McGee v. Armorel Public Schools
| Decision Date | 30 March 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. 91-308,91-308 |
| Citation | 309 Ark. 59,827 S.W.2d 137 |
| Parties | , 74 Ed. Law Rep. 368 John McGEE, Appellant, v. ARMOREL PUBLIC SCHOOLS, et al., Appellees. |
| Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
Richard W. Roachell, Little Rock, for appellant.
Dan Bufford, Little Rock, for appellees.
Appellant, John McGee, appeals an order of dismissal entered by the Mississippi County Chancery Court. McGee filed his complaint in chancery court seeking equitable relief from actions taken by the Armorel Public School District with respect to the termination or nonrenewal of his contract. The chancellor concluded that pursuant to the Teacher Fair Dismissal Act, McGee was a nonprobationary teacher and as such, his exclusive remedy from the board's actions was an appeal to circuit court. Accordingly, the chancellor dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. This appeal requires our interpretation of part of the Teacher Fair Dismissal Act, Ark.Code Ann. § 6-17-1502 (1987). Our jurisdiction is pursuant to Ark.Sup.Ct.R. 29(1)(c). We find the chancellor erred in determining McGee was a nonprobationary teacher, therefore we reverse and remand.
The portions of the Teacher Fair Dismissal Act that are relevant to this appeal provide as follows:
(a) As used in this subchapter, unless the context otherwise requires:
....
(2) "Probationary teacher" means a teacher who has not completed three (3) successive years of employment in the school district in which the teacher is currently employed. A teacher employed in a school district in this state for three (3) years shall be deemed to have completed the probationary period; however, an employing school district may, by a majority vote of its directors, provide for one (1) additional year of probationary status.
(b) A teacher who has completed three (3) successive years of employment in the school district in which the teacher is employed on July 4, 1983, or a teacher who has been given credit for a prior service in another district as authorized by subdivision (a)(2) of this section, is deemed to have completed the required probationary period.
Ark.Code Ann. § 6-17-1510 (1987)
(a) Upon conclusion of its hearing with respect to the termination or nonrenewal of a contract of a teacher who has been employed as a full-time teacher by the school district for less than three (3) continuous years, the board shall take action on the recommendations by the superintendent with respect to the termination or nonrenewal of such contract. The board's decision with regard to nonrenewal of a probationary teacher shall be final.
....
(d) The exclusive remedy for any nonprobationary teacher aggrieved by the decision made by the board shall be an appeal therefrom to the circuit court of the county in which the school district is located, within seventy-five (75) days of the date of written notice of the action of the board. Additional testimony and evidence may be introduced on appeal to show facts and circumstances showing that the termination or nonrenewal was lawful or unlawful. [Emphasis added.]
McGee's complaint was filed in chancery court and sought a declaration that the revocation of his resignation was effective and the school board's acceptance of his resignation was therefore void, a declaration that the school district was in violation of the Teacher Fair Dismissal Act by failing to comply with the notice procedures for nonrenewal or termination of his contract, and an injunction requiring reinstatement to his position for the 1991-92 school year. The school district's answer asserted that McGee failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted because his exclusive remedy for the alleged wrongdoing was an appeal to circuit court pursuant to the Teacher Fair Dismissal Act and that McGee did not have a separate cause of action in the chancery court.
After a hearing on McGee's complaint, the chancellor reviewed the testimony, exhibits, and briefs and entered his order. In his order, the chancellor found:
1. That Plaintiff, John McGee, is a non-probationary teacher as defined by Ark.Code Ann. § 6-17-1502(a)(2), having been employed for two (2) years in Decatur, Arkansas, and having completed two (2) additional years in the Armorel School District, that the second sentence of the statute cited above clearly states that a teacher employed in a school district in this state for three (3) years shall be deemed to have completed the probationary period. The two (2) sentences of the statute are not in conflict, but provide two (2) methods of achieving non-probationary status, i.e., three (3) years in a single district, or a total of three (3) years in school districts in the State of Arkansas:
2. That, under Ark.Code Ann. § 6-17-1510(d), "The exclusive remedy for any non-probationary teacher aggrieved by the decision made by the board shall be an appeal therefrom to the Circuit Court ..."
3. That this Court is without jurisdiction and the case should be dismissed.
IT IS, THEREFORE, CONSIDERED, ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Plaintiff's Petition for a Preliminary Injunction should be and is hereby denied; it is, also, ORDERED that Plaintiff's Complaint should be and is hereby dismissed at cost to the Plaintiff.
On appeal, McGee argues the trial court erred in dismissing his complaint because he is, as a matter of law, a probationary teacher with the right to address any appropriate forum with his cause of action. He contends there is only one way to achieve nonprobationary status--to complete three successive years of employment in the same school district. Thus, he argues the chancellor erred in "tacking-on" his two years of teaching in the Decatur, Arkansas school district with his two years in the appellee school district to reach the conclusion that he has taught three years in Arkansas schools and is therefore a nonprobationary teacher. The Armorel School District defends the chancellor's ruling by arguing that any interpretation other than the chancellor's would render the second sentence of section 6-17-1502(a) meaningless. The appellee school district contends that, as the chancellor stated in his order,...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Meredith v. Buchman, 4:99CV00418WRW.
...of the statute, reconciling the different provisions to make them consistent, harmonious, and sensible." McGee v. Armorel Pub. Sch., 309 Ark. 59, 63, 827 S.W.2d 137, 139 (1992). Defendants' argument and Judge Bogard's opinion focus on the language of the Medical Malpractice Act, Ark.Code An......
-
Foreman Sch. Dist. 25 v. Steele, 01-543
...However, this court has decided the issue of an appeal by a probationary teacher in a nonrenewal case in McGee v. Amorel Public Schools, 309 Ark. 59, 64, 827 S.W.2d 137 (1992), in which this court stated, "As a probationary teacher, McGee does not have a statutory right to appeal to circuit......
-
Throesch v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co.
...part of the statute, reconciling the different provisions to make them consistent, harmonious, and sensible. McGee v. Armorel Pub. Schs., 309 Ark. 59, 63, 827 S.W.2d 137, 139 (1992). Ark.Code. Ann. § 27-19-507 states "the driver or the owner of the vehicle involved in the accident shall fur......
-
Boyd v. State
...have a well-defined meaning, and the wording of the statute is clear, we give those words their plain meaning. McGee v. Armorel Pub. Schs., 309 Ark. 59, 827 S.W.2d 137 (1992). The plain meaning of the words "the prosecuting attorney has the discretion to file ... in circuit court and to pro......