McDonald v. Mutual Life Ins. Co.
| Citation | 160 N.W. 289,178 Iowa 863 |
| Decision Date | 15 December 1916 |
| Docket Number | 30080 |
| Parties | A. W. MCDONALD, Administrator, Appellant, v. MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Iowa |
Appeal from Delaware District Court.--FRANKLIN C. PLATT, Judge.
MYRTLE L. IRISH, now deceased, obtained a policy of insurance on her life from the defendant insurance company. Upon her decease the appellant, McDonald, claiming to act as administrator of the estate of the said Myrtle Irish, recovered a judgment upon said policy. Thereafter, a new trial was granted the defendant. This appeal is from that order.
Affirmed.
J. J Locher and John S. Welch, for appellant.
Deacon Good, Sargent & Spangler, for appellee.
The motion for a new trial has 14 grounds. Among them is that the court erred in striking out certain testimony given by the parents, on an inquiry before a grand jury into whether the said Myrtle died because of a criminal operation, on the ground that the parents were not the real parties in interest.
One defense was that the parents of the said Myrtle are her sole heirs; that these heirs aided in procuring the performance of a criminal operation upon their daughter, and were therefore incompetent and incapacitated, under the law, to take or receive, by inheritance or otherwise, any portion of the estate of the daughter. It may be safely stated, as a general proposition, that, if the court erred in striking out this testimony, it did not err in granting a new trial because it had stricken it out. It seems clear that the exclusion of said testimony was an error. If, by the aid of her parents, the policy holder brought about her own death through a criminal operation, defendant is not liable. Wells v. New England Mut. Life Ins. Co., 191 Pa. 207, 43 A. 126; Hatch v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 120 Mass. 550; Burt v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 187 U.S. 362, 47 L.Ed. 216, 23 S.Ct. 139; Ritter v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 169 U.S. 139, 42 L.Ed. 693, 18 S.Ct. 300; Lundholm v. Mystic Workers, 164 Ill.App. 472.
Testimony given before the grand jury, on investigating the cause of the daughter's death, is admissible to bind the witnesses who gave it. See Steele Smith Groc. Co. v. Potthast, 109 Iowa 413, 417, 80 N.W. 517; Ford v. Dilley, 174 Iowa 243, 156 N.W. 513. The parents gave testimony before the grand jury, tending to prove that the daughter had come to her death by the means aforesaid. This testimony, as seen, is binding upon the parents. If it was also binding upon plaintiff's administrator, it was error to strike same out, and error which not only justifies, but would ordinarily require, the granting of a new trial. The avails of the policy sued on are not subject to the claims of creditors. The parents are the sole heirs, the real parties in interest, the estate--wherefore, the administrator who sues is purely a nominal party. See In re Bagnola, 178 Iowa 757, 154 N.W. 461, and Christie v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 104 Iowa 707, 74 N.W. 697. It follows that, unless there be some competent avoidance, the trial court was right in awarding a new trial because it had excluded the said testimony before the grand jury.
As such avoidance it is urged upon us that the ground of the motion attacking said exclusion was overruled, wherefore, we may not sustain the order made because of the exclusion. This argument is based upon the fact that, on making the order granting a new trial, the court said:
"When I decided the case, I was under the impression that the evidence was of such nature that no pleading need be made by the plaintiff alleging a waiver of notice of proof of loss, but, upon having examined the case thoroughly, I am satisfied that such pleading was necessary, and the objection made by the defendant to the evidence regarding the proof of loss should have been sustained."
The real reliance of appellant seems to be upon the fact that, in continuing this statement, the trial judge said: "For that reason the motion for a new trial is sustained,"--which is claimed to be a statement that sustaining the motion rests wholly upon this reason, which is assigned in terms, and that, therefore, all the other grounds of the motion are overruled. This is followed out by the claim that, if we must find the assigned reason to be an untenable reason, we must reverse the order granting a new trial, which is all logical, if the premise be sound.
The motion did present the ground upon which the court ruled, in terms. It is, of course, true that this particular ground was sustained, and true that the court does say that the motion "is sustained for that reason." It is, however, not said, in terms at least, that other grounds of the motion do not affect the court, nor that all others are overruled. It is true, also, that, if there was no error in taking testimony surrounding the proofs of loss, the trial court gave a wrong reason for sustaining the motion. But ought we to interfere with an act which merely gives the second opportunity to be heard, in which appellant may be successful,...
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McDonald v. Mut. Life Ins. Co.
...178 Iowa 863160 N.W. 289MCDONALDv.MUTUAL LIFE INS. CO.No. 30080.Supreme Court of Iowa.Dec. 15, 1916. Appeal from District Court, Delaware County; Franklin C. Platt, Judge. Myrtle L. Irish, now deceased, obtained a policy of insurance on her life from the defendant insurance company. Upon her decease, the ......