McHugh v. Commonwealth
| Decision Date | 05 March 2020 |
| Docket Number | 19-P-93 |
| Citation | 141 N.E.3d 456 (Table),97 Mass.App.Ct. 1104 |
| Court | Appeals Court of Massachusetts |
| Parties | Michael MCHUGH & others v. COMMONWEALTH & others. |
The plaintiffs are four individuals who worked for the Commonwealth at the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) pursuant to temporary contracts that were extended numerous times. The plaintiffs filed a class action complaint alleging that the defendants' practice of repeatedly extending the plaintiffs' temporary contracts instead of hiring them as permanent employees violated several statutory and constitutional provisions. The ten-count complaint sought damages as well as injunctive, declaratory, and equitable relief. A judge of the Superior Court (motion judge) dismissed all of the plaintiffs' claims in a margin endorsement stating that they were barred by sovereign immunity or failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted. We affirm, although partially for alternative reasons.
Background. We summarize the pertinent facts alleged in the plaintiffs' complaint. See Golchin v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 460 Mass. 222, 225 (2011). The DEP hired all of the plaintiffs as temporary employees. Michael McHugh was hired in 1990, James O. Brown, Jr., was hired in 1994, and Alice Smith and Mark Stinson were both hired in 2005. McHugh, Brown, and Smith all worked in the area of wetlands conservation, such as by collecting and mapping data related to wetlands and by providing expertise on State and Federal law. Stinson addressed inquiries about regulatory issues, including by conducting workshops, among other responsibilities. The plaintiffs allege that their responsibilities were materially indistinguishable from those of permanent employees.
The plaintiffs allege that when the DEP first hired them, they were assured that they would become permanent employees if they performed their jobs satisfactorily. The plaintiffs then agreed to repeated extensions of their temporary contracts, instead of pressing the issue of permanent employment, because they believed that the DEP would fire them if they did not agree to the extensions. As temporary employees, the plaintiffs were denied vacation and sick leave, overtime pay, paid holidays, State retirement benefits, and health care at group insurance rates, among other benefits.
The DEP continued to extend the plaintiffs' temporary contracts until shortly after the plaintiffs filed their class action complaint in 2017, at which point the DEP made McHugh, Stinson, and Smith permanent employees. The DEP also offered to make Brown a permanent employee, but ultimately terminated Brown's employment when he declined the terms of the DEP's offer.4
Discussion. 1. Failure to state a claim. Several of the plaintiffs' claims were properly dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted. See Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6), 365 Mass. 754 (1974). First, the plaintiffs asserted a claim under the Tort Claims Act, G. L. c. 258, which they contend "does not pertain only to traditional torts" and should be read to provide a cause of action for the loss of their benefits caused by the Commonwealth's and the DEP's violations of State and Federal law. We have never interpreted the Tort Claims Act so broadly, however, and have instead stated that the Tort Claims Act "does not create any new theories of liability, but simply provides that tort actions brought against governmental entities are governed by the same theories of liability that apply to actions involving private parties." Vining v. Commonwealth, 63 Mass. App. Ct. 690, 692 (2005). See Sharon v. Newton, 437 Mass. 99, 111 (2002) (). Where the plaintiffs have not articulated a traditional tort theory of liability, this claim was properly dismissed under rule 12 (b) (6).
Second, as to the plaintiffs' claim for quantum meruit, the plaintiffs argue that they may recover under this theory despite the existence of the temporary contracts because those contracts are voidable for duress. We disagree. The elements of economic duress are as follows: "(1) that one side involuntarily accepted the terms of another; (2) that circumstances permitted no other alternative; and (3) that said circumstances were the result of coercive acts of the opposite party" (quotations and citation omitted). Cabot Corp. v. AVX Corp., 448 Mass. 629, 637-638 (2007). The plaintiffs contend that the defendants coerced the plaintiffs into signing the temporary contracts by conditioning their employment on terms contained therein that purportedly contravened the Social Security Act and G. L. c. 29, § 29A, as discussed infra.5 Even assuming that this conduct rises to the level of coerciveness required for economic duress, the plaintiffs have not articulated why they had no other alternative but to keep signing the temporary contracts. They have not explained why they could not find employment elsewhere or why they could not have sought a judicial declaration that they had to be made permanent employees, as they ultimately did.6 See Cabot Corp., supra at 641-642 ().
We also affirm the dismissal of the plaintiffs' claims for violations of the wage act, G. L. c. 149, §§ 148 and 148B, and their minimum wage claims, G. L. c. 151, § 1, under rule 12 (b) (6).7 General Laws c. 149, § 148, requires the Commonwealth, in relevant part, to "pay every mechanic, workman and laborer employed by it" within certain time limits. By the plaintiffs' own allegations, however, they are not mechanics, workmen, or laborers. See Tracy v. Cambridge Jr. College, 364 Mass. 367, 375-376 (1973) (). The plaintiffs are instead professionals who provided expertise and trained others in the areas of wetlands conservation and State and Federal law.8 The plaintiffs' reliance on G. L. c. 149, § 148B, which prohibits employers from misclassifying employees as independent contractors, is also unavailing. While the plaintiffs' complaint repeatedly describes the plaintiffs as "under-benefited long-term contractors," there are no factual allegations to support that they were classified as independent contractors; the factual allegations instead go to whether they were temporary employees. Finally, G. L. c. 151, § 1, prohibits oppressive and unreasonable wages, which G. L. c. 151, § 2, defines as wages that are "both less than the fair and reasonable value of the service rendered and less than sufficient to meet the minimum cost of living necessary for health." The plaintiffs' complaint does not include any factual allegations to support the notion that they were paid an amount less than sufficient to meet the minimum cost of living necessary for health.
2. Moot claims. As to the plaintiffs' remaining claims for violations of their equal protection and due process rights, the Social Security Act, and G. L. c. 29, § 29A, the only available relief would be in the form of an injunction against ongoing violations of the plaintiffs' constitutional rights or in the form of a declaration determining the parties' rights under the Social Security Act and G. L. c. 29, § 29A. In this context, and where none of the plaintiffs are currently temporary employees, we address whether the plaintiffs' remaining claims are moot.
"[L]itigation is considered moot when the party who claimed to be aggrieved ceases to have a personal stake in its outcome." Blake v. Massachusetts Parole Bd., 369 Mass. 701, 703 (1976). Moreover, in making this determination in the context of this particular class action, we look only to whether the action is moot with respect to the named plaintiffs versus any potential class members. It is true that the mooting of a named plaintiff's claim after a class has been certified does not render the entire class action moot. See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 401-403 (1975). At that point, the certified class "acquire[s] a legal status separate from the interest asserted by [the named plaintiff]." Id. at 399. This reasoning has even been extended to some situations in which a named plaintiff's claim becomes moot after the filing of a motion for class certification but before the class is certified. See Gammella v. P.F. Chang's China Bistro, Inc., 482 Mass. 1, 19-20 (2019) ; Cantell v. Commissioner of Correction, 475 Mass. 745, 749, 752-754 (2016). See also United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 404 (1980). Here, however, the plaintiffs had not yet moved for class certification. In these circumstances, the plaintiffs do not represent the class, the class may not be certified, and the class action is moot.9 See Gonzalez v. Commissioner of Correction, 407 Mass. 448, 451-452 (1990). See also Cruz v. Farquharson, 252 F.3d 530, 533-534 (1st Cir. 2001).
We affirm the dismissal of the plaintiffs' constitutional claims on this alternative basis. See Rasheed v. Commissioner of Correction, 446 Mass. 463, 478 (2006). The plaintiffs allege violations of their State and Federal equal protection and due process rights. In substance, they allege that the defendants had no rational basis for treating the plaintiffs differently than permanent employees, who performed the same job functions and were thus similarly situated, and that the plaintiffs were deprived of various benefits without due process by being classified as temporary employees. The plaintiffs first assert these claims without reference to any statutory causes of action. In these circumstances, the only available relief would have been to enjoin the Commonwealth from continuing to violate the plaintiffs' equal protection and...
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