty years and that he had to shoot the victim in order to end the spell. He contends on appeal that this evidence entitled him to his requested charge on self-defense, which the trial court refused. He also raises the refusal of the trial court to excuse the first alternate juror for cause and to give, as requested, a charge on voluntary manslaughter. We affirm.

On October 29, 1986, the defendant confronted the victim near the cash registers of the Winn-Dixie store on Martin Luther King Drive in Atlanta and shot the victim in the forearm with a pistol; then, as the victim tried to run away, shot him twice more in the back. The defendant left the store and was soon apprehended by a nearby officer. While he admitted shooting the victim, the defendant, with the help of an expert witness, attempted to show that he had shot the victim in order to release himself and his family from a spell the victim had cast over them for a long period of time.

1. Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the jury verdict, we find that a rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty of murder beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).

2. In his first enumeration of error, the defendant contends that the trial court erred in refusing to excuse the first alternate juror for cause. On the opening day of the trial, the jury was selected, including two alternates, and court was recessed. The next morning, the sheriff reported to the court that one of the jurors appeared to be intoxicated. After further investigation, that juror was excused and the first alternate called. OCGA § 15-12-172. He expressed reservations about sitting on the jury both because he had something else to do and "because I feel that--the way that the jury appeared to be selected seems unfair or lopsided and therefore I might be biased against the defense." He, however, unequivocally stated that he could consider the evidence presented and the law as charged by the court and lay aside his opinion of the defense lawyer in determining the outcome of the case. No evidence was produced to show that this juror was incapable of rendering an impartial verdict. It therefore follows that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to excuse him for cause. Welch v. State, 237 Ga. 665, 671, 229 S.E.2d 390 (1976).

The defendant argues, nevertheless, that he was unduly prejudiced here where the jury had already been selected, as he was deprived of the right to exercise a peremptory strike, which would in the ordinary selection process have been available to him where a challenge for cause was refused. Such an argument was not made to the trial court and we are not aware of any binding or persuasive authority for the proposition that unused peremptory strikes should be available under these circumstances after the jury has been selected and sworn. Compare White v. State, 154 Ga.App. 527, 268 S.E.2d 790 (1980). See generally, Anno., 3 ALR2d 499, 513 (Later Case Service). After the jury is...

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5 cases
  • Prince v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • October 20, 2003
    ...incapable of rendering an impartial verdict, the trial court does not abuse its discretion by retaining the juror. McDaniel v. State, 257 Ga. 345(2), 359 S.E.2d 642 (1987). Compare Reynolds v. State, supra, 271 Ga. at 175(2), 517 S.E.2d 51 (trial court did not abuse its discretion when it d......
  • Weems v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • June 2, 1997
    ...by and firing into a crowd which included innocent children. Selman v. State, supra at 200(3), 475 S.E.2d 892; McDaniel v. State, 257 Ga. 345, 347(4), 359 S.E.2d 642 (1987); McDonald v. State, 170 Ga.App. 884, 885(2), 318 S.E.2d 749 (1984). Compare Smith v. State, 247 Ga. 612, 277 S.E.2d 67......
  • Swain v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • April 29, 2002
    ...274 Ga. 196, 199, 552 S.E.2d 818 (2001). 9. See Acliese v. State, 274 Ga. 19, 20, 549 S.E.2d 78 (2001). Moreover, in McDaniel v. State, 257 Ga. 345, 359 S.E.2d 642 (1987), the trial court rejected a challenge for cause to a certain juror that arose after the jury had been selected and sworn......
  • Brown v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • April 6, 1988
    ...the defendant shot the unarmed victim through a window while she had her back to him and was threatening no one. See McDaniel v. State, 257 Ga. 345(4), 359 S.E.2d 642 (1987). 3. The trial court's instruction to the jury, that they shall find the defendant guilty of murder if they found a su......
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