State v. Yancey

• Decision Date: 01 December 2020
• Docket Number: A-1-CA-34192 (consolidated),Nos. A-1-CA-34190,A-1-CA-34191,s. A-1-CA-34190
• Parties: STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Millard Doyle YANCEY, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Court of Appeals of New Mexico

484 P.3d 1008

STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.Millard Doyle YANCEY, Defendant-Appellant.

Nos. A-1-CA-34190

A-1-CA-34191

A-1-CA-34192 (consolidated)

Court of Appeals of New Mexico.

Filing Date: December 1, 2020

Certiorari Denied, March 17, 2021, No. S-1-SC-38627

Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General Santa Fe, NM, Elizabeth Ashton, Assistant Attorney General Albuquerque, NM for Appellee

Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender, Allison H. Jaramillo, Assistant Appellate Defender Matthew J. O'Gorman, Assistant Appellate Defender Santa Fe, NM for Appellant

IVES, Judge.

{1} Defendant Millard Yancey appeals an order denying his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. We agree with Defendant that the district court accepted those pleas without informing him of the nature of the charges against him and determining that he understood those charges, as Rule 5-303(F) NMRA requires. In each of Defendant's three cases, consolidated before us, the factual allegations in the charging documents suggest that the fraud and embezzlement charges are mutually exclusive because they involved the same property and the same victim. However, the State did not pursue its charges in the alternative, and the State and Defendant entered into a plea agreement in each case under which Defendant would plead guilty to both fraud and embezzlement. The district court accepted Defendant's guilty pleas without providing him with any explanation of the charges to which he pleaded guilty, much less an explanation of how his conduct in each case satisfied the essential elements of both fraud and embezzlement. This Rule 5-303(F) error was not harmless because Defendant has shown that he did not receive the necessary explanation from any other source. Because Defendant did not knowingly and voluntarily plead guilty, allowing his six felony convictions and a twenty-one-year sentence of imprisonment to stand would violate his constitutional right to due process. Accordingly, we must reverse the district court's order and remand the case so that Defendant may withdraw his pleas, which will result in the reinstatement of all of the original charges against him.

BACKGROUND

{2} In the fall of 2013, the State filed three criminal informations against Defendant. The first charged him with three second-degree felonies involving victim David Cook: one count of fraud in an amount over $20,000, in violation of NMSA 1978, Section 30-16-6(F) (2006) ; one count of embezzlement in an amount over $20,000, in violation of NMSA 1978, Section 30-16-8(F) (2007) ; and one count of racketeering, in violation of NMSA 1978, Section 30-42-4(A) (2002, amended 2015). The second information involved victims Thurman and Genevieve Duncan and charged Defendant with three additional second-degree felonies: one count of fraud in an amount over $20,000, one count of embezzlement in an amount over $20,000, and one count of racketeering. The third information identified the victim as the Lovington Men's Prayer Group and charged Defendant with two third-degree felonies: fraud in an amount over $2,500, in violation of Section 30-16-6(E), and embezzlement in an amount over $2,500, in violation of Section 30-16-8(E).

{3} The three criminal informations summarize charges initially brought in criminal complaints that include the State's factual allegations. In the Cook complaint, the State alleges that between 2004 and 2011, Defendant asked Cook, a client of Defendant's accounting firm, to make tax payment checks out to Defendant. According to the complaint, instead of using all of Cook's money to pay taxes, Defendant "stole" the vast majority of the money: approximately $90,000. Similarly, in the Duncan complaint, the State alleges that Defendant handled monthly payroll taxes for the Duncan business for many years and that Defendant told the principal owners "that they needed to make the checks meant for the IRS or New Mexico Department of Taxation payable directly to [Defendant] because ‘their bank was in Texas but their business was located in New Mexico.’ " The complaint states that in October 2012 the victims learned from the IRS "that they were $39,927.17 in arrears." Finally, the Men's Prayer Group complaint alleges that Defendant, while acting as the victim's treasurer, took for his own use $4,235 that Defendant was responsible for depositing in the victim's bank account.

{4} In March 2014, after Defendant waived his arraignments, Defendant and the State entered into plea agreements in all three cases. Defendant agreed to plead guilty to the fraud and embezzlement charges in all three cases, and the State agreed to dismiss the racketeering charges in the Cook and Duncan cases.

{5} During the change of plea hearing, which addressed all three cases, the following events pertinent to our analysis occurred.¹ The judge began the plea colloquy by asking Defendant, "Do you understand the allegations in the criminal information [in the Cook case]?" Defendant responded, "Yes, sir, I do." The judge then paused to note that the plea agreements were unsigned, indicating that it would be necessary for Defendant to sign them before continuing. Defendant's counsel then informed Defendant that "[b]y signing here, you're acknowledging that you understand the charges that you're pleading to[.]" After receiving the signed plea agreements, the court asked Defendant whether he understood the allegations in the criminal information in the Cook case, and Defendant responded, "Yes, sir." Turning to the next set of charges, the judge asked, "[D]o you understand the allegations in the criminal information in [the Duncan case]?" Defendant responded, "Yes, sir." Next came a similar exchange about the final set of charges. The judge asked, "Do you understand the charges in connection with [the Men's Prayer Group] case?" Defendant again responded, "Yes, sir." After this exchange about the individual cases, the court asked Defendant's counsel whether "a basis in fact [existed] ... for believing that [Defendant was] guilty of the charges in all cases"; defense counsel responded that there did. The judge then asked whether Defendant "acknowledge[d] and agree[d] that the State ha[d] some evidence to prove [his] guilt of all the charges in all three cases." Defendant responded "Yes." Finally, the judge asked, "If you have entered into a plea agreement with the State, do you understand the agreement and do you consent to its terms?" "Yes, sir," Defendant answered. At no point during the hearing did the prosecutor or defense counsel describe the charges against Defendant or the conduct he had engaged in that would satisfy the essential elements of fraud and embezzlement. The district court accepted the guilty pleas in all three cases, finding that Defendant entered those pleas knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.

{6} After the court imposed a total sentence of twenty-one years of imprisonment for all of Defendant's convictions, he moved to withdraw his guilty pleas, arguing that they were not knowing and voluntary. During a hearing on the motion, Defendant testified that he did not understand the basis for his fraud and embezzlement convictions. Defendant also explained that he had never had any interactions with the criminal legal system before being charged in these three cases, that he had retained a lawyer at the outset, that he had only one conversation with that lawyer, and that the lawyer did not have the charging documents with her at the time and only gave him a "general idea" of the charges. Defendant testified that the lawyer who represented him at the plea hearing did not explain the elements of fraud and embezzlement.

{7} Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court should have allowed him to withdraw his guilty pleas because the court failed to (1) adequately inform him of the nature of the charges to which he was pleading guilty; (2) determine whether there was a factual basis for the pleas; and (3) inform Defendant of the maximum term of incarceration to which the pleas exposed Defendant. In the alternative, Defendant argued that he pleaded guilty because he was deprived of his constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel.

{8} A divided panel of this Court reversed on a ground not raised by Defendant. The majority held that "[b]ecause Defendant did not confess his guilt in open court by actually pleading guilty on the record in open court, there is no legal conviction[.]" State v. Yancey , 2017-NMCA-090, ¶ 37, 406 P.3d 1050, rev'd , 2019-NMSC-018, 451 P.3d 561. The dissent concluded that the law does not impose "a mandatory requirement that a defendant verbally plead guilty on the record before the district court could accept the plea." Id. ¶ 48 (M. Zamora, J., dissenting). Rather than reversing based on the issue that this Court raised sua sponte, the dissent would have resolved the appeal by addressing the issues raised by Defendant. Id. ¶ 49.

{9} Our Supreme Court granted the State's petition for a writ of certiorari and reversed, concluding that the majority's "bright-line rule" requiring a "formulaic recitation of the words ‘I plead guilty’ (or the like) [was] inconsistent with New Mexico and federal law." Yancey , 2019-NMSC-018, ¶ 21, 451 P.3d 561. The Court held that the district court did not err by failing to ask Defendant to recite such words on the record, id. , explaining that appellate review of whether a criminal defendant has, in fact, pleaded guilty instead depends on an assessment of "the totality of the circumstances." Id. ¶¶ 12-15 (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, the Court vacated this Court's opinion and remanded the case to this Court to consider the four issues Defendant raised. Id. ¶¶ 21-22.

DISCUSSION

{10} Because we conclude that Defendant was not properly advised of the nature of the charges to which he pleaded guilty, we reverse on this basis and do not reach the remaining issues on appeal. We begin by describing our standard of review. We then...