McDevitt v. Sch. Comm. of City of Malden

• Decision Date: 17 September 1937
• Citation: 10 N.E.2d 100,298 Mass. 213
• Parties: McDEVITT v. SCHOOL COMMITTEE OF CITY OF MALDEN.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

298 Mass. 213

10 N.E.2d 100

McDEVITT

v.SCHOOL COMMITTEE OF CITY OF MALDEN.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Sept. 17, 1937.

Report from Supreme Judicial Court, Suffolk County.

Mandamus proceedings by John W. McDevitt against the School Committee of the City of Malden. On report without decision.

Petition dismissed.L. E. Boutwell and M. L. Brown, both of Boston, for Cora M. Hammond and Harold H. Harding.

Maurice R. Flynn, of Malden, for petitioner.

John F. Neal, of Boston, for Roy L. Minich.

Bernard Kaplan, of Malden, for School Committee of Malden.

QUA, Justice.

The petitioner had been elected and had served for three successive school years as a teacher in the public schools of Malden and was therefore serving at discretion under G.L.(Ter.Ed.) c. 71, § 41. On December 17, 1935, the school committee elected the petitioner as ‘Principal of the Lincoln Junior High School and Lincoln Elementary School to begin work on January 10, 1936.’ It was also voted that his salary ‘be fixed at $3,000.00 for the Lincoln Junior High and $300.00 for the Lincoln Elementary School.’ On January 6, 1936, after a city election had brought about a change in the personnel of the board, the new board voted that ‘the Superintendent be instructed not to recognize’ the vote of December 17, ‘inasmuch as it does not conform with section 59, chapter 71 of the General Laws [Ter.Ed.] of Massachusetts and that the position be declared vacant.’ That section provides that superintendents of schools ‘shall recommend to the committee teachers, textbooks, and courses of study.’ The auditor has found that both votes of the committee were taken in good faith. His subsidiary findings are not inconsistent with this conclusion. Sweeney v. School Committee of Revere, 249 Mass. 525, 530, 144 N.E. 377. The petitioner now seeks to compel recognition of himself as principal of the Lincoln Junior High School with the salary for that office voted to him on December 17.

The school committee had ‘general charge of all the public schools.’ G.L.(Ter.Ed.) c. 71, § 37. This section has been construed broadly. Hammond v. Hyde Park, 195 Mass. 29, 30, 80 N.E. 650;Leonard v. School Committee of Springfield, 241 Mass. 325, 135 N.E. 459;Russell v. Gannon, 281 Mass. 398, 183 N.E. 736. The general managerial powers of the committee continued to exist after the election of the petitioner on December 17. Those powers included the power to change by a majority vote the duties of teachers on tenure at discretion and to assign them to new duties, or to continue them in their existing duties, or to return them to duties formerly performed, although such teachers cannot be dismissed from the teaching force without compliance with G.L.(Ter.Ed.) c. 71, § 42. And a principal is merely a teacher who is entrusted with special duties of direction or management. Boody v. School Committee of Barnstable, 276 Mass. 134, 177 N.E. 78. The second vote of the committee on January 6, 1936, did not dismiss the petitioner from the teaching force. It did no more than revoke the vote of December 17, 1935, which in any event by its terms was not to go into practical effect until January 10 and which therefore never became effective at all. The purpose and result of the second vote were merely to continue the petitioner as a teacher in the performance of the same duties which he performed before December 17. It...