McGrady v. Olsten Corp.
Decision Date | 05 August 2003 |
Docket Number | No. COA02-1035.,COA02-1035. |
Citation | 159 NC App. 643,583 S.E.2d 371 |
Court | North Carolina Court of Appeals |
Parties | Alice Y. McGRADY, Employee, Plaintiff, v. OLSTEN CORP., Employer, and Hartford Specialty Risk, Carrier, Defendants, Defendant-Appellants. |
Doran, Shelby, Pethel and Hudson, P.A., by David A. Shelby, Salisbury, for plaintiff-appellee.
Morris York Williams Surles & Barringer, L.L.P., by Susan H. Briggs and Keith B. Nichols, Charlotte, for defendant-appellants.
Defendants (Olsten Corporation and ITT Specialty Risk Services, Inc.) appeal from a divided opinion of the Industrial Commission, awarding plaintiff (Alice McGrady) medical benefits and temporary total disability. We affirm.
The factual background of this appeal is summarized as follows: Plaintiff was fifty years old at the time of the hearing and had an eighth grade education. In 1994, she completed the course required for certification as a certified nursing assistant (CNA), and was employed by defendant as a CNA. As a CNA, plaintiff provided in-home care for patients requiring assistance with daily living. In July, 1999, plaintiff's only client was Ms. Withers, an elderly woman with limited physical abilities. Plaintiff assisted Ms. Withers with bathing, dressing, personal care, housekeeping, and meal preparation. In addition, plaintiff drove Ms. Withers to various places in the community and did her grocery shopping. Ms. Withers enjoyed fresh fruit, which plaintiff obtained for her from the local farmers market or at a grocery store.
Plaintiff's regular hours were from 6:00 a.m. until 3:30 p.m. On 26 July 1999 plaintiff arrived at her usual time and assisted Ms. Withers with breakfast. During breakfast, Ms. Withers asked plaintiff to take her dog "Footsie" out to the yard. Plaintiff testified she "usually took her out ... sometimes twice a day." While plaintiff was outside with Footsie, she noticed that Ms. Withers' pear tree had borne a pear. She had previously obtained fruit from Ms. Withers' peach tree without incident and decided to retrieve the pear for her and Ms. Withers to share. Plaintiff began to climb the tree; however, she soon realized that the pear was too high up for her to shake it out of the tree, so she started back down. As plaintiff was climbing back to the ground, she fell. Plaintiff was taken by ambulance to a hospital, where physicians determined that she had broken her back, suffering "50 percent compression fracture" of her spine, and resulting in "quite a bit of damage to the vertebral body." She was initially treated with pain medication and bed rest, until further examination revealed that plaintiff had both an "acute compression fracture" and a "burst fracture" of the spine. Accordingly, plaintiff's treating physician performed surgery on her vertebrae and implanted steel rods in her back. Despite the surgery, plaintiff continued to experience pain, and her physician testified at the hearing that it was unlikely that plaintiff could ever return to work, "even light duty." He also testified that plaintiff's injuries were caused by the fall from Ms. Withers' pear tree.
On 9 September 1999, plaintiff filed a claim for workers' compensation, which was denied by defendants on the basis that her injuries were not causally connected to her employment. A hearing was conducted before Deputy Commissioner Wanda Taylor on 17 April 2000, and on 5 October 2000 the deputy commissioner issued an opinion denying plaintiff's claim for workers' compensation. The opinion concluded that, although plaintiff's accident had proximately caused her injuries, the fall itself "was not an activity which a person so employed might reasonably do in employment such as plaintiff's." Plaintiff appealed to the Full Commission, which conducted a review of the record on 7 January 2002. On 18 April 2002, the Industrial Commission issued an opinion reversing the deputy commissioner and awarding plaintiff medical compensation and temporary total disability. The opinion concluded that plaintiff's attempt to get a pear from Ms. Withers' pear tree either was "within plaintiff's work duties" or was not a serious deviation from her job duties, and thus that plaintiff's injuries were compensable. One commissioner dissented on the basis that "[c]limbing a pear tree was not a contemplated action of plaintiff's employment" and thus that there was "no causal relationship between plaintiff's injuries and ... her employment as an in-home caregiver." From this opinion and award, defendants appealed.
"The standard of appellate review of an opinion and award of the Industrial Commission in a workers' compensation case is whether there is any competent evidence in the record to support the Commission's findings of fact and whether these findings support the Commission's conclusions of law." Lineback v. Wake County Board of Commissioners, 126 N.C.App. 678, 680, 486 S.E.2d 252, 254 (1997) (citation omitted). Further, the Industrial Commission's findings of fact "are conclusive on appeal if supported by any competent evidence." Gallimore v. Marilyn's Shoes, 292 N.C. 399, 402, 233 S.E.2d 529, 531 (1977). " Adams v. AVX Corp., 349 N.C. 676, 681, 509 S.E.2d 411, 414 (1998) (quoting Anderson v. Construction Co., 265 N.C. 431, 434, 144 S.E.2d 272, 274 (1965)). Griggs v. E. Omni Constructors, — N.C.App. —, —, 581 S.E.2d 138, 141 (2003) (quoting Click v. Freight Carriers, 300 N.C. 164, 166, 265 S.E.2d 389, 390 (1980)). The Commission's conclusions of law, however, are reviewed de novo. Griggs, id.
Defendants argue on appeal that the Industrial Commission erred by finding that plaintiff suffered a compensable injury. Under N.C.G.S. § 97-2(6) (2001) a compensable injury "mean[s] only injury by accident arising out of and in the course of the employment[.]" In the present case, there is no dispute that plaintiff's injuries were caused by an accident. However, defendants contend that plaintiff's injury did not arise "out of and in the course of" her employment.
"Whether an injury arises out of and in the course of a claimant's employment is a mixed question of fact and law, and our review is thus limited to whether the findings and conclusions are supported by the evidence." Creel v. Town of Dover, 126 N.C.App. 547, 552, 486 S.E.2d 478, 481 (1997) (citing Hoyle v. Isenhour Brick and Tile Co., 306 N.C. 248, 251, 293 S.E.2d 196, 198 (1982)). Creel, id. (citing Clark v. Burton Lines, 272 N.C. 433, 437, 158 S.E.2d 569, 571 (1968)). Thus, "[w]here the evidence shows that the injury occurred during the hours of employment, at the place of employment, and while the claimant was actually in the performance of the duties of the employment, the injury is in the course of the employment." Choate v. Sara Lee Products, 133 N.C.App. 14, 17, 514 S.E.2d 529, 532-533, aff'd, 351 N.C. 46, 519 S.E.2d 523 (1999) (citing Harless v. Flynn, 1 N.C.App. 448, 162 S.E.2d 47 (1968)). "In other words, to be compensable, the injury must spring from the employment or have its origin therein." Robbins v. Nicholson, 281 N.C. 234, 239, 188 S.E.2d 350, 354 (1972) (citations omitted). The burden of proof is upon the claimant who "must establish both the `arising out of' and `in the course of' requirements to be entitled to compensation." Culpepper v. Fairfield Sapphire Valley, 93 N.C.App. 242, 247-248, 377 S.E.2d 777, 780-781, aff'd, 325 N.C. 702, 386 S.E.2d 174 (1989) (citing Roberts v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 321 N.C. 350, 354, 364 S.E.2d 417, 420 (1988)). Moreover:
while the `arising out of' and `in the course of' elements are distinct tests, they are interrelated and cannot be applied entirely independently. Both are part of a single test of work-connection. Because `the terms of the Act should be liberally construed in favor of compensation, deficiencies in one factor are sometimes allowed to be made up by strength in the other.'"
Culpepper, id. ( )(emphasis added).
In the instant case, the Industrial Commission's findings of fact included, in relevant part, the following:
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