McGarry v. Mathis
| Decision Date | 13 December 1938 |
| Docket Number | 44421. |
| Citation | 282 N.W. 786,226 Iowa 37 |
| Parties | McGARRY v. MATHIS et al. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Appeal from District Court, Cass County; Earl Peters, Judge.
Suit in equity brought by a trustee in bankruptcy to annul a renunciation made by the bankrupt of a testamentary devise and to set aside for fraud certain conveyances the bankrupt had made. Plaintiff appealed. There was also a cross-appeal.
Affirmed on defendant-appellees' appeal; reversed on plaintiff-appellant's appeal and remanded with instructions.
John R. DeWitt, of Griswold, and Harry B. Swan, of Atlantic, for appellant.
Dalton & Dalton, of Atlantic, for appellees.
The will of James R. Graham, deceased, was allowed to probate in Cass County District Court on July 6, 1927. By its terms all his property of whatever nature was devised and bequeathed to his surviving spouse, defendant Melvina Graham, for and during her natural life. She filed her election on July 16 1927, accepting the terms and provisions of the will in lieu of all other legal rights in the estate. Subject to this life estate, the will, by its terms, devised and bequeathed all decedent's property to defendants Nathan R. Graham and Marcella Mathis, in equal shares. These two last mentioned beneficiaries were decedent's children, and his only heirs at law. Nathan R. Graham was appointed executor. His final report was approved and the estate closed on July 19 1928. On May 21, 1936, defendant Marcella Mathis executed and filed an instrument, the purport of which was that she absolutely and unequivocally renounced, disclaimed, rejected and refused to receive or accept, any rights, interests, or benefits whatsoever by, through, or under said will. On June 1, 1936, she executed to defendant Nathan R. Graham two deeds, which together described all the real estate of which the testator died seized. Her husband, defendant, George Mathis, joined as a grantor. In each of these instruments, immediately following the description of the real estate conveyed, appears this: " It being the intention of the grantors herein to convey all interest they have in the above described property, if any, as the said Marcella Mathis has heretofore renounced and disclaimed any and all interest in the said property." On December 21, 1936, Marcella Mathis filed in the United States District Court her voluntary petition in bankruptcy. She was adjudged a bankrupt on the same day. Of her estate in bankruptcy appellant became the trustee. In that capacity he filed the petition in this suit on May 13, 1937. Therein he prayed that the renunciation, of which we have spoken, be set aside; that the deeds made to Nathan R. Graham be held for naught because executed without adequate consideration and with intent to hinder and defraud the creditors of Marcella Mathis; that title to the undivided one-half interest of Marcella Mathis in all real estate of which the testator died seized be established in plaintiff-trustee, subject only to the life estate of Melvina Graham. On September 30, 1937, the district court sustained the motion of defendant Melvina Graham in which she moved that the plaintiff's action in equity be dismissed as to her. Whether the decree subsequently entered was binding on her is not discussed in the record before us. On October 5, 1937, the three remaining defendants, Marcella and George Mathis, and Nathan R. Graham, filed separate answers. The cause was tried on the merits on October 14, 1937. A decree was entered December 22, 1937. Therein the court held that the renunciation was valid; that the share and interest devised to Marcella Mathis having become intestate property, descends, subject to the life estate of Melvina Graham therein, to the surviving spouse Melvina Graham and to defendants Nathan R. Graham and Marcella Mathis, each taking one-third. The court also held that the deeds to Nathan R. Graham were without adequate consideration and in fraud of creditors, and decreed that they be cancelled and set aside on condition that plaintiff pay to Nathan R. Graham $2125 with 5% interest from June 1, 1936, within one year from the time the decree becomes final. It also was decreed that plaintiff-trustee is the owner of an undivided one-sixth of all the real estate of which James R. Graham died seized, subject only to said life estate therein, and to the payment of the $2125 and interest; that plaintiff pay one-half, and defendants Marcella Mathis and Nathan R. Graham one-half, of the court costs. Plaintiff has appealed from the decree. There was also a cross appeal perfected. The identity of the defendants so appealing is not entirely clear. Seemingly the cross-appellants are the three defendants who filed answers.
Plaintiff-appellant's first proposition is that the court should have held that the renunciation was invalid, because Marcella Mathis had placed herself in a position where she was estopped from making same. In support of this proposition it cannot be claimed that Marcella Mathis had received as a devisee any money or personal property of or from the estate. She had received nothing from either the corpus or the income. Nor had she conveyed, mortgaged or assigned any interest in the estate prior to the renunciation. Nor does it appear that she retained, secretly or otherwise, any benefits as a beneficiary. Elements of that nature being out of the case, we turn to what was pleaded in the petition as plaintiff's reason for claiming that the renunciation was invalid. This reason, as alleged, was the fact that Marcella Mathis had signed what appellant terms " A receipt voucher and waiver of notice of hearing on the final report in the estate of her father, James R. Graham, Probate No. 3439." This writing was in the following words:
" In the District Court of Cass County, Iowa.
In the Matter of the Estate of James R. Graham, Deceased.
No. 3439. Probate.
Final Report
Receipt and Waiver of Notice.
The undersigned Marcella Mathis being one of the surviving heirs at law of the said James R. Graham deceased, hereby acknowledges receipt in full from Nathan R. Graham, Executor of said estate, of all money and property due me as such heir of said decedent, as set forth in his final report herein; and I hereby waive notice of the pendency of this proceeding, and consent that the said report be approved by the Court and that said Executor be discharged from all further duties and liabilities in the matter of said estate, and that the sureties on his bond herein be released and exonerated.
Signed this 29th day of June, 1928.
Marcella Mathis."
Appellant says that by signing this paper Marcella Mathis permitted a final report to be approved, which set up and adjudicated that she was the owner of the half interest in the estate.
Had the final report shown payment to Marcella Mathis of some portion of the personal effects of decedent that were in the hands of the executor to be distributed under the terms of the will, as in case the life tenant had released some of the money for distribution, there might be reason for saying that the final report, and its approval, exhibited proof that Marcella Mathis had estopped herself from later renouncing all benefits under the will. Bogenrief v. Law, 222 Iowa 1303, 271 N.W. 229. But such facts do not appear. On the contrary the final report shows, and by approving this report the court adjudicated, that the surviving spouse was entitled to all the personal estate remaining after payment of debts, for application on what had been set off for her support, and to her alone it was distributed.
But, though the report, and the adjudication thereon, show that nothing was received by Marcella Mathis, appellant points out that in the waiver she acknowledged receipt in full " of all money and property due me as such heir of said decedent, as set forth in said final report herein." These words are in fact an acknowledgement of receiving nothing, when the reference made to what is set forth in said final report is given consideration. Yet it is urged that in this waiver are inferences that Marcella Mathis was not without interests in the property of the estate, and that she might have been entitled to a portion of the final distribution made by the executor. It is argued that such inferences amount to an assent to take under the will.
If it be conceded, arguendo, that such affirmative matters may be inferred from a mere waiver, something characteristically negative in terms and purpose, we then encounter the rule that proof of a material fact is not accomplished by inference from one isolated incident or circumstance, but from the aggregation of all the related circumstances that appear. Welsch v. Frusch Light & Power Co., 197 Iowa 1012, 193 N.W. 427. In this record are the following related facts and circumstances: Marcella Mathis did have interests in the estate. Their existence was not dependent upon assenting to the will. The waiver makes no reference to the devise or the will. So far as the waiver designates the nature of her interests, the only thing that is specific is the mentioning of her status as an heir of said decedent. While the word " heir" is sometimes loosely used, causing doubt as to the intended meaning, yet we are not warranted, on the record before us, in finding as a matter of fact that in this waiver the word was not used advisedly. Further, it is conceded that when the executor filed his final report the time had not yet...
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