McGarrh v. State

• Decision Date: 26 April 2022
• Docket Number: A-1-CA-39044
• Citation: 514 P.3d 55
• Parties: Dana MCGARRH a/k/a Dana Allen McGarrh, Petitioner-Appellant, v. STATE of New Mexico, Respondent-Appellee.
• Court: Court of Appeals of New Mexico

514 P.3d 55

Dana MCGARRH a/k/a Dana Allen McGarrh, Petitioner-Appellant,

v.STATE of New Mexico, Respondent-Appellee.

No. A-1-CA-39044

Court of Appeals of New Mexico.

Filing Date: April 26, 2022

The Law Office of Scott M. Davidson, Ph.D., Scott M. Davidson, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellant

Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General, Emily Tyson-Jorgenson, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellee

WRAY, Judge.

{1} Petitioner, Dana McGarrh, appeals the district court's denial of his Rule 5-803 NMRA post-conviction petition and motion to reconsider. We reverse in part and affirm in part.

BACKGROUND

{2} Between 1989 and 2001, Petitioner pleaded guilty three times to misdemeanor driving while intoxicated (DWI) charges in San Juan County municipal courts. In 2003, Petitioner pleaded to a fourth DWI in the Eleventh Judicial District Court, which resulted in a fourth degree felony conviction, pursuant to NMSA 1978, Section 66-8-102(G) (2002, amended 2016).¹ Petitioner was sentenced to eighteen months incarceration, and he completed his sentence in March 2006. In 2020, Petitioner filed a Rule 5-803 petition (Petition) and sought to invalidate all four pleas, because he contended that the judges in each plea hearing "never articulated on the record, in spite of clear rule requirements, what the State must prove in order to convict Petitioner McGarrh of any of the charges at issue." The district court summarily dismissed the Petition for three reasons: (1) lack of jurisdiction to review the three misdemeanor pleas, (2) the Petition was untimely, and (3) the pleas were knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered. Petitioner appeals.

DISCUSSION

{3} Petitioner seeks post-conviction relief under Rule 5-803, and we therefore consider his arguments within the confines of that rule. We briefly review the procedural steps outlined by Rule 5-803 in order to provide the context for Petitioner's arguments.

{4} Under Rule 5-803(A) a "petition to set aside a judgment and sentence may be filed in the district court of the jurisdiction which rendered the judgment by one who has been convicted of a criminal offense, and who is not in custody or under restraint as a result of such sentence." Rule 5-803(B) permits the correction of "convictions obtained in violation of the constitution or laws of the United States or the State of New Mexico," including motions to withdraw pleas that are filed by persons who are not in custody. See also Rule 5-803(A) (applying the rule to persons who are not in custody); State v. Yancey , 2021-NMCA-009, ¶ 12, 484 P.3d 1008 ("A person who is convicted based on a plea that is not knowing and voluntary suffers a deprivation of the constitutional right to due process."). Petitions must "be filed within a reasonable time after completion of the petitioner's sentence." Rule 5-803(C). The district court shall summarily dismiss a petition if "it plainly appears ... that the petitioner is not entitled to relief as a matter of law." Rule 5-803(F)(1). The rule sets forth a procedure for a revised petition, Rule 5-803(F)(1), but ultimately, if summary reversal is "not appropriate" the district court is required to order a response from the state. Rule 5-803(F)(2). After a response, the district court may decide the issues and/or hold a preliminary disposition hearing, at which the district court shall "determine whether an evidentiary hearing is required[,]" and if no evidentiary hearing is required, "may dispose of the petition." Rule 5-803(F)(3). In the present case, the district court summarily dismissed the Petition on its face without a response from the State or a hearing.

{5} Petitioner challenges each of the district court's three bases for summary dismissal of his Rule 5-803 Petition. We address each argument in turn.

I. The District Court's Rule 5-803 Jurisdiction to Review Misdemeanor Pleas

{6} The district court determined that it did not have jurisdiction to set aside the three DWI pleas taken in the Farmington and Aztec municipal courts, because Rule 5-803 only "provides relief from a judgment rendered in [d]istrict [c]ourt." Petitioner argues that the district court "erred as a matter of law" based on the plain language of Rule 5-803 because Rule 5-803 permits the filing of a petition in the district court of the jurisdiction that rendered the judgment, and the three plea judgments were entered in municipal courts that were all located in the Eleventh Judicial District Court. The parties agree that Rule 5-803(A) governs the district court's jurisdiction. We review the jurisdictional question de novo, see State v. Barraza , 2011-NMCA-111, ¶ 5, 267 P.3d 815, and we agree with Defendant.

{7} Rule 5-803(A) requires petitions to be "filed in the district court of the jurisdiction which rendered the judgment" and is not limited to pleas made in district courts. See Ramirez v. State , 2014-NMSC-023, ¶¶ 3, 5, 333 P.3d 240 (discussing a district court's post-conviction review of a plea entered in magistrate court). Petitioner's first three DWI convictions were entered in municipal courts located in San Juan County, and San Juan County is part of the Eleventh Judicial District Court. NMSA 1978, § 34-6-1(K) (1992). Petitioner filed the 2020 Petition in the Eleventh Judicial District Court. Because the three prior misdemeanor DWI convictions were entered in municipal courts located in the Eleventh Judicial District Court, the Petition in the present case was properly filed in the Eleventh Judicial District Court. We therefore reverse the district court's jurisdictional ruling.

II. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Determining the Petition to Be Untimely

{8} The district court additionally found that the Petition "was not filed timely pursuant to [ Rule] 5-803(C)" because it was filed "approximately [fifteen] years after the completion of his sentence" and that no exception excused the late filing. Petitioner contends that the district court had "no basis for dismissing [the P]etition on timeliness grounds." We first address the appropriate standard of review for the district court's timeliness determination and then address Petitioner's arguments.

{9} Generally, we review motions to withdraw pleas for abuse of discretion. See State v. Otero , 2020-NMCA-030, ¶ 3, 464 P.3d 1084. Petitioner argues that we should consider de novo the district court's determination that the Petition was untimely, because the facts—the date on which the Petition was filed—are undisputed, and a de novo standard applies when "there are no material facts in dispute" and an appeal presents a question of law. Whittington v. State Dep't of Pub. Safety , 2004-NMCA-124, ¶ 5, 136 N.M. 503, 100 P.3d 209. Petitioner maintains that the "summary dismissal of [the P]etition on timeliness grounds is antithetical to the purposes, history and case law interpreting and applying Rule 5-803." To the extent that Petitioner asks us to consider the meaning of "reasonable time," as it is used in Rule 5-803, our review is de novo. See Roark v. Farmers Grp., Inc. , 2007-NMCA-074, ¶ 50, 142 N.M. 59, 162 P.3d 896 (engaging in rule construction de novo). To the extent, however, that Petitioner maintains the district court improperly applied Rule 5-803 and denied his petition based on timeliness, we review for abuse of discretion. See Otero , 2020-NMCA-030, ¶¶ 3-4, 464 P.3d 1084 (reviewing timeliness under Rule 5-803 for abuse of discretion). Applying these standards of review, we conclude that (1) Rule 5-803 explicitly includes a limitation on the time to bring a petition, and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Petitioner did not timely file the Petition. We explain.

{10} Petitioner outlines the history of post-conviction, post-release law—from the initial use of writs of coram nobis through the application of Rule 1-060(B) NMRA —to argue that "[u]nder Rule 5-803, there is no specified time limit" to request relief from a void judgment and that long periods of delay have been historically acceptable. For support, Petitioner points to State v. Romero , which observed that there was "no limitation of time within which a motion must be filed under the provisions of Rule [1-060(B)(4)]." 1966-NMSC-126, ¶ 25, 76 N.M. 449, 415 P.2d 837. While the history of coram nobis and Rule 1-060(B) motions may provide important context for how petitions to void a plea evolved, we must consider the provisions of the current rule. See Rule 5-803 comm. cmt. (explaining that Rule 5-803 explicitly "superseded" Rule 1-060(B) "for post-sentence matters involving criminal convictions, including the writ of coram nobis"). In its current iteration, Rule 5-803(C) explicitly requires a petition to "be filed within a reasonable time after the completion of the petitioner's sentence, unless the court finds good cause, excusable neglect, or extraordinary circumstances beyond the control of the petitioner that justify filing the petition beyond that time." We therefore reject Petitioner's contention that because prior procedural mechanisms for post-sentence relief did not impose time requirements, Rule 5-803 must be read similarly. See Otero , 2020-NMCA-030, ¶ 7, 464 P.3d 1084 (noting the difference in time requirements between Rule 1-060 and Rule 5-803). Rule 5-803(C) requires petitions for post-conviction, out-of-custody relief to be brought "within a reasonable time."

{11} In the present case, the district court found that the Petition was not brought in a reasonable time, fifteen years after the final sentence was completed, and that no Rule 5-803(C) excuse justified the late filing. Petitioner contends that because the district court summarily dismissed without a hearing, he had no "opportunity to demonstrate good cause, excusable neglect, or extraordinary circumstances justifying the timing of [the] Rule 5-803 motion." We disagree. Petitioner filed a motion to reconsider in the district court, but as it relates to timeliness, he did...