McGee v. Secretary of State
| Decision Date | 04 May 2006 |
| Citation | 896 A.2d 933,2006 ME 50 |
| Parties | Kathleen C. McGEE v. SECRETARY OF STATE et al. |
| Court | Maine Supreme Court |
Gerald F. Petruccelli, Esq. (orally), Bruce A. McGlauflin, Esq., Petruccelli, Martin & Haddow, LLP, Portland, for plaintiff.
G. Steven Rowe, Attorney General, Phyllis Gardiner, Asst. Atty. Gen. (orally), Augusta, for defendant.
Michael A. Duddy, Esq. (orally), Kelly, Remmel & Zimmerman, Portland, for Intervenor Mary Adams.
Richard L. O'Meara, Esq. (orally), Christopher B. Branson, Esq., Murray, Plumb & Murray, Portland, for amicus curiae Democracy Maine, Inc.
Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and CLIFFORD, DANA, ALEXANDER, CALKINS, LEVY, and SILVER, JJ.
[¶ 1] Intervenor Mary Adams appeals from the judgment of the Superior Court (Kennebec County, Marden, J.), vacating a decision of the Secretary of State in which the Secretary concluded that a citizen initiative petition known as the "Taxpayer's Bill of Rights" is supported by the timely filing of a sufficient number of valid signatures. The court held that, pursuant to 21-A M.R.S. § 903-A (2005), the Secretary erred in accepting petitions that were filed one year and three days after the petition was issued. Because we conclude that the provision of section 903-A requiring petitions to be filed within one year of the petition's date of issuance is inconsistent with the Maine Constitution, we vacate the judgment of the Superior Court and remand for entry of judgment affirming the decision of the Secretary of State.
[¶ 2] Mary Adams submitted an application for a direct initiative of legislation to the Secretary of State in August 2004. After making revisions to the proposed language of the petition, the Secretary approved the form of the petition to be submitted to the voters, and he issued the form to Adams on October 21, 2004. See 21-A M.R.S. § 901 (2005). Following the printing of petitions as required by 21-A M.R.S. § 901(3-B) (2005), Adams and other supporters of the initiative (whom we refer to collectively herein as Adams) began collecting signatures. On Friday, October 21, 2005, Adams filed petitions with the Secretary containing 54,127 signatures. On the next business day, Monday, October 24, 2005, at 8:15 A.M., Adams filed petitions containing an additional 4,024 signatures.
[¶ 3] The number of signatures required for the measure to validly invoke the constitutional requirement of presentation to the Legislature was 50,519 (ten percent of the total number of votes for governor in the 2002 election). ME. CONST. art. IV, pt. 3, § 18(2). Although it is not clear in the record, it appears to be undisputed that the petitions filed on October 21 did not contain sufficient valid signatures to meet the constitutionally-required total. Thus, the petitions filed on October 24 were necessary to a successful filing. The Secretary reviewed all of the petitions and issued his decision on February 21, 2006.1 Counting the petitions filed on both October 21 and October 24, he found that Adams had submitted 6,540 invalid signatures and 51,611 valid signatures. The Secretary thus declared the petition to be valid, meaning that it contained enough signatures to qualify for a vote on the citizens' initiative.
[¶ 4] On February 24, 2006, Kathleen McGee filed in the Superior Court a petition for review of final agency action pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 80C and 21-A M.R.S. § 905(2) (2005), challenging the Secretary's decision to accept the petitions filed on October 24, 2005. The court granted Adams's motion to intervene. Following oral argument, the court entered its judgment on April 4. The court vacated the Secretary's decision, holding that the Secretary had no authority to accept the petitions that were filed beyond the statutory deadline and the deadline was not unconstitutional because "[i]t is patently obvious that the legislature has enacted a mandatory scheme to provide a degree of impossibility in the violation of the constitutional provision requiring signatures no older than one year from the date on the petition." Adams appealed, and we ordered expedited briefing and argument in accordance with 21-A M.R.S. § 905(3) (2005).
[¶ 5] Because the Superior Court acted as an intermediate appellate court, we directly review the Secretary of State's decision. Palesky v. Sec'y of State, 1998 ME 103, ¶ 9, 711 A.2d 129, 132. This appeal involves the interpretation of constitutional and statutory provisions, which are issues of law that we review de novo. See Melanson v. Sec'y of State, 2004 ME 127, ¶ 8, 861 A.2d 641, 644; see 21-A M.R.S. § 905(3) ().
[¶ 6] The power of the people of Maine to legislate by direct initiative is set forth in article IV, part third, section 18 of the Maine Constitution. Section 18 includes two timeframes relevant to this case. The first sets filing dates anchored to the schedules of legislative sessions:
The electors may propose to the Legislature for its consideration any bill ... by written petition addressed to the Legislature or to either branch thereof and filed in the office of the Secretary of State by the hour of 5:00 p.m., on or before the 50th day after the date of convening of the Legislature in first regular session or on or before the 25th day after the date of convening of the Legislature in second regular session. If the 50th or 25th day, whichever applies, is a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, the period runs until the hour of 5:00 p.m., of the next day which is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday.
ME. CONST. art. IV, pt. 3, § 18(1).
[¶ 7] The second timeframe is a limit related to the age of the signatures gathered by circulators. "The date each signature was made shall be written next to the signature on the petition, and no signature older than one year from the written date on the petition shall be valid." Id. § 18(2).
[¶ 8] Applying these constitutional timeframes, the fiftieth day after the convening of the first regular session of the 122nd Legislature was January 20, 2005, and the twenty-fifth day after the convening of the second regular session was January 30, 2006. All of the signatures in the petitions presented by Adams were obtained within one year of October 24, 2005. Thus, there is no question that by filing sufficient valid signatures on or before October 24, 2005, and before January 30, 2006, Adams met the constitutional filing requirements for proposing an initiative to the second regular session of the 122nd Legislature.
[¶ 9] We turn then to the statutory provision at issue. The Constitution authorizes the Legislature to enact laws "not inconsistent with the Constitution for applying the people's veto and direct initiative" and "to establish procedures for determination of the validity of written petitions." ME. CONST. art. IV, pt. 3, § 22;2 see also Me. Taxpayers Action Network v. Sec'y of State, 2002 ME 64, ¶ 10, 795 A.2d 75, 79 ().
[¶ 10] Exercising that authority, the Legislature has enacted a number of statutes establishing procedural rules for initiatives. See 21-A M.R.S. §§ 901-906 (2005). Pertinent to the matter before us is 21-A M.R.S. § 903-A, which provides that petitions must be filed within one year of their issuance:
1. Filing. Filing of petitions in accordance with the deadlines specified in the Constitution of Maine, Article IV, Part Third, Section 18 must be completed within one year of the date of issuance under this chapter.
2. Invalid petition. Petitions not filed in accordance with the deadlines specified in the Constitution of Maine Article IV, Part Third, Section 18 within one year of the date of issuance under this chapter are invalid for circulation.
The meaning and validity of this statute are the central issues in this appeal.
[¶ 11] The date of issuance of Adams's petition was October 21, 2004. See 21-A M.R.S. § 901. The petitions she filed on October 24, 2005, thus were not filed within one year of the date of issuance as required by section 903-A. Adams and the Secretary nevertheless argue that the Secretary had the authority to accept those petitions.
[¶ 12] In assessing their arguments, we begin with the plain language of the statute. See Melanson, 2004 ME 127, ¶ 8, 861 A.2d at 644. We agree with McGee and the trial court that the plain language of section 903-A(1) establishes a filing deadline one year after the date of issuance. It is apparent that the statutory scheme anticipates that an initiative petition must meet both the constitutional timeframes and the statutory deadline calculated from the date of issuance. Neither the Constitution nor the statutes explicitly provides the Secretary with the authority to extend those very specific timeframes.
[¶ 13] Adams and the Secretary argue, however, that petitions may be filed after the one-year deadline in section 903-A(1) as long as they "substantially comply" with constitutional and statutory requirements. The Secretary cites cases from a number of other states in which courts have adopted a substantial compliance standard in order to protect the people's right under the state constitution to legislate by direct initiative. See, e.g., Costa v. Superior Court, 37 Cal.4th 986, 39 Cal.Rptr.3d 470, 128 P.3d 675, 690 (2006); Feldmeier v. Watson, 211 Ariz. 444, 123 P.3d 180, 183 (2005); Armstrong v. O'Toole, 917 P.2d 1274, 1276 (Colo.1996). He also cites a concurring opinion in Loontjer v. Robinson, 266 Neb. 902, ...
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