McGrath v. Stevenson, 26784.
| Decision Date | 22 March 1938 |
| Docket Number | 26784. |
| Citation | 194 Wash. 160,77 P.2d 608 |
| Parties | McGRATH v. STEVENSON et al. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Appeal from Superior Court, King County; Malcolm Douglas, Judge.
Action by F. M. McGrath against John C. Stevenson and others, as the Board of County Commissioners of King County, and others, to set aside an order of the Board authorizing vacation of avenue and to enjoin obstructing avenue or interfering with plaintiff in use thereof. From a decree denying the prayer for injunctive or other relief, plaintiff appeals.
Affirmed.
John R. Martin, of Seattle, for appellant.
B. Gray Warner, Patrick Tammany, and Vanderveer & Bassett, all of Seattle, for respondents.
The plaintiff, claiming to be an abutting owner on the vacated portion of Miramar avenue, instituted this action to set aside the order of the board of county commissioners of King county authorizing the vacation of a portion of Miramar avenue on the petition of Birt F. Fisher and others; and to enjoin the defendants from obstructing that avenue or interfering with the plaintiff in the use of that road.
The cause was tried to the court, which found that the petition for the vacation of a part of the road in question was not signed, as the statute, Rem.Rev.Stat. § 6503, requires, by ten freeholders residing in the vicinity of the vacated road and that Miramar avenue, a portion of which was vacated, was the most practicable pedestrian route of ingress and egress to and from the plaintiff's property and constituted a valuable incident to the enjoyment and use of that property. The court made no finding on the question whether the plaintiff was an abutting owner on the vacated road. Defendants Fisher were required to execute a new deed enlarging the easement rights which the county commissioners ordered for the protection of the plaintiff and his friends and guests. The trial court concluded that every right of the plaintiff had been fully safeguarded, and entered a decree denying the prayer for injunctive or other relief. Plaintiff appealed.
Counsel for appellant first contends that as the petition for the vacation of Miramar avenue was not signed by ten freeholders residing in the vicinity of that avenue, the board of county commissioners did not obtain jurisdiction to vacate that avenue; therefore, the proceedings of the board and its order of vacation are void and should be set aside.
On the theory that the residence of certain of the signers of the vacation petition on their properties only at intervals during the summer months was not a 'residing' within the meaning of the statute, the court excluded the signatures of those signers, and as a result of such deletion there were less than ten signatures on the petition. The pertinent statute reads as follows 'When a county road, or a part thereof, is considered useless, and ten freeholders residing in the vicinity of said road may petition the board of county commissioners to vacate the same, such petition shall show the land owned by each petitioner, and shall also set forth that such road will be useless as a part of the general system, that the public will be benefited by its vacation.' Rem.Rev.Stat. § 6503.
Each of the terms 'reside,' 'residing,' 'resident,' and 'residence' is elastic. To interpret the sense in which such a term is used, we should look to the object or purpose of the statute in which the term is employed. A man can have only one place of residence for voting purposes and certain other purposes, but there is no reason why, within the meaning of the vacation statute Rem.Rev.Stat. § 6503, he may not have more than...
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