McGowan v. State, 71947-1.
| Decision Date | 19 December 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. 71947-1.,71947-1. |
| Citation | 60 P.3d 67,148 Wash.2d 278 |
| Parties | Nicole McGOWAN, a Washington State parent, Voter, and taxpayer residing in Snohomish County; Deborah Soloman, Sapina Pele, Kathy Lambert, Washington State Special Education Coalition, North Thurston County School District No. 3, Kennewick School District No. 17, Washington Education Association, Victoria Graves, Theresa Bartl, Diana McCarthy, And Seiu Local 925, Appellants, v. STATE of Washington, Respondent. Public School Employees of Washington, a Washington non-profit corporation, Appellant, v. State of Washington, Gary Locke, in his official capacity as Governor of the State of Washington; Brad Owen, in his official capacity as Lieutenant Governor of the State of Washington and President of the Washington State Senate; Senator Rosa Franklin; Senator Sid Snyder; Senator Harriet A. Spaniel; Representative Clyde Ballard; Representative Dave Mastin; Representative Jim Buck; Representative John Pennington; Representative Frank Chopp; Representative Bill Grant; Representative Val Ogden; and Representative Lynn Kessler; all in their official capacities as representatives of the Washington State Legislature, Respondents. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Eric Nordlof, Elsye Waldman, Auburn, Thomas Ahearne, Hugh Spitzer, Alice Ostdiek, Seattle, Thomas Leahy, Seattle, for Appellants.
Christine Gregoire, Attorney General, William Collins, James Pharris, Senior Assistants, Olympia, for Respondent.
Michael Hoge, David Burman, Annjanette Cooper, Seattle, amicus curiae on behalf of Marysville School District, amicus curiae on behalf of Connie Fletcher, amicus curiae on behalf of Washington Council of School Attorneys.
Initiative 732 provides for annual cost-of-living increases for school district employees. At issue is whether the initiative mandates cost-of-living increases for all school district employees and, if so, whether it requires the State itself to fund cost-of-living increases for all district employees, or only for those employees that are state-funded as part of the State's constitutional duty to provide basic education. The superior court ruled that a cost-of-living increase is required for all school district employees but the State is required to fund the increase only for the state-funded employees. We agree that all school district employees are entitled to the cost-of-living increase and affirm to this extent. However, we hold that the initiative requires the State to fund the increase for all these employees and therefore reverse the superior court in part.
The voters passed Initiative 732 (I-732) in November 2000. Section one of the initiative explains that the state constitution "establishes `the paramount duty of the state to make ample provision for the education of all children.'" I-732 § 1 (quoting Const. Art. IX, § 1). Section one states that meeting this obligation requires well-qualified and experienced teachers. The section explains that salaries for educators were not keeping pace with inflation, threatening Washington's ability to compete with other states to attract and keep well-trained educators. Section one of I-732 concludes with: "The state must provide a fair and reasonable cost-of-living increase to help ensure that the state attracts and keeps the best teachers and school employees for the children of Washington." I-732 provides that "[s]chool district employees shall be provided an annual salary cost-of-living increase." I-732 § 2(1). The measure also includes sections providing for cost-of-living increases for certain community college system employees.
The cost-of-living increase for school district employees is "calculated by applying the rate of the yearly increase in the cost-of-living index to any state-funded salary base used in state funding formulas for teachers and other school district employees." I-732 § 2(1)(a). The measure states that "each school district shall be provided a cost-of-living allocation sufficient to grant this cost-of-living increase for the salaries, including mandatory salary—related benefits, of all employees of the district." Id. I-732 states that "[b]eginning with the 2001-02 school year, the state shall fully fund the cost-of-living increase in this section as part of its obligation to meet the basic education requirements under Article IX of the Washington Constitution." I-732 § 2(1)(d).
In order to place the provisions of I-732 in context, a brief overview of education funding is needed, particularly with regard to "basic education." Article IX of the Washington State Constitution requires state funding of basic education. Seattle School Dist. No. 1 v. State, 90 Wash.2d 476, 585 P.2d 71 (1978). The constitution states: "It is the paramount duty of the state to make ample provision for the education of all children residing within its borders...." Const. art. IX, § 1. The state constitution requires "[t]he legislature [to] provide for a general and uniform system of public schools." Const. art. IX, § 2. Prior to Seattle School District, public school education was funded in part through legislative appropriation and in part by local school districts through special excess levies on property lying within the school districts. The Seattle School District challenged this system on the ground that, contrary to the constitutional mandate, it forced school districts to use special levies, dependent on voter approval, to provide for the "general and uniform system of public schools." Id. At the time the action in Seattle School District was brought, local levies were failing in many districts statewide.
This court held that in order to satisfy the constitution, the Legislature must provide sufficient funds derived "through dependable and regular tax sources, to permit school districts to provide `basic education' through a basic program of education in a `general and uniform system of public schools.'" Seattle School Dist., 90 Wash.2d at 522, 585 P.2d 71 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Const. art. IX, § 2). The court ruled that levies cannot fund basic education, as they do not provide a dependable and regular tax source. Id. at 526, 585 P.2d 71. Levies can, however, be used to "fund programs, activities and support services of a district which the State is not required to fund under its basic mandate." Id. (Emphasis omitted.) The court declined to decide what constitutes "basic education," holding that it is the Legislature's responsibility to define basic educational requirements. Id. at 519-20, 585 P.2d 71.
The court did provide guidelines, however:
[T]he State's constitutional duty goes beyond mere reading, writing and arithmetic. It also embraces broad educational opportunities needed in the contemporary setting to equip our children for their role as citizens and as potential competitors in today's market as well as in the marketplace of ideas. Education plays a critical role in a free society. It must prepare our children to participate intelligently and effectively in our open political system to ensure that system's survival. It must prepare them to exercise their First Amendment freedoms both as sources and receivers of information; and, it must prepare them to be able to inquire, to study, to evaluate and to gain maturity and understanding. The constitutional right to have the State "make ample provision for the education of all [resident] children" would be hollow indeed if the possessor of the right could not compete adequately in our open political system, in the labor market, or in the marketplace of ideas.
Seattle School Dist., 90 Wash.2d at 517-18, 585 P.2d 71 (citations omitted) (quoting Const. art. IX, § 1).
In response to Seattle School District, the legislature reformed the State's education system for children in kindergarten through high school. It passed the Basic Education Act, established basic education funding formulas, and enacted legislation limiting school district levies. As the State says, the funding formulas are complex. Additional legislation has been passed from time to time establishing or relating to various educational programs. Some of the legislation has been determined to be part of basic education and some has not (either by the legislature or by a court determination).
The legislature continues to allow local school districts to submit excess property tax levy measures to the voters, and if approved, the revenue may be used to fund enrichment programs beyond "basic education." Levy revenue also may be used to enhance state or federal programs. Local districts also may use federal revenues, within certain restrictions, to carry out federal programs or, in some circumstances, to supplement state programs. Because money used for enrichment programs or to enhance basic education may not used for required basic education, it does not fall within the constitutional uniformity requirement. Seattle School Dist.,90 Wash.2d at 526,585 P.2d 71.
Often it is not possible to label a specific employee as being exclusively paid with basic education money or enrichment dollars. State law does not require that a given employee be paid entirely from basic education dollars or from enrichment dollars. In general, state funding formulas are used to determine how much money, in total, based on certain student to staff ratios, must be appropriated for school districts to pay for basic education, and this money is then allocated to the individual districts. Each district is thus given flexibility to meet local needs within State prescribed staff ratios and salary requirements.
Against this backdrop, I-732 was enacted. Pursuant to the provisions of I-732, the State calculated its total cost-of-living increase obligation based upon the total number of state formula "staff units" and the average salary per unit—a method that limited its expenditure to state-funded staff.1 In the 2001-03 biennium, this...
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