McGray v. Waguespack

• Decision Date: 12 August 2011
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 11-1760
• Parties: ELVIS MCGRAY v. ZORRAINE M. WAGUESPACK ET AL
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana

ELVIS MCGRAY v. ZORRAINE M. WAGUESPACK ET AL

CIVIL ACTION NO. 11-1760

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA SECTION "F" (2)

Dated: August 12, 2011

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff, Elvis McGray, is a prisoner currently incarcerated in the River Correctional Center in Ferriday, Louisiana. He filed this complaint pro se and in forma pauperis in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Tangipahoa Parish Twenty-First Judicial District Court Judges Zorraine M. Waguespack and Robert J. Ken alleging inappropriate action by the judges in connection with his post-conviction application. Plaintiff's complaint was transferred to this court from the Middle District on July 20, 2011. Record Doc. Nos. 1 and 3 (Complaint and Transfer Order).

Specifically, plaintiff's complaint states the following:

Plaintiff filed into the District Court of Tangipohoa (sic) Parish an (sic) Petition for Post Conviction, . . which was granted by District Judge Robert J. Klen ? on 6/14/2010, and mail[e]d with Post Conviction an (sic) Writ of Habeas Corpus Ad-Testifcandum (sic).

After a[] large amount of time alasp'd (sic), Plaintiff filed an notice of intent to seek appeal, said notice was denied, stating [that he] failed to appear for court date. Now Plaintiff was not awear (sic) of an[y] court dateto appear into said court, because said court, refuse, fail'd (sic) to have Plaintiff brought to said court.

Plaintiff filed into said court an (sic) petition for continuance and/or Requesting Rehearing, that was denied by District Judge Zorraine M. Waguespack on 5/31/2011.

Plaintiff filed his Post conviction into said court because there is in fact an (sic) violation of due process of law within Plaintiff['s] case.

Therefore, one District Judge granted said Post-Conviction and set an (sic) court date, that Plaintiff was not awear (sic) of because said court failed to notified (sic) Plaintiff of said court date.

Judge Zorraine M. Waguespack is denieding (sic) every thing (sic) that Plaintiff files into court.

So why is one District Judge grant[ing] the post-conviction, and another Judge, sentencing Judge Zorraine M. Waguespack denieding (sic) to have Plaintiff brought to court so Plaintiff may have his day into court to prove that said court has violated his fundamental Constitutional rights within his case.

Plaintiff filed into said court an writ of Habeas Corpus Ad-Testifardum (sic), for which can't be denied, but was denied by District Judge Zorraine M. Waguespack.

As it seems to Plaintiff that one Judge see's (sic) the due process violation, and an (sic) sentencing Judge is trying to cover up his mistake by refuseing (sic) to allow Plaintiff be brought to court by denieing (sic) requests to be brought to court.

Id., Complaint at ¶ IV, pp. 3-5.

In the relief portion of his complaint, McGray requests that the court "order said Judge's to have Plaintiff brought before said court so that Plaintiff may have his day into court." Id. (Complaint at ¶ V).

ANALYSIS

I. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

A prisoner's pro se complaint for alleged civil rights violations must be screened by the court as soon as practicable after docketing, regardless whether it has also been filed in forma pauperis. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a); Martin v. Scott, 156 F.3d 578, 579-80 (5th Cir. 1998). Such complaints by prisoners must be dismissed upon review if they are frivolous or fail to state a claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).

"A federal court may dismiss a claim in forma pauperis 'if satisfied that the action is frivolous or malicious.'" Moore v. McDonald, 30 F.3d 616, 620 (5th Cir. 1994) (quoting former 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d), now incorporated in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), as amended). A complaint is frivolous "if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact." Davis v. Scott, 157 F.3d 1003, 1005 (5th Cir. 1998); Reeves v. Collins, 27 F.3d 174, 176 (5th Cir. 1994). The law "'accords judges not only the authority to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, but also the unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint's factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.'" Macias v. Raul A. (Unknown), Badge No. 153, 23 F.3d 94, 97 (5th Cir. 1994) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989)).

"'A complaint lacks an arguable basis in law if it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, such as if the complaint alleges the violation of a legal interestwhich clearly does not exist.'" Davis, 157 F.3d at 1005 (quoting McCormick v. Stalder, 105 F.3d 1059, 1061 (5th Cir. 1997)). "When a complaint raises an arguable question of law which the district court ultimately finds is correctly resolved against the plaintiff, dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate; however, dismissal under the section 1915(d) standard is not." Moore v. Mabus, 976 F.2d 268, 269 (5th Cir. 1992). An in forma pauperis complaint which is legally frivolous, fails to state a claim or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief may be dismissed sua sponte at any time under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).

In this case, plaintiff's Section 1983 complaint may be dismissed either under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) as frivolous because it lacks an arguable basis in law or under Rule 12(b)(6) because it fails to state a cognizable Section 1983 claim under the broadest reading¹ or because it seeks relief against defendants who are immune.

II. JUDICIAL IMMUNITY

Plaintiff's claims against the Tangipahoa Parish judges are barred by judicial immunity. For more than one hundred years, judges have been held immune from liability for judicial acts done within their jurisdiction. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978) (citing Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335 (1871)); Mays v. Sudderth, 97 F.3d 107, 110 (5th Cir. 1996). "A judge, of whatever status in the judicial hierarchy, isimmune from suit for damages resulting from any acts performed in [his or her] judicial role." Ammons v. Baldwin, 705 F.2d 1445, 1447 (5th Cir. 1983) (citations omitted); accord Mays, 97 F.3d at 110-11. This judicial immunity applies even if a judge is accused of acting maliciously or corruptly. Stump, 435 U.S. at 356-57; Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967), overruled in part on other grounds by Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982), as recognized by Hill v. Shelander, 992 F.2d 714, 716 (7th Cir. 1993); Mays, 97 F.3d at 110-11. Judicial officers are absolutely immune from liability for damages unless they are without jurisdiction. Id. at 111; Dayse v. Schuldt, 894 F.2d 170, 172 (5th Cir. 1990); Freeze v. Griffith, 849 F.2d 172, 175 (5th Cir. 1988).

In the past, however, judicial officers did not enjoy absolute immunity from suits seeking injunctive relief. Relief of that nature was available under Section 1983 against state court judges acting in their judicial capacity. Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 541-42 (1984). However, the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996 ("FCIA") amended Section 1983 to provide that "in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief is unavailable." 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

The FCIA therefore statutorily overruled Pulliam's holding regarding the availability of injunctive relief against a state judge in his official capacity. Guerin v.Higgins, No. 00-0244, 2001 WL 363486, at *1 (2d Cir. 2001) (unpublished); Nollet v. Justices, 83 F. Supp. 2d 204, 210 (D. Mass. 2000); see also Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234, 1242 (11th Cir. 2000) (1996 amendment to Section 1983 limits the relief available against a federal judge to declaratory relief). Thus, neither injunctive relief (the kind of relief he specifically requests) nor damages are available to McGray in this Section 1983 action against defendants. Tesmer v. Granholm, 114 F. Supp. 2d 603, 618 (E.D. Mich. 2000); Nollet, 83 F. Supp. 2d at 210.

Furthermore, to whatever extent, if any, that McGray seeks an order of this court directing the judges to take action concerning plaintiff's state court proceedings, a federal court has no power to direct a state court or its judicial officers in the performance of their duties when mandamus is the only relief sought. In re Campbell, 264 F.3d 730, 731 (7th Cir. 2001); Santee v. Quinlan, C.A. No. 96-3417, Record Doc. Nos. 3, 7, 8 (Nov. 5 & 27, 1996) (Duval, J.), aff'd, 115 F.3d 355, 356-57 (5th Cir. 1997); Russell v. Knight, 488 F.2d 96, 97 (5th Cir. 1973); Moye v. Clerk, 474 F.2d 1275, 1276 (5th Cir. 1973); Lamar v. 118th Judicial Dist. Court, 440 F.2d 383, 384 (5th Cir. 1971); White v. Stricklin, No. 3:02-CV-688-D, 2002 WL 1125747, at *2 (N.D. Tex. May 23, 2002); Norman v. Louisiana S. Ct., No. 01-2225, 2001 WL 881298, at *1 (E.D. La. Aug. 3, 2001) (Duval, J.). This court is without authority to order officials of the state court inwhich plaintiff's criminal case is pending to treat his claims in any particular way or to otherwise interfere with the rulings of its judges.

McGray's claims against the judges concern actions that are exclusively within the scope of the judges' roles as judicial officers and therefore within their jurisdiction. Consequently, the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity bars McGray's suit against the judges. For these reasons, all of McGray's claims against defendants must be dismissed as legally frivolous or for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted.

III. HECK BARS PLAINTIFF'S SECTION 1983 CLAIMS

Read broadly, McGray's complaint seeks declaratory and injunctive relief arising from alleged constitutional deficiencies in his state court criminal proceedings. All such claims must be dismissed at this time under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). In Heck, the Supreme Court held that a civil action for alleged civil rights violations that attacks the validity of state confinement, which...