McGill v. Commonwealth
| Citation | 216 Ky. 430 |
| Parties | McGill v. Commonwealth. |
| Decision Date | 09 November 1926 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court (Kentucky) |
1. Indictment and Information. — Indictment for rape of child of tender years, charging offense was committed during particular month in particular year, was sufficient against motion to make more specific.
2. Criminal Law. — Reprimand of defendant's attorney by court for misconduct at trial, and for misconduct in trial of other cases, was prejudicial error for referring to misconduct in other cases.
3. Witnesses. — In prosecution for rape of child of tender years, excluding evidence that civil suit by father and mother of child against defendant to set aside deed was pending was error.
4. Witnesses. — In weighing testimony jury should be in possession of all facts calculated to exert influence on witness.
5. Criminal Law — Excluding Purported Letter from Father of Prosecutrix to Defendant was Not Error, in Absence of Evidence of Genuineness or Avowal that Genuineness would be Established. — In prosecution for rape of child, in absence of evidence of genuineness or avowal that genuineness would be established, excluding letter reported to have been signed by father of child, and claimed by defendant to have been received by him, was not error.
6. Witnesses — Excluding Letters and Papers Signed by Witness, Corroborating Prosecutrix, Showing Her Interest in Rape Prosecution, was Prejudicial Error. — In prosecution for rape of child, where testimony of woman with whom child boarded as to statement by prosecutrix to her 16 months after alleged offense was received without objection, excluding letters and papers signed by her and sent to attorney for child's parents in pending suit against defendant to set aside deed, showing only way she expected compensation for board was out of proceeds of such civil suit, was prejudicial error.
Appeal from Grant Circuit Court.
C.C. ADAMS and B.F. MENEFEE for appellant.
FRANK E. DAUGHERTY, Attorney General, and G.D. LITSEY, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Reversing.
Appellant was convicted of rape and his punishment fixed at five years' imprisonment.
The prosecuting witness, Fannie Dunaway, the daughter of R.K. Dunaway, fixed the time of the offense during the latter part of February, 1923, and the place at appellant's barn some distance from his house. She also testified to other acts of intercourse after that time, and the testimony as to these acts was properly limited by the court. It developed that the prosecuting witness never told any one of the occurrences until a year or more after they happened, and never made any charges against appellant until February, 1925, more than two years after the alleged offense. On the other hand, appellant testified that he had never had intercourse with the prosecuting witness on any occasion; that during the month of February, 1923, he was ill from the flu and that the only two occasions on which he was out of the house were on February 15 and March 3. In this he is corroborated by members of his family and also by his physician, who attended him on several occasions during the month of February.
The indictment charged that the offense was committed on the — day of February, 1923. Appellant's motion for a bill of particulars stating the precise date was overruled, and of this he complains and insists that he was placed at a disadvantage in preparing for the trial. In a case of this kind, where the alleged offense was committed on a child of tender years, it is extremely difficult to fix the precise date, and if the Commonwealth could not comply with the order of court requiring the precise date to be given, it would result in the acquittal of the accused. In view of these circumstances, we are constrained to hold that an indictment charging that the offense was committed during a particular month during a particular year was sufficiently definite, and that the motion to make more specific was properly overruled.
Another contention is that the court improperly reprimanded appellant's attorney in the presence of the jury and thereby prejudiced the rights of appellant. The evidence discloses that during the cross-examination of the prosecuting witness appellant's attorney moved up from behind the attorney's table, and, on objection by the Commonwealth's attorney, a colloquy occurred between the attorney and the court as to the propriety of his conduct. The attorney then proceeded with the cross-examination, and, after asking the witness as to certain dates and receiving the reply, "I don't know," asked the following question: "You fixed the days very well a while ago, you know all about dates, holidays, what is the reason you don't know?" Thereupon the following occurred:
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Alexander v. Duncan
... ... source, it was incumbent on appellees, plaintiffs below, to ... prove title either of record from the commonwealth or by ... adverse possession, which they failed to do. In short, ... appellees' position is that a plaintiff in ejectment ... cannot prove title ... appellant's counsel for misconduct in the trial of other ... cases. It may be that the court went too far in the ... reprimand, McGill v. Commonwealth, 216 Ky. 430, 287 ... S.W. 949; but, as the verdict of the jury is fully justified ... by ... ...