McFadden v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corrs.

• Decision Date: 31 May 2022
• Docket Number: 3:19-cv-891-TJC-PDB
• Parties: ERNA McFADDEN, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Respondents.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida

ERNA McFADDEN, Petitioner,
v.
SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Respondents.

No. 3:19-cv-891-TJC-PDB

United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Jacksonville Division

May 31, 2022

ORDER

TIMOTHY J. CORRIGAN United States District Judge.

I. Status

Petitioner, Erna McFadden, an inmate of the Florida penal system, initiated this action in the Northern District of Florida by filing a pro se Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody. Doc. 1. The Honorable Gary R. Jones, United States Magistrate Judge, transferred the action to this Court. Doc. 3. Petitioner challenges a state court (Duval County, Florida) judgment of conviction for armed robbery and two counts of aggravated battery.^[1] Petitioner is serving a cumulative life term of

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incarceration. Respondents filed a Response. See Doc. 13 (Resp.).^[2] The Court provided Petitioner with an opportunity to reply, but she declined and filed a notice advising that she relies on her allegations as stated in her Petition. See Doc. 15. This case is ripe for review.^[3]

II. Governing Legal Principles

A. Standard Under AEDPA

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) governs a state prisoner's federal habeas corpus petition. See Ledford v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic & Classification Prison, 818 F.3d 600, 642 (11th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S.Ct. 1432 (2017). “‘The purpose of AEDPA is to ensure that federal habeas relief functions as a guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems, and not as a means of error correction.'” Id. (quoting Greene v. Fisher, 565 U.S. 34, 38 (2011)).

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The first task of the federal habeas court is to identify the last state court decision, if any, that adjudicated the petitioner's claims on the merits. See Marshall v. Sec'y Fla. Dep't of Corr., 828 F.3d 1277, 1285 (11th Cir. 2016). The state court need not issue an opinion explaining its rationale for the state court's decision to qualify as an adjudication on the merits. See Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 100 (2011). When the state court's adjudication on the merits is unaccompanied by an explanation,

the federal court should “look through” the unexplained decision to the last related state-court decision that does provide a relevant rationale. It should then presume that the unexplained decision adopted the same reasoning. But the State may rebut the presumption by showing that the unexplained affirmance relied or most likely did rely on different grounds than the lower state court's decision, such as alternative grounds for affirmance that were briefed or argued to the state supreme court or obvious in the record it reviewed

Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S.Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018).

When a state court has adjudicated a petitioner's claims on the merits, a federal court cannot grant habeas relief unless the state court's adjudication of the claim was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States, ” or “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding, ” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1),

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(2). A state court's factual findings are “presumed to be correct” unless rebutted “by clear and convincing evidence.” Id. § 2254(e)(1).

AEDPA “imposes a highly deferential standard for evaluating state court rulings” and “demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as fairminded jurists could disagree on the correctness of the state court's decision.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). “It bears repeating that even a strong case for relief does not mean the state court's contrary conclusion was unreasonable.” Id. [at 102] (citing Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003)). The Supreme Court has repeatedly instructed lower federal courts that an unreasonable application of law requires more than mere error or even clear error. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 18 (2003); Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75 (“The gloss of clear error fails to give proper deference to state courts by conflating error (even clear error) with unreasonableness.”); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 410 (2000) (“[A]n unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.”).

Bishop v. Warden, GDCP, 726 F.3d 1243, 1253-54 (11th Cir. 2013) (internal citations modified).

B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

“The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants effective assistance of counsel. That right is denied when a defense counsel's performance falls below an objective standard of reasonableness and thereby

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prejudices the defense.” Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 5 (2003) (per curiam) (citing Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003), and Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). To establish ineffective assistance, a person must show that: (1) counsel's performance was outside the wide range of reasonable, professional assistance; and (2) counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the challenger in that there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceeding would have been different absent counsel's deficient performance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.

There is no “iron-clad rule requiring a court to tackle one prong of the Strickland test before the other.” Ward v. Hall, 592 F.3d 1144, 1163 (11th Cir. 2010). Since both prongs of the two-part Strickland test must be satisfied to show a Sixth Amendment violation, “a court need not address the performance prong if the petitioner cannot meet the prejudice prong, and vice-versa.” Id. (citing Holladay v. Haley, 209 F.3d 1243, 1248 (11th Cir. 2000)). As stated in Strickland: “If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be followed.” 466 U.S. at 697.

Further, “[t]he question is not whether a federal court believes the state court's determination under the Strickland standard was incorrect but whether that determination was unreasonable - a substantially higher threshold.” Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009) (quotation marks omitted). If

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there is “any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland's deferential standard, ” then a federal court may not disturb a state-court decision denying the claim. Richter, 562 U.S. at 105. As such, “[s]urmounting Strickland's high bar is never an easy task.” Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 371 (2010). “Reviewing courts apply a ‘strong presumption' that counsel's representation was ‘within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.'” Daniel v. Comm'r, Ala. Dep't of Corr., 822 F.3d 1248, 1262 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). “When this presumption is combined with § 2254(d), the result is double deference to the state court ruling on counsel's performance.” Id. (citing Richter, 562 U.S. at 105); see also Evans v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., 703 F.3d 1316, 1333-35 (11th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (Jordan, J., concurring); Rutherford v. Crosby, 385 F.3d 1300, 1309 (11th Cir. 2004).

III. Analysis

A. Grounds One and Two^[4]

Petitioner alleges her trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to “improper prosecutorial comments”; specifically, the state's inclusion of a jury instruction on the principal theory. Doc. 1 at 5. According to Petitioner, the

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evidence presented at trial did not support the instruction, and its presence misled and confused the jury during deliberations. Id.

Petitioner raised this claim in her amended Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 motion for postconviction relief. Resp. Ex. C1 at 15-17. The trial court summarily denied the claim, finding the following:

In Defendant's Amended Motion, she avers the State improperly argued principal theory and that the jurors were improperly instructed on the theory. Specifically, Defendant argues the State only alleged that Defendant committed the robbery at CVS, not that she aided her codefendant in committing the robbery. Thus, Defendant contends it was improper for the jury to be instructed on the principal theory and for the State to argue anything regarding the principal theory.

To prove the offense of Armed Robbery, the State had to show Defendant took property of value from CVS with the intent to permanently deprive CVS of that property and that “force, violence, assault, or putting in fear was used in the cour[se] of the taking.” The jury was instructed on the principal theory to find these elements. The State is entitled to proceed on alternate theories where there is evidence to support both theories. See Hodge v. State, 970 So.2d 923, 926 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008).

Here, the State indeed presented evidence [] to support both theories. The State presented evidence Defendant committed the armed robbery herself by presenting the following evidence: testimony from the store manager that he witnessed Defendant conceal CVS store merchandise in her blue purse, testimony from two individuals that Defendant never went to the register to pay for these items, testimony from those same two individuals that Defendant cut them both with an object while trying to leave the store, and

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testimony that when Defendant was pulled over in the car described by a CVS employee soon after the robbery, there was merchandise and a box cutter found in the car.

However, the officer who stopped the vehicle Defendant was a passenger in, stated that Defendant's blue and white bag only had [a]

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