McElwee v. Ferguson

• Decision Date: 21 January 1876
• Citation: 43 Md. 479
• Parties: WILLIAM MCELWEE, JOHN BOSLEY, and others, v. JAMES P. FERGUSON, Executor of SAMUEL R. MCELWEE, deceased.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

43 Md. 479

WILLIAM MCELWEE, JOHN BOSLEY, and others, v. JAMES P. FERGUSON, Executor of SAMUEL R. MCELWEE, deceased.

Court of Appeals of Maryland

January 21, 1876

APPEAL from the Orphans' Court of Baltimore City.

This appeal was taken by the caveators, from the decree of the Orphans' Court of Baltimore City, overruling their objections to the will of Samuel R. McElwee, and admitting the same to probate.

The cause was argued before BARTOL, C.J., BRENT, MILLER, ALVEY and ROBINSON, J.

John C. King, for the appellauts.

The testator had not at the making of the will, a "sound and disposing mind," as required by the express language of the Code. He was the victim of a disordered mind, and of delusions and hallucinations--the unequivocal evidences of insanity. Art. 93, sec. 300, of the Code; Redfield on Wills, sec. 9; Taylor's Med Jur., 629; Ray's Med. Jur., sec. 129, ( Ed. 1860;) 1 Redfield on Wills, sec. 10 pp. 71, 72; Wharton & Stillé, sec. 185.

To be sane, the mind must be perfectly sound, otherwise it is unsound, and "where there is delusion there is insanity." A sound mind is one wholly free from delusion. 1 Redfield on Wills, sec. 11, pp. 78, 79.

A will which is the direct offspring of partial insanity is invalid although the general capacity is unimpeached. 1 Redfield on Wills, pages 78, 79; Boyd vs. Ely, 8 Watts, 71; Potts vs. House, 6 Ga., 324; Townshend vs. Townshend, 7 Gill, 10.

The act of suicide in this case, was not the result of sudden impulse at the time when committed, but the result of a condition of mind and body previously existing and well defined, anticipated even by the friends of the testator as well as by his physicians. If suicide committed by the testator soon after making his will, is not conclusive evidence of insanity, a person's state of mind and body which is clearly demonstrated to have produced the act, is conclusive evidence of insanity. 1 Redfield on Wills, sec. 14, pp. 111, 117. This is the distinction between the case under consideration, and cases like Burrows vs. Burrows, 1 Hagg., 109; Duffield vs. Morris, Ex'r, 2 Harrington, 375, and another class of cases under life insurance policies. Could any life insurance company avoid its policy upon the evidence of this case? Most unquestionably not.

The evidence in this case does not establish a lucid interval at the time of the making of the will. There was no manifest change in his condition whatever at that time. What are known as "lucid intervals," arises in a wholly different class of cases. Gombault vs. Public Adm'r, 4 Brad. R., 226; White vs. Wilson, 13 Vesey, 87; 1 Redfield on Wills, sec. 14.

This will is, manifestly from the evidence, the result of mental unsoundness in a form of disease known as suicidal mania, recognized at the time as the actual condition of the testator's mind. It is repugnant to the requirements of the testamentary law in this regard, and we respectfully submit that the judgment below should be reversed.

James McCurley, Jr. and N.M. Pusey, for the appellee.

The essential requisites to constitute a valid testamentary act, (the formalities of the law with reference to the execution of the will, having been complied with,) are, that the testator, at the time of the execution thereof, was capable of understanding the business in which he was engaged, the property he desired to dispose of, the object of his bounty named in the will, and that the same was his free and voluntary act. Waters, et al vs. Waters, 35 Md., 536, 547; Higgins, et al. vs. Carlton, 28 Md., 115, 125, 144; Harrison vs. Rowan, 3 Wash. C. C. Rep., 586; Hathorn vs. King, 8 Mass., 371; Potts, et al. vs. House, 6 Ga., 324; Stevens vs. Vancleve, 4 Wash. C. C. Rep., 262; Kinne vs. Kinne, 9 Conn., 102.

The allegation in the caveat of undue influence, deceits, &c., has not been sustained by the evidence; in fact there is no evidence pointing in that direction. The law, in regard to the undue influence, which will invalidate a will, is well settled in this State. Tyson, et al. vs. Tyson's Ex'rs, 37 Md., 567, 582.

It is equally well settled, that in a caveat to a will, charging the want of testamentary capacity on the part of the testator, the burden of proof rests upon the caveators--the rule of law being that every man is presumed to be sane until it is proved that he is otherwise. Tyson, et al. vs. Tyson's Ex'rs, 37 Md., 582; Higgins vs. Carlton, 28 Md., 141, 142.

The appellants do not claim that the testator was a maniac, that he was habitually insane; the extent of their claim is that he was partially insane--that he was laboring under suicidal mania, and their own witness, Dr. Morris, testifies that this is a special form of insanity, and that it may exist among people whose intellectual faculties are in other respects unimpaired.

In law, the absence or presence of delusion, is the true and only test or criterion of absent or present insanity; and in order to invalidate the will of a person laboring under a delusion, it must appear that the will is the direct offspring of the delusion; that the delusion influenced the testator in the manner of the distribution of his property; in other words, that the will, by reason of the delusion, was different from that which it would have been, had the delusion not existed. Even admitting that the testator had suicidal mania, it does not appear that that had any effect on his mind in the disposition of his property. 1 Jarman on Wills, 56, note 7; Dew vs. Clark, 3 Addams, 79, (2 Eng. Eccl. Rep., 441, 442, 497;) Taylor's Med., Jurispd., 630, 655, 656, (5 th Amer Edit.;) Dunham's Appeal, 27 Conn., 192, 201, 202, 203; Duffield vs. Morris, Ex'r, 2 Harrington, 375, 379, 380, 384; 1 Redfield on Wills, 85.

It is not sufficient even to shift the burden of proof, much less to establish the invalidity of this will, for the caveators to show that, about a month prior to the execution of the will, the testator was in such a state of delirium, produced by intoxication, as to incapacitate him at that time from executing a will. He had so far recovered, as that, on the 9th of March, his mind was clear, and the evidence does not even show, that at any time from the 1st of March, down to the very instant of his death, the testator did not possess that degree of testamentary capacity requisite to the making of a valid will. 1 Redfield, pages 91, 92, 93; Taylor's Med. Jurispd., 632, (5 th Amer. Edit.;) Duffield vs. Morris' Ex'rs, 2 Harrington, 384; Brooke vs. Townshend, 7 Gill, 31.

It is not contended that a man is, under any circumstances, justified in taking his own life, but that a person, in the full enjoyment of his reason, may be so pressed upon by influences, from within and from without, that he would, while a sane man, destroy himself. Taylor's Med. Jurspd., 677, 681, (5 th Amer. Edit.;) Ray's Med. Jurspd., secs. 386, 397, 398, 399; Burrows vs. Burrows, 1 Haggard, 109, (3 Eng. E. Rep.;) Duffield vs. Morris' Ex'rs, 2 Harrington, 382, 383, 384; Terry vs. Insurance Co., 1 Dillon C. C. Rep., 403; Nimick vs. Insurance Co., 10 Amer. L. Reg., N. S., 101.

ROBINSON J., delivered the opinion of the Court.

The sole question in this appeal, is whether the testator was of " sound and disposing mind and capable of executing a valid deed or contract," at the time of the execution of the paper purporting to be his last will and testament?

This paper was executed in the forenoon of Saturday, April 3rd, and in the afternoon of the next day the testator died by his own hands. Continuing insanity on the part of the testator is not alleged, but it is insisted on the part of the appellants, caveators below, that at the time of the execution of the paper purporting to be his will, the testator was laboring under what is termed suicidal mania; and that his mind was so disordered as to incapacitate him for making a valid will.

With all the lights which the researches of modern inquiries have elicited in regard to the condition of the mind, even in decided cases of monomania or delusion, it is always a delicate and difficult question to determine in such cases, the precise condition of the other mental faculties; or to ascertain with any degree of certainty to what extent they may be implicated in the disorder.

By some writers, suicidal mania is regarded in all cases and under all circumstances, a positive sign or symptom of insanity. This view however is not sustained by the most eminent writers on the subject, and certainly not by the weight of judicial authority.

Cases may, and do often occur, in which this disorder so affects the mental faculties as to make the party incompetent to execute a will or valid contract; while on the other hand it is obvious, that it may exist, and persons may under its influence, commit suicide, and yet possess their testamentary capacity unimpaired.

Where the act of self-destruction occurs immediately after the execution of a will, it may justly be regarded as a fact tending to establish a disordered condition of the mind, and the existence of some morbid affection tending to the derangement of reason; and a will executed under such circumstances should beget the greatest watchfulness on the part of the Court and the jury. But strange and unaccountable as the phenomenon may appear to most persons, the act of self-destruction cannot be judicially regarded as proof per se of insanity. After all it is but a fact, together with all other facts in the case from which the Court or jury are to determine the testamentary capacity of the testator, not at the time of committing suicide, but at the time of the execution of the will in question.

In all cases it is true, the testator must be of sound and disposing mind, but the question of "sound" or "unsound mind," must at last...