McDowell v. Alvarez
| Decision Date | 15 August 2012 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 09 C 8033 |
| Parties | PHILIP McDOWELL (B-46854), Plaintiff, v. ANITA ALVAREZ, et al. Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff, Philip McDowell, an inmate currently incarcerated at Danville Correctional Center, filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit against Cook County, Cook County State's Attorney Anita Alvarez, and the Village of Alsip. Plaintiff seeks access to DNA and fingerprint evidence gathered in the investigation of the murder of Joseph Pankey. Plaintiff pleaded guilty to the murder in 1993. In 2006 and 2008, he filed state post-conviction motions in the Circuit Court of Cook County seeking access to the evidence. After the state trial court denied Plaintiff's 2008 motion, Plaintiff brought this action. On September 8, 2010, Judge Ronald Guzman denied motions to dismiss filed by Defendants Alvarez and the Village of Alsip and stayed this case because Plaintiff's state post-conviction proceeding was still pending in state court. (Doc. #72.) On July 1, 2011, Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed his state post-conviction petition, and on September 28, 2011, Judge Guzman granted Plaintiff's request to lift the stay. (Doc. #92.) The case was transferred from Judge Guzman to the undersigned judge effective June 5, 2012.
Defendants, the State's Attorney and the Village of Alsip, have each again filed a motion to dismiss.1 As in their prior motions to dismiss, the Defendants contend that Plaintiff is barred from raising his claims in this court under either the Rooker-Feldman doctrine or res judicata. Defendant Alvarez additionally contends that Plaintiff's failure to avail himself of state court remedies before filing this suit prohibits him from proceeding with the current case, and also that denying post-conviction access to DNA evidence to individuals who have pleaded guilty does not violate the Constitution. The Village of Alsip separately maintains that Plaintiff has failed to allege a violation of municipal policy sufficient to state a claim under § 1983 against the Village, which is alleged to have done nothing more than turn the DNA evidence collected over to Cook County. Plaintiff has responded to both motions to dismiss. For the following reasons, the Court grants Defendants' motions.
In 1992, Plaintiff McDowell pleaded guilty to the 1989 murder of Joseph Freeman-Pankey (a plea he unsuccessfully attempted to withdraw later on). Pankey was stabbed to death in his hotel room in Alsip, Illinois, and his Buick Regal was stolen. Plaintiff, who had traveled to the Chicago area with Pankey, was sentenced to 60 years of imprisonment. Eight years later, in December 2000, Plaintiff filed in state court a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which the Circuit Court denied. The denial was affirmed on appeal, but the Illinois Supreme Court remanded the case to the Circuit Court in 2002, directing that the habeas petition be treated as a petition for post-conviction review, see 725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq, and ordering an evidentiary hearing on Plaintiff's claim of actual innocence.3
In the course of the post-conviction proceedings, Plaintiff filed two requests for access to the fingerprint and DNA evidence from his criminal case. First, in 2006, he filed a petition under 725 ILCS 5/116-3 seeking access to the evidence. . Section 116-3 allows Illinois prisoners post-conviction access to DNA and other designated forms of forensic evidence for testing that was not available at the time of their conviction. To obtain such access, the movant must (among other requirements) make a prima facie showing that "identity was the issue in the trial which resulted in his or her conviction." 725 ILCS 5/116-3(b)(l). In People v. O'Connell, 879 N.E.2d 315, 319 (Ill. 2007). the Illinois Supreme Court held that Id.
It does not appear that the state trial court ruled on Petitioner's § 116-3 petition in 2006. The state court documents in the record before this Court contain no such ruling. Also, the transcript of the state court hearing on Plaintiff's second request indicates that he withdrew his original petition pursuant to § 116-3, believing that it would be denied under O'Connell, and replaced it with an "Amended Motion for Post-Conviction Discovery" (hereafter, "discovery motion") in February 2008. (Cmplt. Ex. C, Transcript of 2/27/09 Hearing at 7.) The discovery motion sought access to precisely the same forensic evidence that Plaintiff had originally sought by means of the § 116-3 petition. (Cmplt. Ex. B.) The discovery motion recounted that, in 2007, Plaintiff's attorney in his criminal case was granted limited access to a box of evidence that contained fingerprint and DNA evidence collected during the murder investigation and that the evidence was still intact. (Id.) Plaintiff also stated that he was filing his request as a discovery motion because he knew that the access to evidence allowed under § 116-3 did not apply to persons who pleaded guilty. (Cmplt Ex. B at 2; Ex. C at 7.)
At a hearing on February 27, 2009, the Cook County Circuit Court granted the State's "Motion to Dismiss Petition for Post-Conviction DNA Testing" and granted the State's "motionto deny DNA." (Cmplt. Ex. C, Transcript of 2/27/09 Hearing.) The state trial court held that, because Plaintiff pled guilty, he could not seek access to DNA evidence under § 116-3, and that he could not seek the same relief through a discovery motion in his post-conviction proceeding. (Id. at 9-10.) The state court explained that Plaintiff's post-conviction discovery motion (Id. at 9-10.)
Following the state court's ruling, Plaintiff brought this § 1983 suit in December 2009, alleging that the denial of access to the DNA evidence to establish his actual innocence violates his constitutional rights of procedural and substantive due process and equal protection. He seeks injunctive relief granting him the same access to evidence that the state court denied.
In July 2010, Defendants filed motions to dismiss, arguing that Plaintiff's § 1983 action is barred by the doctrines of Rooker-Feldman and res judicata or, alternatively, that Plaintiff's claim was not yet ripe because his post-conviction petition was still pending in state court. (R. 29 and 33, Motions to Dismiss.) On September 8, 2010, noting that Plaintiff's post-conviction petition was still proceeding in state court, the District Judge previously assigned to this case stayed proceedings in this Court while Plaintiff pursued his actual innocence claim in his state post-conviction proceeding. Doc. # 72 (Sept. 8, 2010).
Plaintiff's state post-conviction petition was scheduled for a hearing on July 15, 2011, but on July 1, 2011, Petitioner requested and was granted leave to voluntarily dismiss his state petition. (Doc. ## 84 and 86, Status Reports of Plaintiff and the State's Attorney.) Plaintiff then asked this Court to lift the stay in this case and, because no post-conviction proceeding was then pending in state court, this Court granted Plaintiff's request. Minute Order, Doc. # 92 (Sep. 28,2011.) Defendants Alvarez and the Village of Alsip then moved to dismiss again. Doc. ## 97, 105. Plaintiff responded to both motions.
In their motions to dismiss, Defendants argue that Plaintiff is barred from raising his access-to-evidence claim in this Court based upon the doctrines of Rooker-Feldman and res judicata. Defendant State's Attorney Alvarez further contends that Plaintiff cannot establish a constitutional right to post-conviction access to evidence and that his case cannot proceed because he did not exhaust state court remedies before bringing this case. The State's Attorney and the Village also maintain that, even if Plaintiff's claims were not barred, he fails to state a claim for any constitutional violation. Finally, Defendant Village of Alsip additionally argues that it is not a proper defendant since the evidence sought is in the possession of the Cook County Circuit Court and the complaint alleges no violation of Village policy.
The purpose of a motion to dismiss is not to determine whether a plaintiff "will ultimately prevail" on his claims, "but whether his complaint [is] sufficient to cross the federal court's threshold." Skinner v. Switzer, 131 S. Ct. 1289, 1296 (2011). When reviewing a motion to dismiss, a court considers true all well pleaded allegations, as well as any inferences reasonably drawn therefrom. See Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1081 (7th Cir. 2008). Under the notice pleading requirement of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), a complaint need only provide enough information to provide sufficient notice of a federal claim and the grounds upon which it rests. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). In that regard, the complaint must at least "plausibly suggest that the plaintiff has a right to relief, raising that possibilityabove a 'speculative level.'" E.E.O.C. v. Concentra Health Services, Inc., 496 F.3d 773, 776 -77 (7th Cir. 2007); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). If a plaintiff pleads facts demonstrating that he has no claim, a court may dismiss the complaint. McCready v. eBay, Inc., 453 F.3d 882, 888 (7th Cir. 2006). Affirmative defenses, such as claim preclusion and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, that are clear from the complaint may be addressed in a motion to dismiss as opposed to a summary...
To continue reading
Request your trial