McGruder v. State

• Decision Date: 06 November 1889
• Citation: 10 S.E. 281,83 Ga. 616
• Parties: MCGRUDER v. STATE.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

10 S.E. 281

83 Ga. 616

MCGRUDER v. STATE.

Supreme Court of Georgia

November 6, 1889

Error from superior court, Douglas county; R. H. CLARK, Judge.

J. S James and W. A. James, for plaintiff in error.

John S Candler, Sol. Gen., for the State.

SIMMONS J.

McGruder was indicted and convicted for violating the special prohibition law of Douglas county. He made a motion for a new trial, upon several grounds set out therein, which was overruled by the court, and he excepted.

1. There was sufficient evidence to authorize the verdict.

2. The main question relied upon in the argument here for reversal of the judgment refusing a new trial was that the verdict was contrary to law, in this: (1) That the local act approved September 4, 1885, under which the plaintiff in error was convicted, was repealed by the general local option act approved September 18, 1885; and (2) that, if not repealed said local act was unconstitutional, in that it contained matter in the act different from that expressed in the title. We do not think that the local act passed for Douglas county and approved September 4, 1885, was repealed by the general local option act, approved September 18, 1885. It is true that the latter act has a general repealing clause; but that clause applies only to laws in conflict with it. There are no words in the general act expressly repealing the local one, but the ninth section of that act expressly provides that no election shall be held under it "for any county, city, town, or any other place in this state where by law the sale of spirituous liquors is already prohibited, either by high license, local option, or other legislation, so long as these local laws remain of force." We think this section was intended to apply to all local laws upon this subject which had been passed by the legislature prior to the passage of this latter act. That body certainly knew what local acts it had passed upon this subject; and it intended this section to save them all from repeal by the act, and to allow them to remain of force. It is said, however, that the people had not adopted this local act by an election when the general act was passed, and, not having been adopted by vote of the people, as provided for in the act, was not a law, in the sense as used in the ninth section above quoted. We do not agree with this construction. Whenever the act for Douglas county was approved by the governor it became a law of the state; but the operation of it was postponed until it was adopted by the people of the county. When that was done and the ordinary issued his proclamation, it went into active effect. So we think that, whether the law had been voted on or not when the general law was passed, it was such a law as was contemplated by the legislature when the ninth section of the general act was adopted. Even if this were not true, we do not think that the local act was repealed by the passage of the general act, 14 days thereafter. In discussing this subject, Endlich, in his work upon the Interpretation of the Statutes, § 223, says: "A general, later, affirmative law does not abrogate an earlier, special one by implication. *** The law does not allow the exposition to revoke or alter, by construction of general words, any particular statute, when the words of the two acts, as compared with each other, are not so glaringly repugnant and irreconcilable as to indicate a legislative intent to repeal, but may have their proper operation without it. It is usually...