McGinnis v. McGinnis

• Decision Date: 31 March 1954
• Docket Number: No. 12664,12664
• Citation: 267 S.W.2d 432
• Parties: McGINNIS et al. v. McGINNIS.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 432

267 S.W.2d 432

McGINNIS et al. v. McGINNIS.

No. 12664.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, San Antonio.

March 31, 1954.

Rehearing Denied April 28, 1954.

Claud J. Carter and Arnold & Cozby, San antonio, for appellants.

Russell B. Wine and John M. Bayne, San Antonio, for appellee.

POPE, Justice.

The sole point in this case is one of parties. The trial court sustained an unsworn plea in abatement to appellant's right to bring suit and dismissed the case without hearing evidence. The case originated as a lunacy proceeding wherein the county court appointed a guardian for the estate and person of Janie Barr, an aged lady, who was found to be a person of unsound mind. Appellant thereafter instituted a statutory bill of review in the county court seeking a revision and correction of the county court's judgment of Janie Barr's lunacy. Art. 4328, Vernon's Ann.Civ.Stats. The case was previously appealed to this Court and we reversed the district court's summary judgment that Janie Barr was a person of unsound mind. We reversed because there was no showing on the summary judgment hearing that she was of unsound mind. McGinnis v. McGinnis, Tex.Civ.App., 257 S.W.2d 786. We there stated that the soundness of Janie Barr's mind was the issue in the case and that it was not yet determined. The case is before us again and that issue is still undetermined and we reverse the case again.

After our remand, appellee, as guardian of the estate and person of Janie Barr, urged an unsworn plea in abatement which challenged the right of appellant to file the bill of review. To understand this case, we must carefully distingusih the exact nature of the objection to parties made by the appellee guardian. The objection is not that William L. McGinnis failed to bring suit as next friend for Janie Barr. The objection is that a next friend for Janie Barr cannot bring suit because she has a guardian.

There can be no question that appellants as next friend was a party, for four reasons: First, after appellant, individually, filed the bill of review in the county court, the guardian raised the point by challenging his right, and asserted that he was a stranger to the proceedings. Two days after the point was raised by the guardian's pleading, the appellant filed a new pleading to meet the objection, and in the new pleading he alleged that he brought the suit for himself 'as well as for the benefit of the said Jannie Barr and her estate.' The objection as to parties was fully met. Having met the objection and having appeared as an individual and also on behalf of Janie Barr, no further objection to parties was made nor asserted in the county court. Second, the plea in abatement that was later filed in the district court is an admission on its face that appellant brought the suit in a representative capacity. The plea in abatement consists of two sentences. The first sentence states what person the plea seeks to strike from the suit. The plea seeks to abate pleadings filed 'by William L. McGinnis, individually and as next friend of Jannie Barr.' It would seem that nothing more would be necessary to convince us that the suit was brought by William L. McGinnis in a dual capacity, one of which was as next friend. At least the appellee guardian so construed the pleadings. Third, this case has once been before this Court on appeal. There was no challenge of the appellant's right to sue, and under the law of the case, we are of the opinion, it is now too late to raise the point. See Home Benefit Ass'n v. Robbins, Tex.Civ.App., 34 S.W.2d 329; 3-B Texas Jur., Appeal and Error, § 1120; 3 Am.Jur., Appeal and Error, § 993. Fourth, Rule 93(b) states that a plea urging the lack of capacity to sue is waived unless it is a sworn plea. The rule has repeatedly been applied in cases where the party sues as next friend or in a representative capacity. Smith v. Moseley, 74 Tex. 631, 12 S.W. 748; Smith v. Wingate, 61 Tex. 54; Menczer v. Ft. Worth Nat. Bank, Tex.Civ.App., 149 S.W.2d 200; Commercial Standard Ins. Co. v. Nelson Mortgage Co., Tex.Civ.App., 138 S.W.2d 169.

Originally the bill of review was filed by two persons, both of whom acted individually and in a representative capacity, but one of them died after the appeal to the district court. After our former reversal, the death was called to the attention of the district court, and the trial court granted leave to William L. McGinnis to file an amended bill of review. The amendment explicitly stated that it was filed 'in his own behalf and also in behalf of Jannie Barr and her Estate as Next Friend.' Except for the words 'as Next Friend,' the parties to the suit in the county court were named in the same manner-individually and in a representative capacity. Hence, the bill of review was brought by William L. McGinnis, not only as an individual, but also in a representative capacity as next friend.

For clarity, we repeat, the point in this case is not whether the bill was brought by a next friend; the only point raised by the plea in abatement is whether a next friend can bring such a suit. The sole and only ground asserted in the plea to abate, and the sole and only ground upon which the district court have acted is the contention that neither William L. McGinnis, as an individual, nor William L. McGinnis, as next friend of Janie Barr's estate and person is 'any person interested in the proceedings.' Article 4328 limits the parties in a bill of review such as this to 'any person interested'.

William L. McGinnis as a mere individual, is not an intereted person and has no justiciable interest. Gulf C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Lester, Tex.Civ.App., 149 S.W. 841. That has been decided in other cases. Craycroft v. Craycroft, Tex.Civ.App., 250 S.W.2d 458; Persky v. Greever, Tex.Civ.App., 202 S.W.2d 303. The two cited cases were not 'next friend' cases.

William L. McGinnis, the individual, is not the same party as William L. McGinnis, the next friend of Janie Barr's estate and person. That William L. McGinnis, individually, has no standing in court should not blind us to the fact that Janie Barr is the other party and the real party. See Jones v. Eastham, Tex.Civ.App., 36 S.W.2d 538, 541. In a suit by a next friend for an incompetent, the incompetent is the real party. Safeway Stores, Inc., of Texas v. Rutherford 130 Tex. 465, 111 S.W.2d 688; Eversole v. Theimer, Tex.Civ.App., 256 S.W.2d 927; Smith v. Thornhill, Tex.Civ.App., 12 S.W.2d 625, affirmed Tex.Com.App., 25 S.W.2d 597. 'The claim is usually stated in the name of the incompetent, suing 'by and through' his named next friend; but a precise compliance is not essential provided the allegations reveal clearly 'that the action is based on the right of the incompetent; that the relief sought is such as he alone would be entitled to * * * and is sought for his benefit.'' 1 McDonald, Texas Civil Practice, § 3.09.

It is not necessary that one be non compos mentis or insane to be represented by a next friend. It is enough that he is, 'by reason of mental or bodily infirmity, incapable of properly caring for his own interests in the litigation'. Lindly v. Lindly, 102 Tex. 135, 113 S.W. 750, 752; Home Benefit Ass'n v. Robbins, Tex.Civ.App., 34 S.W.2d 329; 1 McDonald, Texas Civil Practice, § 3.09.

Janie Barr is the real party to this suit, and she appeared through her next friend. The only issue in this suit is the sanity of Janie Barr. McGinnis v. McGinnis, Tex.Civ.App., 257 S.W.2d 786. The order sustaining the plea in abatement is reduced to the proposition that Janie Barr is not interested in a case in which her own sanity is at issue. That is not the law, but that result has been achieved through losing sight of the true party and the true issue.

We must take the allegations of Janie Barr's pleading as true, since there was a judgment of dismissal and no evidence was heard. Hallaway v. Thompson, 148 Tex. 471, 226 S.W.2d 816; Jones v. Sun Oil Co., 137 Tex. 353, 153 S.W.2d 571; Johnston v. Stephens, 121 Tex. 374, 49 S.W.2d 431. When we do that, we find that the facts are that Janie Barr is an eighty-year-old lady, ill and weak, but sound of mind now, as she has been at all times in the past. Despite that condition, a guardian has taken possession, control and dominion over her estate, is preventing her friends and relatives from visiting her, and wasting the assets of the estate against Janie Barr's best interests. Appellee seeks to overcome the force of these pleadings by insisting that the next friend is disqualified by reason of another lawsuit instituted by the guardian against him individually. If that be a fact, it was not asserted in the plea in abatement. It was not proved. Looking to the appellant's pleadings, it is not present. Assertions in the briefs are not proof.

Rule 44, T.R.C.P., is the basis for the trial court's judgment that Janie Barr may not appear through a next friend. That rule states that minors, lunatics, idiots, or persons non compos mentis, who have no legal guardian, may sue and be represented by 'next friend' under certain stated circumstances. From that rule it is reasoned that one who has a guardian can not sue nor appear by next friend. In the management of the affairs of such persons, of course, the legal guardian is the one who should speak on behalf of the ward. In suits and claims by and against the ward the legal guardian should act for the ward. But this suit concerns whether there is a 'legal guardian.' The effect of the construction of the rule given by the trial court is that once a county court has appointed a guardian, there is nobody who can question the appointment, even by appeal or direct proceeding. The ward could not, because a guardian is appointed. It could not be questioned by appeal even from the county court's judgment, as is evidenced by this very suit. It could not be questioned in the case of a sound healthy person, who has been completely restored, if the guardian took an adverse view. It...