McGarvey v. Darnall

• Decision Date: 01 November 1890
• Citation: 134 Ill. 367,25 N.E. 1005
• Parties: McGARVEY v. DARNALL et al.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

134 Ill. 367

25 N.E. 1005

McGARVEY

v.DARNALL et al.¹

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Nov. 1, 1890.

Appeal from appellate court, third district.

C. A. Keyes, for appellant.

Robert Matheny, for appellees.

BAKER, J.

This was a bill in chancery, filed August 21, 1883, by Harvey Darnall and Agnes Darnall against appellant and the other heirs of Amelia Darnall, who died on the 18th of February, 1883, intestate, in Henry county, Iowa, where she then resided, for the partition of certain lands in Sangamon county, Ill., of which she was seised at the time of her death. Appellant answered, and also filed a cross-bill, averring that letters of administration were duly granted upon the estate of said Amelia Darnall by the proper court, in Henry county, Iowa; that on September 18, 1883, she filed in that court a claim against said estate, and obtained a judgment thereon for $2,545, and costs, which judgment on appeal of the administrator was affirmed by the supreme court of that state, is in full force, and wholly unpaid; that said decedent left no personal property whatever, nor any real estate except the lands described in the petition; and praying that if said lands cannot be partitioned, and have to be sold, the court may decree the payment, out of the proceeds of her said judgment, with interest, and costs. It was shown that Amelia Darnall left no personal estate in Iowa, except $400 in worthless promissory notes, nor any in Illinois, except one bed and one bureau, the value of which does not appear; that letters of administration were granted to the petitioner, Harvey Darnall, by the county court of said Sangamon county, but not until the 11th of November, 1884; that no claim has been filed in said court, or presented to the administrator here, and that appellant is the only claimant, as creditor, against the said estate. On final hearing in the Sangamon circuit court, a decree was rendered dismissing the cross-bill, and ordering partition as prayed for in the original bill. That decree was affirmed in the appellate court, and the cause then brought here by this appeal.

It was incumbent upon appellant to establish the case made by her cross-bill by showing, at least prima facie, that the estate of Amelia Darnall, deceased, was justly indebted to her in the sum claimed, ($2,545,) or in some other amount. This she did not attempt to do otherwise than by offering in evidence the record of a judgment for said sum of $2,545, recovered by her in the circuit court of Henry county, Iowa, against A. Roads, the administrator appointed in that state. The doctrine is well settled that if letters of administration are granted in different states to different persons, in respect to estate left by the same deceased person, there is no privity between such administrators, and that therefore a judgment against the administrator in one state is not competent testimony to show a right of action against either a domiciliary or ancillary administrator in another state, or to affect assets in such other state. Story, Confl. Laws, § 522; Freem. Judgm. § 163; Judy v. Kelley, 11 Ill. 211;Rosenthal v. Renick, 44 Ill. 202;Ela v. Edwards, 13 Allen, 48;Stacy v. Thrasher, 6 How. 44;McLean v. Meek, 18 How. 16. While there is privity between the administrator and the heir in respect to personal estate left by the intestate, yet in respect to the realty of which such intestate died seised there is no privity. Stone v. Wood, 16 Ill. 177;Hopkins v. McCann, 19 Ill. 113; Freem. Judgm. supra; Low v. Bartlett, 8 Allen, 259. Hence, when application is made to sell lands for the payment of a claim for which a judgment has been obtained against the administrator, such judgment, even if recovered in the state or jurisdiction where the lands are situate, is not binding and conclusive. In the case at bar, the real estate sought to be subjected to the satisfaction of the claim of appellant is located in this state, and the judgment produced for the purpose of establishing the validity of such claim was rendered by a court of Iowa, and against an administrator who was appointed by a court of that state, and authorized to administer upon the property of the deceased within that state only. The judgment was incompetent to show, even prima facie, the validity of the claim. Rosenthal v. Renick, supra; Low v. Bartlett, supra. Had the judgment for the demand of appellant been rendered by a county court of this state, and in due course of an administration under the authority and laws of this state, then it would have been competent evidence against the heirs, and would have established, prima facie, a charge upon the real estate in Sangamon county, or from the proceeds to be derived from its sale. Section 60, c. 3, Rev. St. 1874, provides that when a claim is presented against an estate for allowance, if the executor, administrator, widow, heirs, or others interested in said estate, shall not object, the claimant shall be permitted to swear to his claim; but that if objection is made thereto, then it shall not be allowed without other sufficient evidence. In Mason v. Bair, 33 Ill. 194, this court, referring to this section, which was then a part of the statute of wills,...