Tuscumbia City Sch. Sys. v. Pharmacia Corp.

• Decision Date: 27 June 2012
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. CV–12–S–332–NW.
• Parties: TUSCUMBIA CITY SCHOOL SYSTEM, on behalf of itself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. PHARMACIA CORPORATION, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama

871 F.Supp.2d 1241

TUSCUMBIA CITY SCHOOL SYSTEM, on behalf of itself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff,

v.PHARMACIA CORPORATION, Defendant.

Civil Action No. CV–12–S–332–NW.

United States District Court,

N.D. Alabama,

Northwestern Division.

June 27, 2012.

Andrew S. Herring, Courtney L. Peinhardt, D. Frank Davis, John E. Norris, Wesley W. Barnett, Davis & Norris LLP, Birmingham, AL, for Plaintiff.

Augusta S. Dowd, J. Mark White, Linda G. Flippo, White Arnold & Dowd PC, Matthew H. Lembke, Michael R. Pennington, Bradley Arant Boult Cummings LLP, Birmingham, AL, Thomas M. Goutman, White & Williams LLP, Philadelphia, PA, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

LYNWOOD SMITH, District Judge.

The plaintiff in this action is the public school system of the City of Tuscumbia, Alabama. It commenced this diversity jurisdiction case as a putative class action against defendant, Pharmacia Corporation, alleging one count of negligence and one count of wantonness or recklessness in the design, manufacture, and marketing of electric ballasts for fluorescent light fixtures containing “the now-banned toxic chemicals known as Polychlorinated Biphenyls (‘PCBs'),” and with knowledge that: PCBs were toxic; that failing ballasts release PCBs into classrooms like those maintained by the plaintiff; and, that “PCBs could cause systemic toxic injuries” to humans.¹ Defendant moved to dismiss the action for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.² Following consideration of the pleadings, motion, briefs, and research the motion will be denied.

I. STANDARDS FOR REVIEWING RULE 12(b)(6) MOTIONS TO DISMISS

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits a party to move to dismiss a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” That rule must be read in conjunction with Rule 8(a), which requires that a pleading contain only a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). While that pleading standard does not require “detailed factual allegations,” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 550, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007), it does demand “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (citations omitted).

A pleading that offers “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” [Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955]. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders “naked assertion [s]” devoid of “further factual enhancement.” Id., at 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955.

To survive a motion to dismiss founded upon Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), [for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted], a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Id., at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955. A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id., at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955. The plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability requirement,” but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Ibid. Where a complaint pleads facts that are “merely consistent with” a defendant's liability, it “stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’ ” Id., at 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (brackets omitted).

Two working principles underlie our decision in Twombly. First, the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice. Id., at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (Although for the purposes of a motion to dismiss we must take all of the factual allegations in the complaint as true, we “are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions. Second, only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss. Id., at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955. Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will, as the Court of Appeals observed, be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense. [ Iqbal v. Hasty], 490 F.3d [143] at 157–158 [ (2d Cir.2007) ]. But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not “show [n]”—“that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8(a)(2).

In keeping with these principles a court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusionscan provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (emphasis added).

When ruling upon a motion to dismiss, the court must assume that all well-pleaded facts alleged in the plaintiff's complaint are true. See Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 451, 453, 126 S.Ct. 1991, 164 L.Ed.2d 720 (2006) (stating that on a motion to dismiss, the court must “accept as true the factual allegations in the amended complaint”); Marsh v. Butler County, 268 F.3d 1014, 1023 (11th Cir.2001) ( en banc ) (setting forth the facts in the case by “[a]ccepting all well-pleaded factual allegations (with reasonable inferences drawn favorably to Plaintiffs) in the complaint as true”). Accordingly, the statements contained in the following part of this opinion as the “facts” for Rule 12(b)(6) purposes may, or may not, be the actual facts. See, e.g., Williams v. Mohawk Industries, Inc., 465 F.3d 1277, 1281 n. 1 (11th Cir.2006).

II. BACKGROUND FACTS

The Tuscumbia City School System is a public school district in Colbert County, Alabama.³ Defendant, Pharmacia Corporation, is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in New Jersey. It is a wholly owned subsidiary of Pfizer, Inc. It also is the successor in interest of Monsanto Company,⁴ which manufactured PCBs from 1929 until 1979. ⁵ Monsanto was the sole U.S. manufacturer of PCBs, which “do not occur in nature,” ⁶ and the chemicals were not imported in any significant amounts.⁷

PCBs are hazardous chemicals, so much so that Congress specifically outlawed their manufacture in the Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976.⁸ Exposure to PCBs can occur in many forms. Skin contact, inhalation of vapors emitted by heated PCBs, and ingestion of the chemicals are all hazardous. ⁹ The chemicals are a known carcinogen, and are deleterious to a person's immune, reproductive, nervous, and endocrine systems.¹⁰ They also can reduce cognitive abilities.¹¹ For example, children exposed to PCBs may exhibit reduced IQs and altered behaviors.¹²

Prior to the Congressional Act banning the production of PCBs, the chemicals were used, among other purposes, in the assembly of “ballasts” for fluorescent light fixtures.¹³ A “ballast” is the device that controls the amount of electricity flowing into the fluorescent tube.¹⁴ “Essentially all ballasts manufactured for fluorescent light fixtures before 1979 contain liquid PCBs.” ¹⁵ The danger to humans and the environment lies coiled in the fact that ballasts containing PCBs are known to leak, fail, and overheat.¹⁶ Indeed, all ballasts eventually fail.¹⁷ The devices are especially prone to overheating when they fail,¹⁸ When a ballast containing PCBs fails, it releases the chemicals into the atmosphere and environment.¹⁹

As early as 1937, studies showed the toxicity of PCBs.²⁰ Despite Monsanto's awareness of the dangers inherent in exposure to PCBs, the company did not inform the public of the health risks associated with exposure to devices containing the chemicals. In fact, the company sought to hide the dangers from the public.²¹ Monsanto's attempt to cover up the danger of PCBs lasted from the 1930s through the 1970s.²² Monsanto sold PCBs to manufacturers of fluorescent light fixtures, despite its knowledge that PCBs were stable chemicals that would linger in the environment for years after being released via ballast failures.²³

Prior to the 1979 Congressional ban on manufacturing PCBs, the chemicals were used in all ballasts installed in fluorescent light fixtures, including those placed in school buildings.²⁴ The Tuscumbia City School System owns and operates schools that contain pre–1979 fluorescent light fixtures operated by ballasts containing PCBs.²⁵ The release of PCBs from failing ballasts has made the school buildings unsafe, exposing students, faculty, administrators, and adjunct staff to potential harm.²⁶ The release of PCBs constitutes manifest property damage, similar to the property damage caused by the escape of asbestos fibers into a school's environment.²⁷

A. Procedural Facts

The School System's initial complaint was filed on January 31, 2012. ²⁸ Defendant responded with a motion to dismiss, together with an unopposed motion to stay discovery pending the court's ruling on the motion to dismiss.²⁹ Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on April 20, 2012. ³⁰ Defendant filed the motion to dismiss that is addressed in this opinion on April 27, 2012.³¹

III. DISCUSSION

Defendant argues that, under Alabama law, it is not liable to the...