McGeehan v. McGeehan
Decision Date | 10 August 2017 |
Docket Number | No. 93 Sept. Term, 2016.,93 Sept. Term, 2016. |
Citation | 167 A.3d 579,455 Md. 268 |
Parties | Ann MCGEEHAN v. Michael MCGEEHAN |
Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Argued by Mitchell Y. Mirviss (Venable LLP of Rockville, MD; David S. Coaxum, Offit Kurman, P.A. of Fulton, MD) on brief, for Petitioner.
Argued by Allen J. Kruger (Elizabeth A. Kruger and Brendan J. Murphy, Law Offices Kruger DiGiovanni Aluisi, LLC of Laurel, MD) on brief, for Respondent.
Judith A. Wolfer, Esquire, The House of Ruth Maryland, Inc., Domestic Violence Legal Clinic, Baltimore, MD, amici curiae for The House of Ruth Maryland Domestic Violence Legal Clinic National Network to End Domestic Violence.
Argued before Barbera, C.J., Greene, Adkins, McDonald, Watts, Getty, Lynne A. Battaglia (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ.
We are asked to consider whether an agreement entered into during the course of a marriage made manifest by three deeds by which title was transferred to the wife, Ann McGeehan, Petitioner, by her husband, Michael McGeehan, Respondent, was sufficient to exclude those properties from consideration as marital property under Section 8–201(e) of the Family Law Article of the Maryland Code (1984, 2012 Repl. Vol.).1 We granted certiorari to address the following question:
Did the Court of Special Appeals err in affirming the trial court's determination that the parties' oral agreement, with consideration, that property deemed Wife's sole and separate property did not constitute a "valid agreement" under the requirements of [the Family Law Article] § 8–201(e) ?
McGeehan v. McGeehan , 451 Md. 580, 155 A.3d 435 (2017).
In October of 2014, Ann and Michael McGeehan separated after an eighteen year marriage, during which they had eight children. Two months later, Mr. McGeehan filed for divorce in the Circuit Court for Howard County, and an acrimonious debate ensued, which culminated in a divorce in December of 2015. The one year battle consumed volumes of the record, but our analysis will be focused on only that which engenders the discussion of three pieces of real property: property located on Embassy Park Road in Washington, DC ("Embassy Park"), purchased in December of 1998 and titled initially in both names as tenants by the entirety; another property located in Mason Neck, Virginia ("Mason Neck"), purchased in 2000 and titled initially in the husband's name; and property located on Farside Road in Ellicott City, Maryland ("Farside"), purchased in 2002 and titled as tenants by the entirety.
A fourth property located at Log Jump Trail in Ellicott City, Maryland ("Log Jump"), purchased in September of 2013 by the McGeehans and titled as tenants by the entirety is relevant, because proceeds of sales of the Farside and Embassy Park properties apparently were rolled into the Log Jump purchase. Only the Log Jump and Mason Neck properties were owned by the parties at the time of their divorce.2
The present dispute between the parties before us was queued up in April of 2005 when a series of events occurred that were encapsulated by the Circuit Court Judge in her findings:
[I]n the year 2000, wife learned the husband had taken $50,000 out of her sole bank account without her knowledge or permission to purchase a piece of property in [Mason Neck], Virginia. Husband told her afterward he had taken the money to purchase the property but wife now says she doesn't know if that's why he took the money.
The judge then discussed Mr. McGeehan's stock trading, which ultimately lead to the April 2005 real property transactions:
Husband testified he accessed many of wife's accounts and that she was aware that he did so since it was he who handled the family finances. In addition, he had changed the document that wife had signed to allow him to take $5,000 out of her premarital security account and he changed it to read $15,000. Throughout the parties' marriage, from time to time—from the time husband worked for Merrill Lynch, husband would invest in the stock market. He made a lot of money early on but lost as much as he had earned when the dot com bubble burst. Husband discontinued stocking trading for a period of time when the family lived in Europe but resumed in about 2008 and continued to trade for several years. His last trade was about six months ago. It appears from the evidence that husband has lost significantly more in the stock market than he has profited.
The judge then described the circumstances of the transfer in April of 2005 that lead to this embroilment:
In 2005, wife discovered that husband had been trading her premarital stock account and she discovered that when she got a tax bill from the State of Virginia for over $592,000. This was a time of crisis for the couple and at that time it led them both to contemplate the future of their marriage. Wife made a new will leaving everything to her children and had her family's estate attorney write up a waiver of the statutory share for her husband to sign. Wife lost trust in husband, demanded that he transfer the parties' Embassy Park Drive home, Farside home in Ellicott City and the property in Virginia into her sole name. Husband alleges that this was done for estate planning purposes due to his risky employment but it's more credible that it was done to appease wife who was distraught over losing her inherited stock portfolio. The parties continued in the marriage after this. Husband continued to be in charge of the parties' finances.
The judge also found that, "All of the premarital funds had been co-mingled at that point."
The gravamen of the question raised by Ms. McGeehan, however, arises as a result of the judge's determination that the Mason Neck property retitled in 2005 to Ms. McGeehan's name was marital property:
The [Mason Neck], Virginia property was disputed property. It was initially titled in husband's name. It was transferred to wife's name in 2005 at a time when wife had recently learned her premarital estate had been traded away in the stock market. It would seem that it was the parties' mutual agreement that the property would be wife's property. Under the law of Maryland, even though property is titled in the name of one party or another party, it remains marital property and can be excluded by agreement of the parties. But the law is clear that to do that, and I just learned this, the agreement has to be specific not just that it's my sole and separate property but it is my sole and separate property and will be excluded from marital property in the future. It has to be explicitly stated. It was not explicitly stated. I've seen no evidence that it was. So, under the cases of Golden versus Golden and Falise versus Falise , the property is now marital. However, it's titled in wife's name. Wife is the only person as the titled owner who can give an opinion as to its value and since the property was not appraised, I have to find that the value of that property is $600,000.00.
The Judge also determined that the Log Jump property, titled as tenants by the entirety upon purchase, was marital property, without any discussion of whether any portion of it was excluded by valid agreement or any consideration of its financial underpinnings or source of funds3 :
There is a house on Log Jump Trail, 11640 Log Jump Trail. It is titled tenants by the entireties. It is marital property. Its value is $1,568,200.00. There is a debt against that property of $445,000. So the value of that property is ... $1,123,200.
The "gift deed" executed and recorded in 2005 between the McGeehans with respect to the Mason Neck property conveyed the property to Ms. McGeehan as her "sole separate and equitable estate":
The "gift deed" conveying the couple's Embassy Park property to Ms. McGeehan similarly provided that the property would be "her sole separate and equitable estate":
With respect to the Farside property, the deed transferring the property from "Husband and Wife to Wife"4 provided:
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Persaud v. Goad
... ... of this statutory scheme is "to ensure that the value of both real and personal property is distributed in a fair and equitable manner." McGeehan v ... McGeehan , 455 Md. 268, 279 (2017). Statutory provisions authorizing a monetary award are "designed to accomplish an equitable division of the ... ...
-
Lloyd v. Niceta
... ... sum provision constituted a penalty, [ 6 ] but was enforceable. The ... circuit court relied on McGeehan v. McGeehan , 455 ... Md. 268, 298, 167 A.3d 579, 596-97 (2017) (citation omitted), ... where this Court noted that "many postnuptial ... ...
-
Shymanski v. Shymanski
... ... the entirety property was marital[,]" thereby ... superseding, in part, the Court's holding in Grant ... McGeehan v. McGeehan , 455 Md. 268, 284 (2017). That ... amendment did not, however, affect the applicability of the ... Grant v. Zich formula ... ...
-
Matcha v. Bersoff-Matcha
... ... Maryland Code (1984, 2012 Repl. Vol.); McGeehan v ... McGeehan , 455 Md. 268, 280-81 (2017). The Court of Appeals, in McGeehan , 455 Md. at 282-84, in interpreting Section 8-201(e), held that the ... ...
-
§ 4.06 Distinguishing Between Premarital, Post-Marital and Reconciliation Agreements
...Minnesota: Minn. Rev. Stat. § 519.11. Texas: Tex. Fam. Code § 4.104. Wisconsin: Wis. Stat. Ann. § 766.58. [409] McGeehan v. McGeehan, 455 Md. 268, 167 A.3d 579 (2016).[410] Minn. Stat. Ann. § 519.11.[411] Barchella v. Barchella, 44 A.D.3d 696, 844 N.Y.S.2d 78 (2007).[412] In re Marriage of ......
-
Orders for Use and Possession of A Family Home and Family Use Personal Property
...298 Md. 552, 562-63, 471 A.2d 705, 710 (1984).[772] Harbom v. Harbom, 134 Md. App. 430, 760 A.2d 272 (2000).[773] McGeehan v. McGeehan, 455 Md. 268, 167 A.3d 579 (2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 1288 (2018). [774] Caccamise v. Caccamise, 130 Md. App. 505, 518-19, 747 A.2d 221, 228, cert. de......
-
Step 3: the Trial Court's Consideration of Factors and Determination of the Monetary Award
...477 A.2d 1163 (1984) (The Supreme Court of Maryland opinion was abrogated by statute on other grounds as stated in McGeehan v. McGeehan, 455 Md. 268, 167 A.3d 579 (2017)).[359] Malin, 153 Md. App. at 429-30, 837 A.2d at 219; Grant, 53 Md. App. at 616, 456 A.2d at 79.[360] Flanagan v. Flanag......
-
Step 1: Classification of Marital and Nonmarital Property
...v. Rogers, 271 Md. 603, 607, 319 A.2d 119 (1974).[87] Allender v. Allender, 199 Md. 541, 87 A.2d 608 (1952).[88] See McGeehan v. McGeehan, 455 Md. 268, 167 A.3d 579 (2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 1288 (2018); Brewer v. Brewer, 156 Md. App. 77, 846 A.2d (2002),[89] Fam. Law § 8-201(e)(3)(i......