McGowan-Amandola v. Fed. Realty Inv. Trust

• Decision Date: 17 February 2021
• Docket Number: 2017–12313,2017–05054,Index No. 1874/10
• Citation: 138 N.Y.S.3d 911 (Mem),191 A.D.3d 868
• Parties: Joan MCGOWAN–AMANDOLA, et al., appellants, v. FEDERAL REALTY INVESTMENT TRUST, respondent, et al., defendants.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

191 A.D.3d 868

138 N.Y.S.3d 911 (Mem)

Joan MCGOWAN–AMANDOLA, et al., appellants,

v.FEDERAL REALTY INVESTMENT TRUST, respondent, et al., defendants.

2017–05054

2017–12313

Index No. 1874/10

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

Submitted—December 8, 2020

February 17, 2021

Sacco & Fillas, LLP, Astoria, N.Y. (James R. Baez of counsel), for appellants.

Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin, New York, N.Y. (Adam C. Calvert of counsel), for respondent.

LEONARD B. AUSTIN, J.P., SYLVIA O. HINDS–RADIX, FRANCESCA E. CONNOLLY, VALERIE BRATHWAITE NELSON, JJ.

DECISION & ORDER

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the plaintiffs appeal from (1) an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (James Hudson, J.), dated March 27, 2017, and (2) an order of the same court dated October 24, 2017. The order dated March 27, 2017, insofar as appealed from, granted that branch of the motion of the defendant Federal Realty Investment Trust which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it. The order dated October 24, 2017, insofar as appealed from, denied that branch of the plaintiffs' motion which was for leave to renew their opposition to that branch of the motion of the defendant Federal Realty Investment Trust which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it.

ORDERED that the orders are affirmed insofar as appealed from, with one bill of costs.

On November 14, 2009, the plaintiff Joan McGowan–Amandola (hereinafter the injured plaintiff) allegedly was walking across a paved area between two sidewalks in the parking lot of a shopping center when she was struck by a vehicle making a left turn. The injured plaintiff, and her husband suing derivatively, commenced this personal injury action against, among others, the defendant Federal Realty Investment Trust (hereinafter FRIT), which owned the premises. The plaintiffs alleged that FRIT negligently designed the parking lot.

FRIT moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against it, contending that the parking lot was not negligently designed and that the design of the parking lot was not a proximate cause of the accident. In an order dated March 27, 2017, the Supreme Court granted FRIT's motion. The plaintiffs subsequently moved, inter alia, for leave to renew their opposition to that branch of FRIT's motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it. In an order dated October 24, 2017, the court, among other things, denied that branch of the plaintiffs' motion. The plaintiffs appeal.

"To sustain the burden of proving a prima facie case of proximate cause, the plaintiff in a negligence action must generally show that the defendant's negligence was a substantial cause of the events which produced the injury" ( Liquori v. Brown, 172 A.D.3d 1354, 1355, 101 N.Y.S.3d 147 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Derdiarian v. Felix Contr. Corp., 51 N.Y.2d 308, 315, 434 N.Y.S.2d 166, 414 N.E.2d 666 ). "Although the issue of proximate cause is generally one for the finder of fact, ‘liability may not be imposed upon a party who merely furnishes the condition or occasion for the occurrence of the event but is not one of its causes’ " ( Castillo v. Amjack Leasing Corp., 84 A.D.3d 1298, 1298, 924 N.Y.S.2d 156 [citation omitted], quoting Ely v. Pierce, 302 A.D.2d 489, 489, 755 N.Y.S.2d 250 ).

Here, FRIT established, prima facie, that its parking lot was not negligently designed and that any alleged negligence in the design of the parking lot was not a proximate cause of the accident (see Liquori v. Brown, 172...