McDonald v. City of Jacksonville
| Decision Date | 20 December 2019 |
| Docket Number | No. 1D19-573,1D19-573 |
| Citation | 286 So.3d 792 |
| Parties | Eugene MCDONALD, Appellant, v. CITY OF JACKSONVILLE, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Amie E. DeGuzman and John J. Rahaim II, of Law Office of John J. Rahaim, II, P.A., Jacksonville, for Appellant.
Michael Arington of Eraclides, Gelman, Hall Indek, Goodman, Waters & Traverso, Jacksonville, for Appellee.
In this workers' compensation case, Claimant, Eugene McDonald, appeals an order of the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) denying compensability of his coronary artery disease (CAD) pursuant to the presumption of occupational causation created by section 112.18, Florida Statutes. As explained below, because the JCC put the burden of proof regarding the "trigger" on the wrong party, we reverse.
Claimant, a law enforcement officer with the Jacksonville Sheriff's Office, was on duty on Thanksgiving Day, 2016. While on duty, he attended a voluntary brunch held at his unit's substation, then resumed his patrol duties. He testified that shortly after the brunch, and again at work on Friday, he experienced what he thought was indigestion. On Saturday, Claimant was off duty, but his pain worsened, so his wife took him to the hospital. Doctors at the hospital diagnosed a heart attack
(myocardial infarction ), and hospitalized him for five days. The medical evidence established that Claimant had CAD, which ultimately led to a plaque rupture, and his subsequent myocardial infarction.
Later, Claimant filed a petition for benefits seeking compensability of his CAD as the industrial injury. The Employer/Carrier (E/C) expressly denied compensability of the CAD.
In the ensuing litigation, Claimant produced an opinion from his independent medical examiner, Dr. Mathias, that the cause of his CAD could not be determined. The E/C, in turn, relied on the opinion of the authorized treating provider, Dr. Dietzius, that the cause of the CAD was a combination of non-occupational factors.
The JCC appointed an expert medical advisor, Dr. Borzak, who opined that "the cause of the event was the presence of hypercholesterolemia, hypertension
, diabetes and age" and that those non-occupational risk factors "were sufficiently strong in this case to reach the standard of more likely than not resulting in his coronary event." Dr. Borzak added that "[w]hile the onset of symptoms was on the job, there is no clear or identifiable triggering factor."
In his final order, the JCC found that Claimant met his burden to prove the statutory criteria entitling him to the presumption of compensability of his CAD, because he proved that he was a member of a protected class, that his "coronary artery disease
resulting in a myocardial infarction" qualifies as "heart disease" that could be covered by the presumption, that his pre-employment physical showed no evidence of heart disease, and that he sustained disability based on his hospitalization following the heart attack caused by his CAD. Thus, the JCC explained, because Claimant relied solely on the presumption to establish compensability, the E/C's burden—to rebut and attempt to overcome the presumption—was to present at least competent, substantial evidence that Claimant's CAD resulted from nonoccupational causes.
Once the JCC ascertained that Dr. Borzak had opined that Claimant's CAD resulted from wholly non-occupational causes, the JCC embarked on an analysis of whether there was a "trigger" causing Claimant's heart attack and, if so, whether that trigger was occupational or non-occupational; as authority, the JCC cited City of Jacksonville v. Ratliff , 217 So. 3d 183 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017). For the reasons explained below, the JCC erred by placing this trigger burden on Claimant.
For proof of occupational causation Claimant relies solely on section 112.18's statutory presumption that "[a]ny condition or impairment of health of any ... law enforcement officer ... caused by tuberculosis
, heart disease, or hypertension ... shall be presumed to have been accidental and to have been suffered in the line of duty unless the contrary be shown by competent evidence." Claimants seeking to avail themselves of this statutory presumption of occupational causation must meet certain prerequisites.
The E/C concede that Claimant satisfied all the statutory prerequisites for entitlement to the presumption that his CAD was work-related. This necessarily includes the fact that the cause of Claimant's disability due to his heart attack was his CAD, which is what Dr. Borzak opined and the JCC found.1 At that point, the issue was whether the E/C could overcome, with the requisite competent evidence, the presumption that the CAD was occupational.
Where the JCC erred was by overlooking the fact that by proving the prerequisites—including a disabling heart attack caused by CAD—Claimant had established entitlement to travel on the presumption, and by requiring Claimant to establish a work-related cause of the purported "trigger" of his heart attack rather than keeping the burden on the E/C to overcome the presumption of compensability of the CAD.
, heart disease or hypertension had a non-industrial cause." Unless the...
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