McGee v. State, 90-KA-878
| Decision Date | 22 April 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. 90-KA-878,90-KA-878 |
| Citation | 608 So.2d 1129 |
| Parties | Tom McGEE, Jr. v. STATE of Mississippi. |
| Court | Mississippi Supreme Court |
Jessie L. Evans, Blackmon Blackmon & Evans, Canton, for appellant.
Michael C. Moore, Atty. Gen., John R. Henry, Jr., Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee.
Before HAWKINS, P.J., and PRATHER and McRAE, JJ.
McRAE, Justice, for the Court:
This is an appeal from the Circuit Court of Holmes County before which appellant Tom McGee, Jr. ("McGee") was convicted on August 17, 1990, for the sale of cocaine. McGee was sentenced to serve a term of thirty (30) years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections and to pay a fine of $25,000. We reverse and remand for further findings regarding the appellant's speedy trial claims. We also reverse on grounds that the lower court erred in failing to grant the appellant's jury instruction concerning the discrediting or impeachment of a witness. The case is remanded for a new trial unless it is determined that McGee is entitled to dismissal and discharge on speedy trial grounds.
McGee was indicted on October 19, 1988. On October 21, 1988, the court continued the case until the April, 1989 Term. The court did not express the grounds for continuance, stating merely that "good and sufficient cause" existed. On April 21, 1989, the court entered a second continuance upon motion by defendant, postponing the trial until June 6, 1989. In his motion for continuance, McGee stated that defense counsel had other trials and hearings pending and would not have sufficient time to prepare. The trial was not held in June of 1989 and the record reflects no motion or order for continuance. However, on January 12, 1990, the State moved for another continuance, and the court shelved the case until the next term. The record is silent from January 12, 1990 until August 16, 1990, the date upon which McGee moved for dismissal on grounds that he had been denied a speedy trial. The motion was denied. Without being specific, the court stated four conclusionary reasons for denying McGee's motion to dismiss: (1) the "greatly increased" number of drug cases coming before the court; (2) the inability of the court to promptly dispose of the large number of cases arising during each term of court; (3) the "severely restricted" availability of drug analysts; and (4) the chronic delay in obtaining drug analyses from the Mississippi State Crime Lab. The court On appeal, McGee assigns several issues for our review. Of these, we are primarily concerned with whether the proceedings below abridged the defendant's right to a speedy trial and with the trial court's refusal to grant McGee's proposed jury instruction concerning the credibility of impeached witnesses. The other assignments of error are without merit.
accordingly found that "it was not physically and humanly possible for the cases to be brought forward and tried within the two hundred and seventy days and that it is through no fault nor neglect of the State's attorney that this case has been delayed, therefore, the motion will be denied." The court postponed the trial until the following day. Following McGee's trial and conviction, the court denied McGee's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, for a new trial
FACTS
Sometime after seven o'clock p.m. on August 24, 1987, Donna Conner, an undercover narcotics agent, and a confidential informant who knew McGee, followed McGee's automobile to a nightclub. Conner and the informant approached McGee while he was still seated in his vehicle, and the informant introduced Conner as a friend who wanted to buy cocaine. McGee produced a purple Crown Royale bag from which he extracted a quarter-gram packet of cocaine. He admittedly sold the packet to Conner for twenty-five dollars.
McGee's sole defense at trial was entrapment; i.e., that he was not predisposed to make the sale. According to McGee's testimony, he had only one packet at the time of the sale and he possessed that packet for his personal use, not for the purpose of sale. To prove predisposition to sell, the State introduced Conner's testimony that the Crown-Royale bag contained at least "two or three" additional packets. Conner further stated: "I could see other packets in his hand as he was taking his hand out of the bag to give me only one packet." However, as counsel for defense brought out on cross-examination, Conner did not state in her crime report that the bag contained more than one packet of cocaine, nor did she mention the fact when the officers and agents involved in the operation conferred after the sale. Further, in response to a query concerning whether Conner had mentioned the presence of additional packets, Narcotics Agent Dean Gibbs (who provided surveillance for the operation) stated: "All I remember she [sic] saying [was] that she couldn't see because it was down inside and he reached down between his legs." On the other hand, Agent Shirlene Anderson, who drove Conner to and from the scene, testified that Conner mentioned the presence of other drugs while the two were returning home after concluding the operation.
LAW
McGee argues that his trial and conviction violate Miss.Code Ann. Sec. 99-17-1 (Supp.1991) which requires that a defendant be brought to trial within 270 days of arraignment unless good cause is shown. Excluding the time consumed by continuances granted upon motion by the defendant, 1 McGee was tried some 669 days after his arrest and arraignment. 2 The relevant events and the times at which they occurred are set out below:
At issue are the three delays for which the record reflects no contemporaneous expression of cause (October 21, 1988 to April 12, 1989; June 16, 1989 to January 11, 1990; and April 3, 1990 to August 16, 1990). These three delays, totaling 518 days, are the ones McGee emphasized in his August 16, 1990 motion to dismiss. 3
Neither the trial court nor the parties recorded explanations for the delays at issue. The October 21, 1988 Order of Continuance merely states that "[f]or good and sufficient cause the Court is one [sic] of the opinion that the above stated case should be continued until the next term of court." Such a "bland and generic" recitation of "good cause" does not suffice to satisfy the requirements of Sec. 99-17-1. Yarber v. State, 573 So.2d 727, 729 (Miss.1990); Vickery v. State, 535 So.2d 1371, 1375 (Miss.1988). The record does not even reflect continuances for the delays beginning June 16, 1989 and January 11, 1990.
At the August 16, 1990, hearing on McGee's motion to dismiss, however, the trial court found as follows:
The motion will be denied for these reasons:
One, in the past five years the number of indictments and cases coming before this Court for disposal have greatly increased, most of them--most of the increase being in dealing directly with drug offenses. For example, the Court remembers one term, I believe it was last year, where out of sixty indictments, thirty-nine of them were for illicit drug dealings.
Two, there simply does not exist enough days during term of this Court to deal with the large number of cases that this Court must dispose of in the allotted time.
Three, the availability of drug analysts to testify is severely restricted and there appears in this case at least one continuance for this very reason.
Next, number four, there is a growing problem with getting the results of drug analyses of the Mississippi State Crime Lab because of the overload of cases that they have to handle, and sometimes as long as a year elapses before the analysis is ready.
The Court, therefore, finds that it was not physically and humanly possible for the cases to be brought forward and tried within the two hundred and seventy days and that it is through no fault nor neglect of the State's attorney that this case has been delayed; therefore, the motion will be denied.
The trial court's conclusions, while perhaps valid from an administrative standpoint, are general and contain no specific findings regarding the instant case per se. Given that the Holmes County Circuit Court system and the State Crime Lab are overwhelmed with drug cases, the State nevertheless bears the burden of positively demonstrating that the backlog actually caused the delay in this particular case. See Williamson v. State, 512 So.2d 868, 877 (Miss.1987) (); Nations v. State, 481 So.2d 760 (Miss.1985) (same). If the State can so demonstrate, then the trial court's denial of McGee's motion to dismiss may be proper since docket congestion can constitute "good cause" for delay. See Williamson v. State, 512 So.2d 868, 876-77 (Miss.1987) (); see also Adams v. State, 583 So.2d 165, 167 (Miss.1991) (); Yarber v. State, 573 So.2d 727, 729 (Miss.1990) (same); Kinzey v. State, 498 So.2d 814, 816-17 (Miss.1986) (same); Bailey v. State, 463 So.2d 1059, 1063 (Miss.1985) (same); State v. Sistruck, 404 So.2d 564, 565 (Miss.1981) (same). Otherwise, the ruling must fall for lack of evidence to support it. On remand, the trial court is directed to consider whether the specific facts of the instant case give rise to good cause for delay. The court should make specific findings as opposed to stating general conclusions.
McGee argues that even if crowded dockets did in fact delay his trial, the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss since the reasons for delay were not made part of the record at the time when the delays occurred. After-the-fact justifications, according to McGee, will not suffice. In his brief, McGee contends:
Good cause is determined at the time the case is continued...
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