McDonald v. Davis Cnty.
| Decision Date | 13 July 2021 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 1:20-cv-00136-JNP-DAO |
| Parties | SARAI McDONALD, Plaintiff, v. DAVIS COUNTY, DAVIS COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE, DAVIS COUNTY DETENTION CENTER, JOHN DOES I-XX, and DOE ENTITIES I-XX, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Utah |
Before the court is a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (the "Motion") filed on behalf of Defendants Davis County, Davis County Sheriff's Office ("DCSO"), and Davis County Detention Center ("DCDC") (collectively, "Defendants").1 ECF No. 12. The court entertained oral argument on the pending Motion on July 8, 2021. Having reviewed the memoranda2 andconsidered the oral argument, the court grants Defendants' Motion and grants Plaintiff Sarai McDonald ("Plaintiff") leave to amend her Complaint.
Plaintiff brought this cause of action in Utah state court on April 20, 2020. ECF No. 2-1. In her Complaint, Plaintiff asserted several causes of action against Defendants: assault, battery, violation of civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, violation of civil rights under article I, section 9 of the Utah constitution, and malice. Id. Defendants accepted service of Plaintiff's Complaint on September 21, 2020 and timely removed to this court based on federal question jurisdiction on October 21, 2020. ECF No. 2.
Plaintiff's cause of action arises from her incarceration at DCDC, a division or law enforcement agency of Davis County, beginning in June 2018. While incarcerated at DCDC, Plaintiff was "subjected to systematic physical and emotional abuse." ECF No. 2-1 ¶ 8. This abuse was at the hands of DCSO employees and other inmates known as "POD Guards," who performed duties on behalf of DCDC and DCSO.
As part of the "systematic" and "consistent" (ECF No. 2-1 ¶ 15) abuse Plaintiff suffered, she was routinely, and for periods longer than law or regulations permit, kept in solitary confinement. She was confined to her cell for days and sometimes weeks at a time. DCDC employees and POD Guards also routinely denied her food, causing Plaintiff to lose a substantial amount of weight. Plaintiff did not regain weight until she was transferred to the Utah State Hospital at the end of 2018 for a mental competency evaluation.
In addition to the foregoing abuse, on the evening of October 22, 2018, three officers entered Plaintiff's cell and physically harmed her. Approximately five minutes prior to their entry, Plaintiff had been given a hot dinner tray by a deputy and POD Guards. Upon entering Plaintiff's cell, the officers—one of whom was Corporal Meldrum—forcibly took Plaintiff's food tray away from her. Corporal Meldrum then punched Plaintiff in the head, struck Plaintiff with two flat hands, and pushed her down onto her metal bunk, which did not have a mattress on it. Corporal Meldrum and the other two officers then exited Plaintiff's cell with her food tray. Plaintiff did not receive medical attention for the injuries she sustained during the encounter until several hours later. The next morning, Plaintiff was badly bruised around her mouth and chin because of the encounter the prior evening. On May 21, 2019, Plaintiff requested that Davis County, DCSO, and DCDC conduct an internal investigation of Corporal Meldrum, the other DCSO employees, and the POD Guards. Plaintiff has not received any information related to the investigation and believes that no such investigation has occurred. Defendants move for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), arguing that Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) permits a party, "[a]fter the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay trial," to "move for judgment on the pleadings." FED. R. CIV. P. 12(c). Rule 12(c) motions for judgment on the pleadings are evaluated under the same standard applicable to Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss. Mock v. T.G. & Y. Stores Co., 971 F.2d 522, 528 (10th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted). Dismissal of a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is appropriate when the plaintiff fails to "state a claim upon which relief can be granted." FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). When considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a court "accept[s] as true all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint and view[s] them in the lightmost favorable to the plaintiff." Burnett v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 706 F.3d 1231, 1235 (10th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation omitted). The complaint must allege more than labels or legal conclusions and its factual allegations "must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
In their Motion, Defendants advance several arguments in favor of dismissal. First, Defendants argue that Plaintiff's claims against DCSO and DCDC should fail because DCSO and DCDC are non-jural entities that cannot be sued. Second, Defendants argue that they are immune from Plaintiff's assault and battery claims under the Governmental Immunity Act of Utah ("GIAU"). Third, Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to state a municipal liability claim under § 1983. Fourth, Defendants argue that Plaintiff's claim under the Utah constitution has not been sufficiently pleaded. Finally, Defendants argue that Plaintiff's malice claim should fail because malice is not an independent cause of action under Utah law. The court considers each argument in turn.
Defendants argue that Plaintiff's claims against DCSO and DCDC should be dismissed because DCSO and DCDC are subordinate agencies to Davis County and are therefore non-jural entities that cannot be sued. Defendants cite two unpublished cases from the District of Utah in support of their position. In response, Plaintiff concedes that DCSO and DCDC are non-jural entities. However, Plaintiff argues that, as provided in her Complaint (ECF No. 2-1 ¶ 5), she should be permitted to maintain her causes of action against DCSO and DCDC until she completesdiscovery, learns the contact information of the officers and officials involved in her allegations, and amends her Complaint to name the correct individuals.
A non-jural entity is an entity that is "incapable of suing or being sued in its own name." Melendres v. Arpaio, 784 F.3d 1254, 1260 (9th Cir. 2015). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17 states that the capacity of a party who is not an individual or a corporation, such as a governmental entity, to sue or be sued is determined "by the law of the state where the court is located." See FED. R. CIV. P. 17(b)(3). Although there is a Utah statute that expressly provides that a county may sue and be sued, UTAH CODE § 17-50-302(2)(a)(i), "there is no statutory or case authority supporting a direct action against a county's subdivisions, including its jails." White v. Utah, 5 F. App'x 852, 853 (10th Cir. 2001) (unpublished).
The Tenth Circuit has affirmed the dismissal of a city's police department because the police department "[was] not a separate suable entity" in a case asserting causes of action under § 1983, various federal and state constitutional sections, and common law. Martinez v. Winner, 771 F.2d 424, 444 (10th Cir. 1985); see also Melendres, 784 F.3d at 1260 (). The Eleventh Circuit has agreed, finding that "[s]heriff's departments and police departments are not usually considered legal entities subject to suit." Dean v. Barber, 951 F.2d 1210, 1214 (11th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted). Several unpublished cases from the District of Utah have found the same. E.g., Harker v. Simpson, No. 1:08-cv-00035, 2010 WL 1257745, at *7 (D. Utah Mar. 26, 2010) (unpublished) ; Tyler v. Utah, No. 2:07-CV-4, 2008 WL 5390993, at *3 (D. Utah Dec. 23, 2008) (unpublished) .
"Because claims against governmental subunits are paid from the city or county treasury, typically, the city, county or board of county commissioners is the proper party in interest under Rule 17(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure rather than the subunit." Harker, 2010 WL 1257745, at *7 (citation omitted); see also Martinez, 771 F.2d at 444 (). Accordingly, "[i]n the absence of any case law establishing that [DCSO and DCDC] are separate suable entities," the claims against them should be dismissed. See Cheek v. Garrett, No. 2:10-CV-508, 2011 WL 1085785, at *2 (D. Utah Mar. 21, 2011) (unpublished).
Based upon the foregoing and Plaintiff's concession that DCSO and DCDC are non-jural entities, the court finds that DCSO and DCDC are not separate suable entities. The court accordingly dismisses all causes of action against DCSO and DCDC and considers the remainder of Defendants' arguments for dismissal only as applied to Davis County. Additionally, at oral argument, counsel for both parties confirmed that information has been...
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