McFarland v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 29 April 1902
• Citation: 68 S.W. 105,94 Mo. App. 336
• Parties: McFARLAND v. MISSOURI, K. & T. RY. CO.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

68 S.W. 105

94 Mo. App. 336

McFARLAND v. MISSOURI, K. & T. RY. CO.

Court of Appeals of St. Louis, Missouri.

April 29, 1902.

RAILROADS — FIRES SET BY LOCOMOTIVES — JOINT OPERATION — CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTE.

1. The statute imposing absolute liability for fire set out by locomotives (Rev. St. 1899, § 1111) is conceded to be valid.

2. Defendant owned and operated a railroad in this state, but permitted a Missouri company to use a portion of the road conjointly with defendant. A fire was set out on plaintiff's farm by a locomotive of the latter company. Plaintiff sues for the damages under the statute (Rev. St. 1899, § 1111) making "each railroad corporation, owning or operating a railroad in this state," responsible absolutely in damages to any one whose property is injured by fire communicated by locomotives in use upon a railroad "owned or operated by such railroad corporation." It was held that defendant was liable.

3. The act imposing absolute liability for fires set out by locomotives (Rev. St. 1899, § 1111) of a railroad company owning and operating a road is not limited by the law (Id. § 1060) which gives authority to make running arrangements for joint use of a railroad, and makes a domestic proprietor liable if it allows a foreign corporation to use its road, or part thereof. Those acts do not alter the liability for fire of a company owning and operating a railroad.

4. Statutory terms are to be interpreted according to their natural and ordinary meaning, and in such a manner as to harmonize, if possible, with other parts of the written law.

5. The maxim, "Expressio unius est exclusio alterius," should be applied only where it appears to point to the legislative intent.

(Syllabus by the Judge.)

Appeal from circuit court, Monroe county; David H. Eby, Judge.

Action by Easton McFarland against the Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Geo. P. B. Jackson, for appellant. R. B. Bristow, for respondent.

BARCLAY, J.

This action is brought to recover for damages caused by fire charged to have been communicated to plaintiff's farm property by a locomotive engine in use upon the railroad owned by defendant. The petition sets forth the particulars of the injury to plaintiff's property, in the destruction of 50 tons of hay, some rails, posts, and meadow sod. It alleged the cause to be fire permitted to escape in October, 1899, from a locomotive engine in use upon the railroad owned and operated by defendant between the cities of Hannibal and Moberly, Mo. The defense is, in substance, that the fire which did the damage was set out by sparks from one of the engines of a Missouri corporation (the Wabash Railroad Company) which then operated engines and trains over that part of defendant's railroad above described by virtue of a contract in the nature of a lease between defendant and the Wabash Company. Said contract was in force at the time of the fire. It provided for the concurrent use of the railroad between Moberly and Hannibal by the two companies. Each company, however, had sole control of its own engines, trains, and train employés, except that the movements of trains and of other rolling stock were directed by one train dispatcher, to avoid collisions. The trial court sustained a general demurrer to the answer. Defendant declined to plead further. On a hearing of the facts stated in the petition, of which we have given merely the outline, there was a judgment for plaintiff for $387.50. We have omitted many of the particulars of the pleadings concerning which no controversy is raised. The vital issue is whether the fact that the fire originated from a Wabash engine constitutes a defense to the action. It is granted that defendant owned the railroad where the engine ran, and near which the fire occurred, and that defendant operated the railroad there conjointly with the Wabash Company. These facts, it is claimed, avoid the liability which otherwise would clearly rest upon defendant.

1. The action is founded on section 1111, Rev. St. 1899. No constitutional question touching the validity of that statute was mooted in the trial court. It is accepted as valid, in view of the decisions on that subject. Mathews v. Railway Co., 121 Mo. 298, 24 S. W. 591, 25 L. R. A. 161; Campbell v. Railway Co., 121 Mo. 340, 25 S. W. 936, 25 L. R. A. 175, 42 Am. St. Rep. 530; Railroad Co. v. Mathews, 165 U. S. 1, 17 Sup. Ct. 243, 41 L. Ed. 611; Adams v. Railway Co., 138 Mo. 242, 28 S. W. 496, 29 S. W. 836.

2. The chief point involved in this appeal is whether defendant is liable under the statute cited, assuming that the fire was communicated to plaintiff's property by the Wabash engine, operated exclusively by the Wabash Railroad Company. We hold that it is. The language of a statute is to be interpreted according to the natural and ordinary meaning of its terms. The learned counsel for defendant has submitted a most ingenious and scholarly argument, designed to show that the true intent of the enactment requires the courts to place the burden of...