McDonald v. Stevenson
Decision Date | 12 November 1922 |
Docket Number | (No. 818.)<SMALL><SUP>*</SUP></SMALL> |
Parties | McDONALD et al. v. STEVENSON et ux. |
Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Appeal from District Court, Harris County; Chas. E. Ashe, Judge.
Suit by Marie McDonald and others against J. R. Stevenson and wife. From a judgment for defendants, plaintiffs appeal. Affirmed.
W. J. Howard, of Houston, for appellants.
Campbell, Myer & Freeman, of Houston, for appellees.
O'QUINN, J.
Appellants sued appellees for partition of lots 7 and 8 in block 19, and lot 5 in block 76, in the Noble addition to the city of Houston, Tex., and lot 5 in block 25 in the Chapman Second addition to the city of Houston, alleging that they were the owners of a one-half interest in said property, and that appellees were the owners of the other half.
Appellees answered by general denial, plea of not guilty, and specially pleaded the three and five years' statutes of limitation. They also pleaded improvements in good faith. By cross-action, appellees, in the form of trespass to try title, sued for the entire premises.
Appellants, by supplemental petition, answered by plea of not guilty, and that they had all the while been tenants in common with appellees.
The case was tried before the court without a jury, resulting in a judgment in favor of appellees for all the premises, from which appellants appeal.
The court filed the following findings of fact:
It is agreed by the parties that the only question in the case is whether the property in question was, at the time of the death of James McDonald, his separate property, or whether, notwithstanding the transaction with and through Burgheim, it remained the community property of said McDonald and wife. If it was his separate property, the appellants are the owners of one-half of it, and the judgment of the court below is wrong. If, on the other hand, it was community property, the appellees are the owners of all of it, and the judgment below is right.
The steady and unbroken policy of the law of Texas has been to classify property according to the facts surrounding its acquisition, thus determining the interest...
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