McHenry Coal Co. v. Sneddon

• Decision Date: 15 February 1896
• Citation: 34 S.W. 228,98 Ky. 684
• Parties: McHENRY COAL CO. v. SNEDDON.
• Court: Kentucky Court of Appeals

34 S.W. 228

98 Ky. 684

McHENRY COAL CO. v. SNEDDON.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

February 15, 1896

Appeal from circuit court, Ohio county.

"To be officially reported."

Action by David P. Sneddon against the McHenry Coal Company to recover damages for personal injuries. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Reversed.

O'Neal Phelps, Pryor & Selligman, Phelps & Thum, and Charles Eaves for appellant.

H. P Taylor and Taylor & McHenry, for appellee.

PRYOR C.J.

The appellee, Sneddon, was an employ21e in the McHenry Coal Mine Company, and, while engaged in hauling coal in the mine, was injured by the team he was driving colliding with a team driven by another employé. We will not allude to the testimony further than to say that the case went properly to the jury upon the question as to gross negligence on the part of the superintendent of the mines, and that of contributory neglect on the part of the appellee. The trial of such issues belongs to the jury, and, as the case must go back, we refrain from discussing the facts applicable to either issue. We are satisfied, however, that it is not a case for punitive damages; and while it is difficult to establish any certain rule by which trial courts are to be controlled in this class of cases, and the instructions must be governed by the facts of each case, it is, nevertheless, well settled that it is not every case of gross negligence where punishment in the way of damages may be inflicted. Where the facts conduce to show reckless, willful, or malicious conduct on the part of the party charged with the wrong, exemplary damages may be awarded. There is no evidence of the presence of malice or reckless conduct on the part of the superintendent, as indicating a purpose to have the appellee injured, or a reckless disregard of the safety of his person, and therefore the instruction as to punitive damages should have been refused. The instruction should have confined the jury, if they returned a verdict for the plaintiff, to compensatory damages only.

This judgment must be reversed for another reason. During the progress of the trial it appeared that the parties were or had been making an effort to compromise the matter in controversy, and a concession evidently had been made by the company to pay the appellee something in the way of compensation. This character of testimony was endeavored to be introduced by the plaintiff, not only one...