McDonald's Corp. v. DeVenney
Decision Date | 11 June 1982 |
Docket Number | K-M |
Citation | 415 So.2d 1075 |
Parties | McDONALD'S CORPORATION and The Industrial Development Board of Elmore County v. Jack DeVENNEY, et al. ARONOV REALTY COMPANY andart v. Jack DeVENNEY, et al. 80-494, 80-495. |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Edward S. Allen and J. Foster Clark of Balch, Bingham, Baker, Hawthorne, Williams & Ward, Birmingham, for McDonald's Corp.
William B. Dunn of Howard, Dunn & Howard, Wetumpka and William M. Slaughter and Mark E. Ezell of North, Haskell, Slaughter, Young & Lewis, Birmingham, for Aronov Realty Co. and K-Mart Corp.
J. Michael Rediker and W. Clark Goodwin of Ritchie & Rediker, Birmingham and Joe A. Macon, Jr. of Stowe & Macon, Wetumpka, Joseph H. Johnson, Jr. and David W. Spurlock of Johnson & Thorington, Birmingham, for appellees.
Appellees, a group of individuals who either are the owners of or have an ownership interest in existing retail businesses in Elmore County, filed a declaratory judgment action against appellants, McDonald's Corporation, Aronov Realty Company, K-Mart Corporation, and the Industrial Development Board of Elmore County, regarding the validity of two proposed bond issues established pursuant to Code 1975, §§ 11-20-30 to -50 (1977 County Board Act). The bond issues were authorized by the Industrial Development Board of Elmore County. The two projects involve retail facilities. One project is a McDonald's Restaurant and the other is a retail shopping center comprised of various retail mercantile stores including a K-Mart Store.
The issue on appeal is the same issue that was before the trial court--whether the two projects are within the definition of "project" under the 1977 County Board Act. The trial court held that the Act does not include as a "project" the "planned expansion of retail facilities."
Appellants submit that the trial court incorrectly limited the scope of the 1977 County Board Act and that the court should not "second-guess" the Industrial Development Board of Elmore County as to whether the projects would have been undertaken regardless of the bond issue. The position of the appellants is that the Legislature intended for retail businesses to make use of the 1977 County Board Act.
Appellees, on the other hand, contend that the Legislature did not intend for the 1977 Act to finance the construction of retail facilities. In addition, appellees submit that the 1977 Act must be interpreted along with the 1949 Cater Act (Code 1975, § 11-54-81(a)), the 1951 Wallace Act (Code 1975, §§ 11-54-20 to -32) and the 1961 County Act (Code 1975, §§ 11-20-1 to -13). The trial court agreed with the appellees and held as follows:
We affirm.
Alabama Code, 1975 § 11-20-30, defines "project" as:
Obviously, subsections a. and c. do not apply; thus, the question before this Court is whether the Legislature intended for retail enterprises such as McDonald's or K-Mart to be considered as "[a]ny commercial enterprise in storing, warehousing, distributing or selling any product of agriculture, mining or industry."
State v. AAA Motors Lines, Inc., 275 Ala. 405, 407-08, 155 So.2d 509 (1963).
Appellants submit that this Court should examine the 1977 County Board Act separate from the other "projects for promotion of industry and trade acts," i.e., the Cater Act, the Wallace Act, and the 1961 County Act. We disagree, because all four acts have a common purpose and the means provided to effectuate this purpose are identical. These sections of the Code are in pari materia; and, as a general rule, such statutes should be construed together to ascertain the meaning and intent of each. Locke v. Wheat, 350 So.2d 451 (Ala.1977); League of Women Voters v. Renfro, 292 Ala. 128, 290 So.2d 167 (1974).
The purpose of the 1977 County Board Act, like that of the Wallace Act, the Cater Act, and the 1961 County Act, is to bring industry and thus jobs to Alabama. This legislative intent is expressed in the respective statutes. In the Cater Act, § 11-54-81, the Legislature stated:
"It is the intent of the legislature by the passage of this article to authorize the incorporation in the several municipalities in this state of industrial development boards to acquire, enlarge, improve, replace, own, lease and dispose of properties to the end that such boards may be able to promote industry, develop trade and further the use of the agricultural products and natural and human resources of this state ... by inducing manufacturing, industrial, commercial and research enterprises: (1) To locate in this state, (2) To enlarge, expand and improve existing operations ...."
In the Wallace Act, § 11-54-21, the Legislature stated:
"It is the intent of the legislature by the passage of this article to authorize municipalities to acquire, own and lease and, in connection with any such acquisition, to enlarge, improve and expand projects for the purpose of promoting industry and trade ... by inducing manufacturing, industrial, commercial and research enterprises to locate in this state or to expand and enlarge existing enterprises ...."
In the 1961 County Act, § 11-20-2, the Legislature stated:
"It is the intent of the legislature ... to authorize counties to acquire, own and lease projects for the purpose of promoting industry and trade by inducing manufacturing, industrial and commercial enterprises to locate in this state or to expand, enlarge or modernize existing enterprises or both ...."
In the 1977 County Board Act, § 11-20-31, the Legislature stated:
"It is the intent of the legislature ... to authorize the incorporation in the several counties in this state of public corporations to acquire, enlarge, improve, replace, own, lease and dispose of properties to the end that such corporations may be able to promote industry, develop trade and further the use of the agricultural products and natural and human resources of this state ...."
All of these acts express a similar intent and purpose, that is, to give a municipality...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
McNair v. State
...So.2d 326, 328 (1962), these sections "should be construed together to ascertain the meaning and intent of each." McDonald's Corp. v. DeVenney, 415 So.2d 1075, 1078 (Ala.1982). "When ascertaining legislative intent, statutes which are in pari materia ... must be interpreted as a whole in li......
-
Tuscumbia City Sch. Sys. v. Pharmacia Corp.
...], the court nonetheless will review the legislative material cited to it, to determine the legislative intent. McDonald's Corporation v. DeVenney, 415 So.2d 1075 (Ala.1982). There is no question about the fact that, at the time of enacting the asbestos exposure statute, the legislature was......
-
Stephenson v. Lawrence County Bd. of Educ.
...should be applied together in order to accomplish the manifest intent of the Legislature's exercise of power. See McDonald's Corp. v. DeVenney, 415 So.2d 1075, 1078 (Ala.1982); see also Locke v. Wheat, 350 So.2d 451 (Ala.1977); League of Women Voters v. Renfro, 292 Ala. 128, 290 So.2d 167 (......
-
First Alabama Bank of Dothan v. Renfro
...6-10-3, 6-10-121, and 6-10-122, we must look to the intent of the legislature at the time § 6-10-2 was enacted. McDonald's Corporation v. De Venney, 415 So.2d 1075 (Ala.1982). It is also appropriate to look to the purposes and objects of the legislation and any evil sought to be remedied or......