McGahee v. Alabama Dept. of Corrections

• Decision Date: 04 March 2009
• Docket Number: No. 07-15602.,07-15602.
• Parties: Earl J. McGAHEE, Petitioner-Appellant, v. ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Richard Allen, Respondents-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

560 F.3d 1252

Earl J. McGAHEE, Petitioner-Appellant, v. ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Richard Allen, Respondents-Appellees.

No. 07-15602.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

March 4, 2009.

Bryan A. Stevenson (Court-Appointed), Angela L. Setzer, Equal Justice Initiative of AL, Montgomery, AL, for McGahee.

Beth Jackson, Montgomery, AL, for Respondents-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama.

Before TJOFLAT, MARCUS and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

ANDERSON, Circuit Judge:

Defendant Earl Jerome McGahee was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death by the State of Alabama. McGahee appeals the district court's denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for the writ of habeas corpus challenging his conviction. We hold that the Alabama state courts unreasonably applied clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court. We further hold that the State violated McGahee's Fourteenth Amendment equal protection rights under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), by using its peremptory strikes in a discriminatory manner. Accordingly, we reverse the district court's ruling and direct the court to issue a writ of habeas corpus conditioned on the State's right to retry the petitioner.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On September 12, 1986, McGahee was convicted of two counts of capital murder for the deaths of Connie Brown and Cassandra Lee.¹ The jury returned an 11-1 verdict recommending a death sentence, which the trial court subsequently imposed. McGahee v. State, 554 So.2d 454, 456 (Ala.Crim.App.1989).

McGahee directly appealed his conviction and sentence to the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals, raising his Batson claim among others, in that appeal. Although the Court of Criminal Appeals overturned McGahee's death sentence based on the improper introduction of victim impact testimony at the sentencing phase of his trial, the Court of Criminal Appeals denied McGahee's Batson challenge. McGahee v. State, 554 So.2d at 459-62, aff'd, Ex parte McGahee, 554 So.2d 473 (Ala.1989). After a second penalty phase hearing, a new jury returned a 10-2 verdict sentencing McGahee to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. McGahee v. State, 632 So.2d 976, 978 (Ala.Crim.App.1993). The trial judge rejected the jury's verdict and sentenced McGahee to death. Id. McGahee's second death sentence was affirmed on direct appeal. Id., aff'd, Ex parte McGahee, 632 So.2d 981 (Ala.1993), cert. denied, McGahee v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 1189, 115 S.Ct. 1251, 131 L.Ed.2d 132 (1995).

McGahee filed a petition for relief from judgment and sentence pursuant to Rule 32 of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure. The trial court held a hearing on some of McGahee's claims, and denied McGahee's Rule 32 petition. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. McGahee v. State, 885 So.2d 191 (Ala. Crim.App.2003), cert. denied, Ex parte McGahee, 885 So.2d 230 (Ala.2004).

McGahee filed a petition for the writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama in 2005. He alleged numerous grounds for relief, including the Batson claim from his first direct appeal. The district court barred a portion of McGahee's Batson claim as unexhausted.² The district court issued an order denying McGahee's remaining Batson claims and other claims on the merits on October 15, 2007. McGahee v. Campbell, No. 05-0042, 2007 WL 3037451 (S.D.Ala. Oct. 15, 2007). McGahee filed a notice of appeal. The district court granted a Certificate of Appealability on one issue: whether the prosecutor used his peremptory strikes in a racially discriminatory manner to remove all of the African-American jurors from McGahee's venire.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Because McGahee filed his federal habeas petition after April 24, 1996, this case is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 2254 as modified by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"). Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 2063, 138 L.Ed.2d 481 (1997). AEDPA "establishes a highly deferential standard for reviewing state court judgments." Parker v. Sec'y for Dep't. of Corr., 331 F.3d 764, 768 (11th Cir.2003). Under AEDPA, a federal court may only grant the writ of habeas corpus if the state court's determination of a federal claim was "(1) ... contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) ... was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

The evaluation of a prosecutor's race-neutral explanations under Batson is a "pure issue of fact ... peculiarly within a trial judge's province." McNair v. Campbell, 416 F.3d 1291, 1310 (11th Cir.2005). Therefore, a Batson claim at habeas is often analyzed under AEDPA § 2254(d)(2), and is only granted "if it was unreasonable to credit the prosecutor's race-neutral explanations." Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 338, 126 S.Ct. 969, 974, 163 L.Ed.2d 824 (2006) (applying AEDPA, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), to a Batson claim). See also Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 240, 125 S.Ct. 2317, 2325, 162 L.Ed.2d 196 (2005) (analyzing Miller-El's Batson claim under § 2254(d)(2)).

In this case, the district court reviewed McGahee's claims under § 2254(d)(2). McGahee, however, primarily argues that the Alabama courts failed to follow Batson's three-step analysis. Where the concern is that a state court failed to follow Batson's three steps, the analysis should be under AEDPA § 2254(d)(1), which requires the federal court find that the state court rendered a decision that was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law." AEDPA, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).

"Under the `unreasonable application' clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from this Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 413, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1523, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (O'Connor, J., writing for the majority). "A federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable." Id. at 411, 120 S.Ct. at 1522. With these principles in mind, we review the decisions of the Alabama state courts in this case.

III. DISCUSSION

The Supreme Court issued its opinion in Batson on April 30, 1986, before the trial of this case in September 1986. Thus, Batson clearly established the relevant federal law. Batson requires a court to undertake a three-step analysis to evaluate equal protection challenges to a prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-98, 106 S.Ct. at 1723. In Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003), the Supreme Court paraphrased Batson and summarized its three-step analysis:

First, a defendant must make a prima facie showing that a peremptory challenge has been exercised on the basis of race. 476 U.S., at 96-97, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69. Second, if that showing has been made, the prosecution must offer a race-neutral basis for striking the juror in question. Id., at 97-98, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69. Third, in light of the parties' submissions, the trial court must determine whether the defendant has shown purposeful discrimination. Id., at 98, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69.

Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. at 328-29, 123 S.Ct. at 1035 (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-98, 106 S.Ct. at 1722-24). The Alabama trial court probably engaged in an unreasonable application of Batson, but we need not rely thereon because it is clear that the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals unreasonably applied Batson when it failed to follow Batson's three-step analysis. We review each court's decision in turn.

A. Trial Judge's Application of Batson

McGahee made his Batson challenge at the end of jury selection, after the prosecution had removed all of the African-American jurors from the venire panel through challenges for cause and peremptory challenges. Because the trial court denied McGahee's Batson motion based only upon the State's proffer of generalized reasons for its peremptory challenges, and because the trial court failed to make any ruling following the State's proffer of individualized reasons for its peremptory challenges, the trial court unreasonably applied Batson to this case.

1. Jury Selection

As noted above, Batson was the "clearly established Federal law" at the time of McGahee's trial. AEDPA, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).³ Jury selection proceeded in this case in the following manner. On September 8, 1986, jury selection began. The court first granted deferrals for hardship, inconvenience, or necessity. The court, prosecution, and defense each questioned the entire jury panel, and then the court allowed the attorneys to voir dire the venire in panels to ask about previous media exposure. Following the individual examination of all the jurors, juror Dr. Willis Wright approached the bench and asked for a deferral because of an out-of-town obligation beginning the next day. The court denied his request.

The judge then entertained challenges for cause. At this point, sixty-six potential jurors remained after deferrals for hardship and other dismissals by the court.⁴ Twenty-four members of the venire were African-American.⁵ The State made its challenges for cause first. The State moved to dismiss nine jurors for cause. All nine were African-American. Eight were challenged for being "unalterably opposed to the penalty of death," and one was challenged for being "too ill to serve." The defense objected to the...