McGoue v. Janecka

• Decision Date: 22 July 2002
• Docket Number: No. 01-CV-4603.,01-CV-4603.
• Citation: 211 F.Supp.2d 627
• Parties: Anthony McGOUE,<SMALL><SUP>1</SUP></SMALL> Plaintiff, v. James JANECKA, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

211 F.Supp.2d 627

Anthony McGOUE,¹ Plaintiff, v. James JANECKA, et al., Defendants.

No. 01-CV-4603.

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania.

July 22, 2002.

Anthony McGoue, Philadelphia, PA, pro se.

Christopher R. Mattox, Diorio & Sereni, LLP, Media, PA, for defendants.

EXPLANATION AND ORDER

ANITA B. BRODY, District Judge.

Plaintiff, Anthony McGoue ("McGoue" or "plaintiff"), has filed suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against James Janecka ("Janecka"), warden of the George W. Hill Correctional Facility ("facility"),² Francis Bruno ("Bruno"), assistant warden for programs at the facility, Michael Shank ("Shank"), head counselor at the facility, and David Mullany ("Mullany"), work release counselor at the facility (collectively "defendants"). McGoue, who is proceeding pro se, alleges that while incarcerated, defendant's violated his right to due process by removing him from the work release program without providing him with written notice or an institutional hearing. Defendants have moved to dismiss plaintiff's claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Because I find that the complaint fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted, I will grant defendant's motion to dismiss.

Factual Background³

McGoue, a prisoner at the George Washington Hill Correctional Facility, participated in a court-ordered work release program. On April 3, 2001, a laboratory testing company sent a report to the facility indicating that based on a sample collected on March 29, 2001, plaintiff had used alcohol. Defendant Mullany, plaintiff's work release counselor, confronted McGoue with the results of the examination. McGoue explained to Mullany that he worked as a barber, an occupation requiring him to handle alcohol based materials throughout his work day. After a week of institutional investigation during which plaintiff remained at the facility, Mullany informed plaintiff that he could return to his position at the barber shop on April 9, 2001. On April 11, 2001, defendant Bruno contacted Judge Patricia Jenkins at the Court of Common Pleas for Delaware County and advised her of plaintiff's positive urinalysis test. The letter made no reference to the institutional investigation or to the fact that the facility had permitted plaintiff to return to work on April 9. Bruno recommended that Judge Jenkins remove plaintiff from the work release program. The following day, the judge issued such an order, removing plaintiff from work release and taking away his "good time."

On April 16, 2001, McGoue filled out an information request form. On that form, plaintiff informed Mullany that though he had been taken off of the work release program, he never received a "misconduct" explaining his infractions. Having received no response, plaintiff submitted another information request on May 1, 2001, this time to defendant Shank, asking why he never received a hearing prior to his removal from work release. On May 29, 2001, defendant wrote to defendant Bruno, again asking why he was taken off of the work release program without a write-up. Five days later, plaintiff sent a slightly more specific request. Citing the inmate discipline guide and his constitutional rights, he again inquired as to why he received no hearing. Defendant Shank responded the following day and explained that McGoue did not need a discipline hearing because the judge, rather than the prison officials, revoked his work release status. On June 6, 2001, plaintiff submitted an information request to Warden Janecka. Plaintiff reminded the warden that he had previously asked him why he was taken off of work release without a write-up and that Janecka had indicated he would look into the matter. He never received a response. On September 10, 2001, McGoue filed his complaint in federal court.

Legal Standard

In order to survive a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must provide enough evidence to support his or her claims; however, a plaintiff does not need to demonstrate that he or she will prevail on the merits. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984). The claim may be dismissed only if the plaintiff cannot demonstrate any set of facts in support of the claim that would entitle him or her to relief. Williams v. New Castle County, 970 F.2d 1260, 1266 (3d Cir.1992). In considering the motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom, construing the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Weiner v. Quaker Oats Co., 129 F.3d 310, 315 (3d Cir.1997). Where a plaintiff is pro se the court adopts a less stringent reading of the allegations than it would if an attorney drafted the complaint. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972). The court will permit a pro se plaintiff "to offer supporting evidence of his allegations unless it appears `beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.'" Evans v. Vaughn, No. CIV.A. 97-5754, 1998 WL 135096 at *2 (E.D.Pa. March 24, 1998) (quoting Haines, 404 U.S. at 520-21, 92 S.Ct. 594).

Discussion

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff may bring suit against any person who, acting under the color of law, deprived him or her of a right secured by the Constitution or other law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). In order to prevail on a due process claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate the existence of a protected liberty interest. A protected liberty interest may arise from either of two sources, the Due Process clause itself or the laws of a state. See Hewitt v Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466, 103 S.Ct. 864, 74 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983).

The Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that a state may not deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. Though validly convicted prisoners do not forfeit all of their rights, the "criminal defendant has been constitutionally deprived of his liberty to the extent that the State may confine him and subject him to the rules of its prison system." Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224, 96 S.Ct. 2532, 49 L.Ed.2d 451 (1976). "As long as the conditions or degree of confinement to which the prisoner is subjected is within the sentence imposed upon him and is not otherwise violative of the Constitution, the Due Process Clause does not in itself subject an inmate's treatment by prison authorities to judicial oversight." Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 468, 103 S.Ct. 864. The Supreme Court has found that a prisoner has no liberty interest protected by the Due Process clause when transferred from one facility to another, either for administrative or disciplinary reasons, or when placed in administrative segregation. See Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 460, 467-68, 103 S.Ct. 864 (administrative segregation); Meachum, 427 U.S. at 225, 96 S.Ct. 2532 (transfers); Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 243, 96 S.Ct. 2543, 49 L.Ed.2d 466 (1976) (transfers). The Third Circuit has determined that a prisoner had no liberty interest in remaining in a halfway house. See Asquith v. Dep't of Corr., 186 F.3d 407, 411 (3d Cir.1999). Other courts have reached similar conclusions regarding the participation in a work release program and the removal from participation in that program. See, e.g., Evans, 1998 WL 135096 at *3 (finding no protected liberty interest when returned to general prison population after twelve years of work clearance and nine years of living outside of walled prison facility).

State laws or regulations can also give rise to liberty interests protected by the Due Process clause. See Asquith, 186 F.3d at 411. However, no deprivation of that interest occurs unless the actions of the state "imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life." Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995). The court must measure the hardship not on the basis of the prisoner's life both before and after the specific deprivation, but instead in relation to what any inmate might expect to encounter as a result of being convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment. See Asquith, 186 F.3d at 412. Against this backdrop, several courts have determined that removal from a work release program does not amount to an atypical and significant hardship. See Callender v. Sioux City Residential Treatment Facility, 88 F.3d 666, 669 (8th Cir.1996); Dominique v. Weld, 73 F.3d 1156, 1159-60 (1st Cir.1996).

McGoue claims that defendants deprived him of his due process rights by removing him from the work release program without providing him with official notice of his misconduct or a hearing. The Due Process clause does not provide plaintiff with a protected liberty interest in remaining in the work release program. Judge Jenkins imposed a sentence on McGoue ranging from one year less one day up to two years less one day, followed by three years probation. As a condition of confinement, Judge Jenkins indicated that plaintiff was to immediately be placed on work release. None of the defendants actually made the decision to remove plaintiff from the work release program. Though Bruno recommended this action in a letter to the sentencing judge, McGoue's removal from the program was effected by a court order signed by Judge...