McFeeters v. Cecil
| Decision Date | 15 September 1936 |
| Docket Number | 26001. |
| Citation | 60 P.2d 801,177 Okla. 454,1936 OK 512 |
| Parties | McFEETERS v. CECIL. |
| Court | Oklahoma Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
Where services are performed under a general hiring without any express agreement as to the time or measure of compensation or the term of employment, and there is a single hiring and the services continue for a series of years without interruption or payment until the death of the employer, the statute of limitation will not begin to run against the claim for compensation until the services are ended. But where there is no evidence of a single hiring and the services are intermittent, the law, for the purpose of determining when the statute begins to run, will not imply an agreement that the payment of compensation will be postponed to the termination of the employment, but will regard the hiring as from year to year, and the wages as payable at the same time.
Appeal from District Court, Woods County; Arthur G. Sutton, Judge.
Action by Mabel McFeeters against William M. Cecil, administrator of the estate of A. M. Cecil, deceased. From the judgment plaintiff appeals.
Affirmed.
Mauntel & Spellman, of Alva, for plaintiff in error.
E. W Snoddy, of Alva, for defendant in error.
This is an action commenced by plaintiff in error upon a claim presented to and disallowed by defendant as administrator of the estate of A. M. Cecil, deceased.
The claim sued upon was:
"To services rendered in caring for Mrs. A. M Cecil from October 27, 1912, to January 1, 1925, (a) $100.00, per year $1232.00 And from January 1, 1925, to January 1, 1932, @ $250.00, per year ..... 1750.00 -------- Total .............................................. $2982.00
The claim was in proper form and was presented to the administrator in due time.
Trial was had to a jury resulting in a verdict and judgment for plaintiff in the sum of $750.
Motion for a new trial was filed in due time by plaintiff, alleging errors of law occurring at the trial, and error of the court in giving instructions numbered three and four.
By said instructions plaintiff's right, if any, to recover was limited to services rendered within three years next preceding the death of A. M. Cecil, which occurred on September 30, 1932.
The principal question presented is whether the three-year statute of limitations (St.1931, § 101, subd. 2) applies to claim for services of the nature here involved. The petition alleged the services sued for were nursing, caring for, assisting in the housekeeping, sewing, other services and work for the said A. M. Cecil and caring for the wife of A. M. Cecil, all at the special instance and request of said S. M. Cecil, continuously during the period from October 27, 1912, to January 1, 1932.
Plaintiff's husband and A. M. Cecil's wife were brother and sister, and Cecil lived with his wife on a farm near Alva, Okl. Plaintiff and her husband lived most of the time covered by the claim in Wichita, Kan.
It appears that Mrs. Cecil became an invalid sometime in 1912. In October of that year she was operated upon in a hospital at Wichita, and thereafter she was never well until her death in August, 1932, nearly twenty years. She was treated from time to time by physicians in Wichita, and was often taken there for treatment. She was in the hospital at Wichita two or three times, but at all other times while in Wichita she stayed at the home of plaintiff and was nursed and cared for by plaintiff. Her trips to Wichita would be from about one to two months apart, and she would stay in Wichita from three or four days to several weeks. When not in Wichita she was with her husband on the farm. From time to time plaintiff would go from her home in Wichita to the home of Mrs. Cecil, to nurse, care for and look after Mrs. Cecil and assist in doing the housework. She was not with Mrs. Cecil continuously, but, as stated in plaintiff's testimony, she visited and assisted sometimes for three or four days, and at other times for four or five weeks. There was no evidence of a definite agreement in regard to the period of employment, or the mode or rate of compensation. If there was any contract or agreement it was, under the evidence, an implied contract.
Where services are rendered for a long period under such circumstances, the authorities are in conflict as to when the statute of limitations begins to run. There appear to be three lines of decisions on the question.
In Illinois, Freeman v. Freeman, 65 Ill. 106, and in North Carolina, Miller v. Lash, 85 N.C. 51, 39 Am.Rep. 678, and other jurisdictions, the rule is that in such cases the law implies a promise to pay for the services...
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