McGinley-Ellis v. Ellis
| Decision Date | 19 October 1993 |
| Docket Number | GINLEY-ELLI,A,No. 49A02-9303-CV-135,49A02-9303-CV-135 |
| Citation | 622 N.E.2d 213 |
| Parties | In re the Marriage of: Anne Marie Mcppellant-Petitioner, v. Charles R. ELLIS, Appellee-Respondent. 1 . |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Nancy L. Cross, Miroff, Cross, Ruppert & Klineman, Indianapolis, for appellant-petitioner.
Bruce M. Pennamped, Lowe Gray Steele & Hoffman, Indianapolis, for appellee-respondent.
Anne Marie McGinley-Ellis [Anne] appeals several portions of the decree which dissolved her marriage to Charles R. Ellis [Charles]. We reverse the property settlement and child support portions of the decree and remand with instructions. In all other respects, we affirm.
The facts in the light most favorable to the trial court's judgment indicate that Anne and Charles were married on July 26, 1985. Two children were born of the marriage, Catherine (born August 29, 1987), and Serita (born November 25, 1988). The petition for dissolution was filed on November 9, 1990.
The net marital estate was worth approximately $231,000.00. The trial court awarded Charles property worth approximately $200,500.00 and awarded Anne property worth approximately $30,500.00 for an approximate 87-13 division of the net marital estate in Charles' favor. However, the trial court's findings purport to divide the property 60-40 in favor of Anne.
The largest marital asset was the stock in Charles' family's business, the Paint and Auto Supply Corporation [PASCO], an Indiana corporation engaged in the business of selling automotive paint and painting supplies. PASCO was established by Charles' father and partner in 1959. Charles worked for PASCO in the summers throughout his childhood. Charles left college in 1979 when his father asked him to work at PASCO full-time toward the end of eventually assuming ownership of PASCO. Charles became the primary operating officer in 1983 after his father suffered a heart attack. During the marriage, Charles was elevated to president of PASCO and worked long hours at PASCO, often not returning from work until well after the children were in bed.
At the time the parties were married, Charles owned 22 shares of PASCO stock. During the marriage, Charles' parents gave him an additional 140 shares of stock. The shares were transferred over time in order to lessen the parents' federal gift and estate tax liability. Charles' parents testified at trial that Charles had received the stock as a result of his efforts on behalf of the business and that Charles' siblings had received no stock since they had not worked in the business. Charles admitted that he had begun working in the business full-time with the express intention of ultimately acquiring ownership of PASCO through his efforts.
Charles concedes that the 162 shares of PASCO stock in the marital pot are worth approximately $190,000.00. However, the trial court valued the PASCO stock in the marital estate at $9,331.00 representing the appreciation in value of the 22 shares that Charles brought into the marriage.
Charles requested the court to award the parties joint legal custody of the children with primary physical custody in Anne. Anne requested sole legal custody. The trial court awarded the parties joint legal custody with primary physical custody in Anne.
Charles derives his income from the operation of PASCO. For the purposes of computing the child support award resulting from an application of the guidelines, the trial court found that Charles' income consisted of his salary from PASCO ($814.00 per week) plus the "in kind" compensation of PASCO's provision of a truck for Charles' use ($93.00 per week). This income analysis translates into an annual income of $47,169.00 per year. Anne is not employed outside the home: the trial court imputed some income to her. The trial court found that the child support award resulting from an application of the guidelines was $200.00 per week. The trial court ordered Anne to execute IRS Form 8332 in order to waive the dependency tax exemptions in favor of Charles "for all future years."
Additional facts are supplied as necessary.
When reviewing a claim that the trial court improperly divided marital property, we must decide whether the trial court's decision constitutes an abuse of discretion. Van Riper v. Keim (1982), Ind.App., 437 N.E.2d 130. We consider only that evidence most favorable to the trial court's disposition of the property. Benda v. Benda (1990), Ind.App., 553 N.E.2d 159, trans. denied. We presume the trial court followed the law and made all the proper considerations in making its decision. White v. White (1981), Ind.App., 425 N.E.2d 726. We will reverse only if there is no rational basis for the award, that is, if the result is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. In re Marriage of Salas (1983), Ind.App., 447 N.E.2d 1176.
Indiana Code 31-1-11.5-11, governing property distributions in contested divorces, reads as follows:
(b) ... the court shall divide the property of the parties, whether owned by either spouse prior to the marriage, acquired by either spouse in his or her own right after the marriage and prior to final separation of the parties, or acquired by their joint efforts, in a just and reasonable manner, ...
(c) The court shall presume that an equal division of the marital property between the parties is just and reasonable. However, this presumption may be rebutted by a party who presents relevant evidence, including evidence concerning the following factors, that an equal division would not be just and reasonable:
(1) The contribution of each spouse to the acquisition of the property, regardless of whether the contribution was income producing.
(2) The extent to which the property was acquired by each spouse prior to the marriage or through inheritance or gift.
(3) The economic circumstances of each spouse at the time the disposition of the property is to become effective, including the desirability of awarding the residence or the right to dwell in that residence for such periods as the court may deem just to the spouse having custody of any children.
(4) The conduct of the parties during the marriage as related to the disposition or dissipation of their property.
(5) The earnings or earning ability of the parties as related to a final division of property and final determination of the property rights of the parties.
Following the legislative adoption of the equal division presumption, we placed the requirement upon trial courts, when effecting an unequal division of marital property, to state the reasons based on the evidence which establish that an equal division is not just and reasonable. In re Marriage of Davidson (1989), Ind.App., 540 N.E.2d 641. However, our supreme court has held that express trial court findings will not be compelled for insubstantial deviations from precise mathematical equality. Kirkman v. Kirkman (1990), Ind., 555 N.E.2d 1293.
At the outset, we note that the present deviation from equality amounts to approximately $84,811.00 ($231,000.00/2 - $30,688.94 = $84,811.06). As noted above, the property was divided 87-13 in favor of Charles ($200,500.00/$231,000.00 = .868). This is not an insubstantial deviation from precise mathematical equality. See Hoskins v. Hoskins (1993), Ind.App., 611 N.E.2d 178. Thus, we must analyze the sufficiency of the trial court's findings justifying the unequal division of marital property. Id.
Charles requested the trial court to make findings pursuant to Ind.Trial Rule 52. The purpose of making special findings is to provide parties and reviewing courts with the theory upon which the judge decided the case so that the right of review might be preserved effectively. Willett v. Clark (1989), Ind.App., 542 N.E.2d 1354; Sandoval v. Hamersley (1981), Ind.App., 419 N.E.2d 813, trans. denied. Whether special findings are adequate depends upon whether they are sufficient to disclose a valid basis under the issues for the legal result reached in the judgment. Willett, 542 N.E.2d at 1357. On appeal, we construe the trial court's findings together liberally in support of the judgment; however, we may not add anything to the special findings of fact by way of presumption, inference, or intendment. Sandoval, 419 N.E.2d 813. In reviewing the trial court's entry of special findings, we neither reweigh the evidence nor reassess the credibility of witnesses. Flansburg v. Flansburg (1991), Ind.App., 581 N.E.2d 430, trans. denied. Our T.R. 52(A) standard of review for trial court findings pertaining to a property distribution under I.C. 31-1-11.5-11 has been stated as follows:
[W]here, as here, the outcome is not mandated by an established rule of law but, instead, the decision rests within the discretion of the court, we must reverse if the decision is not consistent with the findings and conclusions or if the reasons given are insufficient as a matter of law to justify the manner in which the court exercised its discretion. The reason arises from the fact that the court does have discretion. If the reason given by the court is not a valid basis for a particular exercise of discretion, it can be no more than conjecture on our part once the court recognizes the invalidity of its original reason it will reach precisely the same exercise of discretion for other reasons.... Similarly, if the findings and conclusions entered by the court, when construed most favorably toward the judgment, are nevertheless clearly inconsistent with it, the decision must be set aside regardless of whether there was evidence adduced at trial which would have been sufficient to sustain the decision. To hold otherwise would negate the primary purpose of special findings.
Wilson v. Wilson (1980), Ind.App., 409 N.E.2d 1169, 1174 (Emphasis in original; quoting In re Marriage of Miles (1977), 173 Ind.App. 5, 9, 362 N.E.2d 171,...
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