McGuire v. Bode
Court | United States State Supreme Court of Missouri |
Citation | 607 S.W.2d 165 |
Decision Date | 09 June 1980 |
Peggy McGuire, Appellant,
v.
Fred Bode, Respondent
No. WD30861
Court of Appeals of Missouri, Western District
June 9, 1980
Richard Huber, Columbia, Missouri, Attorney for Appellant.
Robert L. Hyder, Jefferson City, Missouri, Attorney for Respondent.
JUDGES: Wasserstrom, C.J., Presiding, Pritchard, Kennedy, JJ.
OPINION BY: KENNEDY
OPINION
[607 S.W.2d 166] Plaintiff's petition, seeking money damages for fraud, was dismissed by the court upon defendant's motion for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. From that judgment the plaintiff has appealed.
The petition obviously undertakes to state a cause of action for damages for fraud. Neither the motion to dismiss, the court's order sustaining the same, nor respondent's brief points out in what respect or what respects the petition is deficient. We search it, however, to determine whether it does state a cause of action.
Elements of cause of action for damages for fraud.
The component parts of a cause of action for damages for fraud are listed in Yerington v. Riss, 374 S.W.2d 52, 57 (Mo. 1964). The elements are: (1) A representation; (2) its falsity; (3) its materiality; (4) the speaker's knowledge of its falsity . . .; (5) his intent that it should be acted on by the person and in the manner reasonably contemplated; (6) the hearer's ignorance of its falsity; (7) his reliance on its truth; (8) his right to rely thereon; (9) the hearer's consequent and proximate injury.
Contents of petition.
Leaving out formal parts, the prayer and the first two paragraphs, the petition reads as follows: "3. On or about April 28, 1978, pursuant to an agreement with Defendant, Plaintiff began to rent and occupy for her personal residence property owned by Defendant at 2118 Louis Circle, Jefferson City, Missouri.
"4. Plaintiff agreed to rent the property based on an understanding that Defendant had no plans to sell the property, that Defendant would be her landlord and that Plaintiff would be allowed to continue her occupancy indefinitely, rent to be paid monthly.
"5. Defendant knew of and encouraged that understanding of Plaintiff and led her to believe that he did not intend to sell the aforementioned property and that Plaintiff could occupy the property as long as she complied with the terms of rental agreed upon by both parties.
"6. Notwithstanding that understanding, Defendant was, during the period of the negotiation of the rental agreement, offering the aforementioned property for sale.
[607 S.W.2d 167] "7. Defendant willfully and knowingly concealed this offer of sale from Plaintiff by refusing to post public notice of the sale and personally arranging for the property to be shown only in Plaintiff's absence.
"8. Such concealment was a fraudulent omission by Defendant of a material fact and said omission along with Plaintiff's reliance on Defendant's implied promise not to sell was a principal inducement to Plaintiff to leave her former home and agree to rent Defendant's property.
"9. Less than one month after Plaintiff began to occupy the aforementioned property, Defendant did sell the property and on or about May 26, 1978, the new owners served an eviction notice on Plaintiff.
"10. Plaintiff's detrimental reliance on Defendant's implied agreement not to sell and Defendant's fraudulent omission of a material fact caused damage to Plaintiff in the form of moving expenses, increased rental costs based on her abandonment of her home and forced rental of new property with time constraints that severely harmed her bargaining position thus forcing her to agree to less advantageous rental terms, various and sundry utility deposit costs and installation charges, various purchases of items incidental to and necessary to her moving of her residence twice within a two months period, mental duress...
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Wells v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 77-0426-CV-W-6.
...be of an existing fact, rather than a contingency which could possibly occur to prevent fulfillment of the promise. See McGuire v. Bode, 607 S.W.2d 165, 168 (Mo.App.1980); Dillard v. Earnhart, 457 S.W.2d 666, 670-71 (Mo.1970); Sun 'N Sand, Inc. v. United California 522 F. Supp. 1026 Bank, 2......
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Danforth v. Danforth, WD
...more definite and certain under 55.27(d) might have been in order, but such generality does not warrant a dismissal. McGuire v. Bode, 607 S.W.2d 165, 167 (Mo.App.1980); Wallis v. St. Louis Cty., 563 S.W.2d 93, 95 (Mo.App.1978). Here the pleader was required only to state the ultimate facts-......
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Sofka v. Thal, 64696
...464, 190 S.W. 908 (1916); State ex rel. Kansas City Exchange Co. v. Harris, 229 Mo.App. 721, 81 S.W.2d 632 (1935) and McGuire v. Bode, 607 S.W.2d 165 (Mo.App.1980). Suffice it to say that as none of those cases involved a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, none is authority for......
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Tindall v. Holder, s. 19018
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