McDuffie v. State

• Citation: 17 S.E. 105,90 Ga. 786
• Parties: McDUFFIE v. STATE.
• Decision Date: 20 February 1893
• Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

17 S.E. 105

90 Ga. 786

McDUFFIE v. STATE.

Supreme Court of Georgia

February 20, 1893

Syllabus by the Court.

1. Where, in a criminal trial, the judge fully and fairly charged the jury concerning the law of reasonable doubt, he was not bound to give a request instructing them, in effect that if they have a reasonable doubt as to the existence of some particular and specially enumerated fact, or what should be the proper inference therefrom, it would be their duty to give the accused the benefit of such doubt.

2. Under the facts presented by affidavits concerning the competency of one of the jurors, it was not error to refuse to set aside the verdict on the ground that such juror was not fair and impartial.

3. The fact that the juror's granduncle married the grandmother of the prosecutor establishes no relationship, either by blood or marriage, between the juror and the prosecutor; it appearing that the latter was not a descendant of that marriage.

4. It was not error to charge that threats made by the deceased against the accused, although communicated to the latter before the homicide, would not justify the killing, unless at the time of the killing there was some effort on the part of the deceased to kill the accused, or inflict upon him an injury amounting to a felony; it appearing that the court also instructed the jury that they might take such threats into consideration in determining whether or not the circumstances were sufficient to excite the fears of a reasonable man, and the charge being otherwise full and correct on the subject of reasonable fears.

5. If a person, on being assaulted by the brother of another instantly withdraws, and arms himself, and, before sufficient cooling time has elapsed, returns, and a combat ensues between himself and the other, the latter being the first to produce actual contact, and the former, without deliberation but acting under the sudden impulse of overmastering passion, kills the other, he would be guilty of voluntary manslaughter.

6. The evidence fully warranted the verdict for voluntary manslaughter, and a new trial was properly refused.

Error from superior court, Clinch county; S. R. Atkinson, Judge.

D. F. McDuffie was convicted of manslaughter, and brings error. Affirmed.

J. L. Sweat, B. A. Whittington, W. M. Hammond, and Harrison & Peeples, for plaintiff in error.

W. G. Brantley, Sol. Gen., for the State.

LUMPKIN J.

1. The accused being on trial for murder, and relying upon the defense that he shot the deceased under the fears of a reasonable man, that the deceased and his brother were about to kill or do him some serious bodily injury, his counsel requested the court to charge as follows: "If, after considering all the evidence in the case, you have reasonable doubt as to the existence of such purpose on the part of the deceased and his brother, or on the part of either of them then and there to kill McDuffie, or to do him some serious bodily injury, or if you have reasonable doubt as to whether McDuffie then and there believed in the existence of such purpose on the part of his assailant or assailants, and that he had reasonable ground for such belief, it will be your duty to give him the benefit of such doubt." Error is assigned upon the refusal of the court to give this request in charge to the jury. Counsel for the plaintiff in error relied upon the ruling in Mitchell v. State, 71 Ga. 128. In that case the court was requested to charge, in effect, that if the jury had a reasonable doubt as to whether the circumstances under which the accused acted were such as were calculated to excite the fears of a reasonable man, or whether he felt at the time he shot, and had reason to feel, from the circumstances, that it was necessary to shoot, to save his own life, he would be justifiable. This court held that this request, being pertinent, should have been given; it appearing that the trial judge entirely failed in his charge to instruct the jury as to what should be their finding if they were not fully satisfied that the circumstances proved were such as to excite the fears of a reasonable man. In the present case the charge requested was, substantially, that if the jury were unable to determine, beyond a reasonable doubt, from the actions of the deceased and his brother at the time of the killing, whether it was the purpose and intention of either to kill or injure the accused, and that the accused was justified in believing, from their conduct, that such was their purpose, he should be given the benefit of such doubt. Even if, following the ruling in Mitchell's Case, supra, which certainly went a great length, the court could properly have given this instruction to the jury, we do not think he was bound to do so. The charge, as a whole, was full, fair, clear, and accurate, and, as will presently appear, sufficiently covered the law of reasonable fears and reasonable doubt. The following extracts from it show that the question as to what should be the verdict of the jury, in the event they should be unable to determine what were the purpose and intention actuating the deceased and his brother, was not left open, but the court expressly instructed them, in effect, that, though they should find that neither the deceased nor his brother had any intention of injuring the accused, still, if the accused was justified in believing that such intention existed, he could not be convicted. The court charged: "There needn't have been actual danger to McDuffie, but if the circumstances were of such a character as to have justified in a reasonably courageous man the belief that he stood in immediate peril of his life, or the infliction upon him of injuries amounting to a felony, and that, acting under such fears, and under such circumstances, he took the life of the deceased, he could not be convicted." ...