McGuire v. Bowlin, A18-0167
| Decision Date | 04 September 2019 |
| Docket Number | A18-0167 |
| Citation | 932 N.W.2d 819 |
| Parties | Nathan C. MCGUIRE, Appellant, v. Julie A. BOWLIN, Respondent, Thomas M. Bowlin, Defendant, Joy M. Szondy, Respondent, Chelon L. Danielson, Respondent, Cheryl Hewitt, Respondent. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Sharon L. Van Dyck, Van Dyck Law Firm, PLLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota; and Donald Chance Mark, Jr., Tyler P. Brimmer, Fafinski Mark & Johnson, P.A., Eden Prairie, Minnesota, for appellant.
Julie Bowlin, Chanhassen, Minnesota, pro se.
Thomas M. Bowlin, Chanhassen, Minnesota, pro se.
Andrew T. Shern, Andrew T. Shern Law Office, PLLC, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for respondent Joy M. Szondy.
Chelon L. Danielson, Woodbury, Minnesota, pro se.
Kirsten J. Hansen, Garth J. Unke, Stich Angell, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota, for respondent Cheryl Hewitt.
Mark R. Bradford, Bassford Remele, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota, for amicus curiae Minnesota State High School Coaches Association.
Kris Palmer, Jansen & Palmer, LLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for amicus curiae National High School Basketball Coaches Association.
Under New York Times Co. v. Sullivan , 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964), and its progeny, defamation plaintiffs who are "public officials" or "public figures" can recover in a defamation action only upon a showing of actual malice. See id. at 283–84, 84 S.Ct. 710 ; Chafoulias v. Peterson , 668 N.W.2d 642, 648–49 (Minn. 2003). In this case, we must decide whether appellant Nathan McGuire, a public high school basketball head coach, falls into either of those categories. Having reviewed the undisputed facts regarding McGuire’s duties as coach and regarding the lack of any controversy concerning his performance before the allegedly defamatory statements were made, we conclude that McGuire is neither a public official nor a public figure. However, because McGuire did not appeal the district court’s conclusion that the statements of respondents Joy Szondy, Chelon Danielson, and Cheryl Hewitt fall under a qualified privilege, we nevertheless affirm summary judgment as to those three respondents. Because the district court granted summary judgment to respondent Julie Bowlin solely on the basis of McGuire’s status as a public official, we reverse as to McGuire’s defamation claim against her and remand for further proceedings on that claim.
This case comes before us following the district court’s grant of summary judgment against McGuire. Accordingly, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to him. See Expose v. Thad Wilderson & Assocs., P.A. , 889 N.W.2d 279, 284 (Minn. 2016).
From the fall of 2012 to the spring of 2014, McGuire was the head coach of the girls' basketball program for Woodbury High School. In that role, he oversaw five assistant coaches, made strategic decisions, scheduled games and practices, and had general oversight of the program.
While McGuire was coaching at Woodbury, respondents, all of whom were parents of players on the team, expressed concerns about McGuire’s conduct, most notably alleging that he swore at practices, touched players in inappropriate ways,1 and flirted with players. In January 2014, these concerns ultimately culminated in Bowlin, Szondy, and Hewitt meeting with (and Danielson writing a letter to) school administrators to discuss McGuire’s conduct. Two days after respondents met with the school administrators, McGuire was placed on administrative leave from his coaching duties. Two months later, in March 2014, the school district decided not to renew McGuire’s coaching contract.
Around the same time, Bowlin and Danielson filed maltreatment-of-minor reports against McGuire with the Minnesota Department of Education. Following an investigation, the Department concluded that Bowlin’s daughter had not been subjected to maltreatment. Although the record is silent as to Danielson’s daughter, no evidence suggests that the Department reached a different conclusion as to her.
Even after McGuire was removed from his coaching position, Bowlin continued to make statements about him. In August 2014, she emailed another parent that, "Last I heard yesterday he was recently put in jail ... I will find out the truth and call the [Department of Education] today and find out." In December she sent that same parent’s spouse a photo of a newspaper article titled "Woodbury man sentenced to jail in stolen funds case," accompanied by a text that said It is undisputed that the subject of the article was not McGuire.
In December 2015, McGuire served and filed a complaint alleging respondents had engaged in defamation and a civil conspiracy, and that Bowlin and Danielson had filed false maltreatment-of-minor reports.2 Following discovery, Szondy, Danielson, and Hewitt moved for summary judgment. They alternatively argued that because (1) McGuire was a public official, (2) McGuire was a public figure, or (3) their statements were made under a qualified privilege, McGuire was required to prove malice and there was no such proof here. The district court granted their motions, dismissing all claims against Szondy and Hewitt, as well as the defamation claim against Danielson. Four months later, Bowlin and Danielson filed new motions for summary judgment, Bowlin as to all claims against her and Danielson as to the remaining false-reporting and civil-conspiracy claims against her. The district court granted the motions reasoning that McGuire was a public official and that there was no evidence that Bowlin or Danielson "knowingly or recklessly" made a false report. The district court did not reach the issue of whether McGuire was a public figure.
In the court of appeals, McGuire appealed the issues of whether he was a public official, whether there was any genuine issue of material fact that respondents acted with actual malice, and whether there was any genuine issue of material fact that Bowlin3 knowingly or recklessly filed a false maltreatment-of-minor report. In an unpublished opinion, the court of appeals affirmed the district court’s decisions. McGuire v. Bowlin , No. A18-0167, 2018 WL 6273533 (Minn. App. Dec. 3, 2018). The court held that McGuire was a public official, that nothing in the record showed that respondents acted with actual malice, and that there was no evidence that Bowlin knowingly or recklessly filed a false maltreatment report. Id. at *4–6.
McGuire petitioned for further review solely on the issue of whether he was a public official for the purpose of his defamation claims. We granted his petition.
McGuire appeals the court of appeals' conclusion that he is a public official. Whether McGuire is a public official is a question of law that we review de novo. Britton v. Koep , 470 N.W.2d 518, 520 (Minn. 1991).
To prevail on a defamation claim, a plaintiff must show: (1) that the defendant made a false and defamatory statement about the plaintiff; (2) that the statement was an unprivileged publication to a third party; (3) that the statement had a tendency to harm the plaintiff’s reputation in the community; and (4) that the defendant was at fault (at least negligent). Id. This case concerns the standard to be applied in determining fault.
In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan , the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment "prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with ‘actual malice’—that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." 376 U.S. at 279–80, 84 S.Ct. 710. At that time, the Court noted that it had "no occasion here to determine how far down into the lower ranks of government employees the ‘public official’ designation would extend ... or otherwise to specify categories of persons who would or would not be included." Id. at 283 n.23, 84 S.Ct. 710. Two years later, the Court elaborated that the higher fault requirement for public officials was based on two motivating forces: "first, a strong interest in debate on public issues, and, second, a strong interest in debate about those persons who are in a position significantly to influence the resolution of those issues." Rosenblatt v. Baer , 383 U.S. 75, 85, 86 S.Ct. 669, 15 L.Ed.2d 597 (1966). The Court went on to note, however, that those interests must be balanced against the "pervasive and strong interest" society has in "preventing and redressing attacks upon reputation." Id. at 86, 86 S.Ct. 669.
We most recently had occasion to address the scope of the public-official designation in Britton , 470 N.W.2d 518. In that case, we identified three criteria to use in evaluating whether an individual’s position makes them a public official: first, "performing governmental duties directly related to the public interest," second, "holding a position to influence significantly the resolution of public issues," and third, "government employees having, or appearing to the public to have, substantial responsibility for or control over the conduct of government affairs." Id. at 522. We address each criterion in turn.
The first Britton criterion is whether McGuire was performing governmental duties directly related to the public interest. This criterion has its origins in Hirman v. Rogers , 257 N.W.2d 563 (Minn. 1977). There, the plaintiff was a police officer, and the parties and the district court all agreed that he was a public official. Id. at 566. Thus, the plaintiff’s public-official status did not receive significant discussion. See id. However, in Britton , we acknowledged that the criterion as articulated in Hirman is "very broad and could be applied to any government functionary." Britton , 470 N.W.2d at 522. Indeed, taken literally, it would extend from the lowest level of government employees all the way to elected officials. Such a scope is contrary to ...
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