McEachin v. United States

• Decision Date: 05 June 1981
• Docket Number: No. 79-610.,79-610.
• Citation: 432 A.2d 1212
• Parties: David McEACHIN, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee.
• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals

Page 1212

432 A.2d 1212

David McEACHIN, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee.

No. 79-610.

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Argued October 28, 1980.

Decided June 5, 1981.

Randy I. Bellows, Public Defender Service, Washington, D. C., with whom Silas J. Wasserstrom, Public Defender Service, Washington, D. C., was on brief, for appellant. Vito T. Potenza, Public Defender Service, Washington, D. C., also entered an appearance for appellant.

Christopher A. Myers, Asst. U. S. Atty., Washington, D. C., with whom Charles F. C. Ruff, U. S. Atty., John A. Terry and Steven C. Tabackman, Asst. U. S. Attys., Washington, D. C., were on brief, for appellee.

Before KERN and PRYOR, Associate Judges, and GALLAGHER, Associate Judge, Retired.^*

PRYOR, Associate Judge:

On November 15, 1978, appellant was arrested while on the premises of the Bolling Air Force Base, a military installation located within the District of Columbia. He was ultimately charged with possession of marijuana (D.C.Code 1973, § 33-402) on that date and two other offenses which stemmed from an incident which allegedly occurred on an earlier date. Thus, he was also charged with unlawful entry (D.C.Code 1973, § 22-3102) of Bolling Air Force Base and petit larceny (D.C.Code 1973, § 22-2202) of tools from a store on the base. Appellant was subsequently convicted of all charges after a trial by jury. On appeal, he seeks reversal on the grounds that (1) the Superior Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the offenses with which he was charged; (2) the government failed to establish every element of both petit larceny and unlawful entry; and (3) the court erred in its denial of appellant's request for additional instructions relating to the petit larceny charge.¹ We affirm.

I SUPERIOR COURT JURISDICTION

Appellant contends that the trial court's denial of his motion to dismiss the informations for lack of jurisdiction in the Superior Court over criminal offenses committed within Bolling Air Force Base was erroneous.² Since Bolling is a military installation, he urges that it should be viewed as a federal enclave, with exclusive jurisdiction over it vested in the United States. Citing a number of cases involving crimes committed within federal military enclaves in various states, where federal courts have asserted exclusive jurisdiction for the prosecution of such crimes,³ appellant urges that the purpose of the District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-358, tit. I, 84 Stat. 475 (1970) (codified at D.C.Code 1973, §§ 11-101 to 23-1705) (hereinafter Court Reform Act or the Act), was to establish "separate and independent [judicial] systems — one local, and the other federal[,]" Thompson v. United States, 179 U.S.App. D.C. 76, 81, 548 F.2d 1031, 1036 (1976), as exists in the states, and that the local District of Columbia courts should treat the problem of jurisdiction in the same manner as state courts would. We find no merit in appellant's position for several reasons.

In all the cases upon which appellant relies, it was recognized that as a prerequisite to the right of federal courts to exercise exclusive jurisdiction, it is required that the state in which the base is located either have relinquished all rights over its land by cession to the United States, or have consented to the purchase or condemnation of its land to the federal government. United States v. Gliatta, 580 F.2d 156, 158 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1048, 99 S.Ct. 726, 58 L.Ed.2d 728 (1979); United States v. Holmes, 414 F.Supp. 831, 837 (D.Md.1976); Board of Supervisors of Fairfax County, Va. v. United States, 408 F.Supp. 556, 563 (E.D.Va.1976), appeal dismissed, 551 F.2d 305 (4th Cir. 1977).⁴ When land or other property is acquired by the United States by purchase or condemnation without the consent of the state legislature, it would not be entitled to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over the property, as the state has retained the right to exercise its general police powers. See Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. 245, 264, 83 S.Ct. 426, 437, 9 L.Ed.2d 292 (1963), Surplus Trading Co. v. Cook, 281 U.S. 647, 650, 50 S.Ct. 455, 456, 74 L.Ed. 1091 (1930); United States v. Gliatta, supra at 158 n. 6; Vincent v. General Dynamics Corp., 427 F.Supp. 786, 795 n. 9 (N.D.Tex. 1977); State v. De Berry, 224 N.C. 834, 836, 32 S.E.2d 617, 618 (1945). Therefore, it does not follow, as appellant contends, that if Bolling Air Force Base was located in any of the fifty states, its status as a military base would automatically confer exclusive jurisdiction on the United States courts.⁵

Nor can it be said that the enactment of the Court Reform Act, which established a dual court system in this jurisdiction, precludes the Superior Court of the District of Columbia from exercising jurisdiction over offenses occurring on Bolling Air Force Base. Prior to the passage of the Act, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia and the District of Columbia Court of General Sessions, the precursor of the Superior Court, shared concurrent original original jurisdiction over all misdemeanor offenses committed in the District of Columbia. Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 392 n. 2, 93 S.Ct. 1670, 1673 n. 2, 36 L.Ed.2d 342 (1973); Thompson v. United States, supra, 179 U.S.App.D.C. at 79, 548 F.2d at 1034, see D.C.Code 1967, §§ 11-527, -963(a)(1). In an attempt to relieve the Art. III courts in this jurisdiction of the burden of having to hear purely local matters, and thus to address its attention to concerns more national in scope, Congress enacted the Court Reform Act, which provided for the establishment, inter alia, of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. Palmore v. United States, supra 411 U.S. at 408-09, 93 S.Ct. at 1681-82; Andrade v. Jackson, D.C.App., 401 A.2d 990, 992 (1979); Thompson v. United States, supra, 179 U.S.App.D.C. at 79, 548 F.2d at 1034. The Superior Court was granted original jurisdiction over "any criminal case under any law applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia." D.C.Code 1973, § 11-923(b)(1). Here, appellant was convicted of offenses exclusively applicable under the District of Columbia Code, albeit those offenses occurred on a military base.

It is true, as appellant contends, that he could have been prosecuted under a variety of federal statutes for the crimes he was alleged to have committed. See 18 U.S.C. § 1382 (1976) (unlawful entry); 18 U.S.C. § 661 (1976) (larceny); 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1976) (possession of marijuana pursuant to the Assimilative Crimes Act). However, that fact alone does not deprive the Superior Court of its jurisdiction, for "it is clear that where the same act constitutes both a federal offense and a state offense under the police power, the state may prosecute . . . The mere existence of a similar federal statute does not prevent prosecution under local law for the same offense." Davis v. United States, D.C.App., 385 A.2d 757, 759 (1978) (per curiam) (citations omitted). See United States v. Jones, 174 U.S.App. D.C. 34, 37, 527 F.2d 817, 820 (1975) (one whose acts constitute violations of both federal and local law may be prosecuted under either "in the absence of a specific federal statute superseding prosecution on the local offense . . .").

Our opinion in Davis v. United States, supra, is illustrative of the jurisdiction of the Superior Court in the instant case. Subsequent to his plea of guilty to the charge of operating a lottery in violation of D.C.Code 1973, § 22-1501, while a patient at the Veterans Administration Hospital in Washington, D.C., Davis sought to have his judgment of conviction set aside on the ground that the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction to decide his case since crimes committed on lands of the United States only constitute violations of federal law. In rejecting appellant's position, we held that "the fact that the offense occurred in a building owned by the United States would not deprive the Superior Court of jurisdiction. . . . Federal jurisdiction over a crime does not arise merely from ownership of the land by the United States." Id. at 759-60 (citations omitted).⁶

Contrary to appellant's position that Davis is inapposite to sustaining the jurisdiction of the Superior Court in this instance, we perceive no justifiable difference between the right of the lower court to assume jurisdiction over cases involving District of Columbia Code offenses committed on the grounds of federally owned property such as the Veterans Administration Hospital, see Davis v. United States, supra, the United States Capitol, see Arshack v. United States, D.C.App., 321 A.2d 845 (1974), and the White House, see Carson v. United States, D.C.App., 419 A.2d 996 (1980); Whittlesey v. United States, D.C. App., 221 A.2d 86 (1966), from its right to exercise jurisdiction over crimes committed on Bolling Air Force Base. To hold otherwise would lead to the kind of anomalous result recognized by the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals in another context in United States v. Greene, 160 U.S.App.D.C. 21, 489 F.2d 1145 (1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 977, 95 S.Ct. 239, 42 L.Ed.2d 190 (1974). There, appellant challenged the use of the District of Columbia felony murder statute (D.C.Code 1973, § 22-2401) in conjunction with a United States Code felony statute (18 U.S.C. § 752(a) (1976) (rescuing a federal prisoner)), the result of which led to his conviction of federal felony murder. The Court rejected Greene's contention that the criminal provisions of the D.C.Code were not intended by Congress to be used in implementing statutes of the United States Code relating to "national crimes." It stated:

To adopt appellant's construction would lead to an anomalous result, one that Congress could not conceivably have intended. If one killed during the course of a robbery on the street in front of a bank, he would be prosecuted for felony murder under the D.C.Code,...