McDonald v. Stewart

• Decision Date: 18 December 1970
• Docket Number: No. 42465,42465
• Citation: 289 Minn. 35,182 N.W.2d 437
• Parties: Francis C. McDONALD, Appellant, v. Jean STEWART, et al., Defendants, William E. Crowder, Respondent.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Page 437

182 N.W.2d 437

289 Minn. 35

Francis C. McDONALD, Appellant, v. Jean STEWART, et al., Defendants William E. Crowder, Respondent.

No. 42465.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Dec. 18, 1970.

Syllabus by the Court

1--2. Where defendant attorney, acting without unprofessional animus in the performance of professional services for his client, counsels or induces a conveyance of the client's property to another, notwithstanding knowledge of the client's prior contract to convey to plaintiff, defendant attorney is not liable to plaintiff in tort for interference with such contractual relationship.

W. L. Sholes, Minneapolis, for appellant.

William E. Crowder, pro se.

Heard before KNUTSON, C.J., and NELSON, MURPHY, PETERSON, and ROSENGREN, JJ.

OPINION

PETERSON, Justice.

Plaintiff, Francis E. McDonald, appeals from a summary judgment dismissing his claim against defendant, William E. Crowder, an attorney, for tortious interference with a contractual relationship between plaintiff and defendant's client, Shirley Marie Twigg.

Miss Twigg, who inherited her father's homestead, entered into a written purchase agreement on April 29, 1966, for the sale of that property to plaintiff for a price of $10,000. She was represented in that transaction by Horace Van Valkenburg, who was the attorney in the probate proceedings. On or about May 23, 1966, however, she repudiated the agreement. Van Valkenburg thereupon notified the real estate broker of that fact and terminated his professional relationship with Miss Twigg. On July 8, 1966, plaintiff filed a summons and complaint against Miss Twigg in Hennepin County District Court asking specific performance of the purchase agreement and damages for breach, contemporaneously filing a notice of lis pendens with the register of deeds. Service of process, however, was not completed within 6 months thereafter, which, by terms of the purchase agreement, apparently deprived him of the right to enforce the contract by specific performance.

Meanwhile, on July 19, 1966, Miss Twigg executed a warranty deed conveying subject property to one Jean Stewart, which deed was duly recorded. And, contemporaneous therewith, Mrs. Stewart and her husband executed an unrecorded collateral agreement providing for reconveyance of title by them to Miss Twigg upon being reimbursed for funds advanced and to be advanced by them to her, and providing, further, that, after the passage of a 'reasonable time,' Mrs. Stewart could, at her option, retain the property upon payment to Miss Twigg of the difference between $10,000 and the unpaid advancements.

The litigation arises out of the particular circumstances in which the transaction occurred, as disclosed by the pleadings and various affidavits and depositions incident to defendants' motion for summary judgment. It is undisputed that Miss Twigg and the Stewarts were longtime friends and neighbors and that defendant Crowder had from time to time performed professional services for both the Stewarts and Miss Twigg's deceased father. It is undisputed that the Stewarts and Crowder were aware of the lis pendens that had been filed by plaintiff. It is undisputed that the property was subject to a mortgage balance of $3,700 and that the revenue stamps upon the deed from Miss Twigg to the Stewarts reflected a consideration of $7,500. It is undisputed that Miss Twigg was a person of limited capacity, who experienced difficulty in maintaining remunerative employment and in managing her affairs, with the result that she was in serious financial straits. Her taxes were unpaid, her mortgage was delinquent, and she had other substantial bills outstanding. Mrs. Stewart, according to her uncontroverted statement in a discovery deposition, had advanced for Miss Twigg the aggregate sum of $5,093.21 to pay these obligations, together with a fee in undisclosed amount for defendant Crowder's professional services in the transaction.

Plaintiff, with the unarticulated implication that the deed and reconveyance agreement with the Stewarts was disadvantageous to Miss Twigg, generally alleges that she executed those documents because of the misrepresentations and threats of defendant Crowder and the Stewarts, allegations they vigorously deny. The only threat specifically alleged is that 'if she did not sign the two papers a guardian would be appointed for her and she would be put in a rest home.' The specific misrepresentation alleged is that defendant Crowder 'told her she should sign for her own protection.' Miss Twigg, in an affidavit apparently prepared by plaintiff's attorney, subsequently stated that defendant Crowder and the Stewarts told her that she 'should not go through with the sale to (plaintiff).'

Plaintiff commenced an action against...