McHugh v. Slack

• Decision Date: 08 March 1895
• Citation: 39 P. 674,11 Wash. 370
• Parties: MCHUGH v. SLACK ET AL.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

39 P. 674

11 Wash. 370

MCHUGH v. SLACK ET AL.

Supreme Court of Washington

March 8, 1895

Appeal from superior court, Snohomish county; John C. Denney, Judge.

Action by James McHugh against Charles G. Slack, T. L. Grant, and others. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant Slack appeals. Affirmed.

Hoyt C.J., dissenting.

Crowley Sullivan & Grosscup, for appellant.

Delaney & Gamel, for respondent.

ANDERS J.

This is an appeal by the defendant Slack from a judgment and decree of the superior court of Snohomish county foreclosing a mechanic's lien on lots 14, 15, 16, and 17 in block 670 in the city of Everett. Several objections to the sufficiency of the plaintiff's claim of lien as introduced in evidence were interposed by the appellant in the court below, and the same are relied upon here as grounds for the reversal of the judgment. The statute under which this lien is claimed provides that every person claiming a lien must file with the county auditor of the county in which such property, or some part thereof, is situated, a claim containing a statement of his demand, after deducting all just credits and offsets, with the name of the owner or reputed owner, if known, and also the name of the person by whom he was employed, or to whom he furnished the materials with a statement of the terms and conditions of his contract if any, and also a description of the property to be charged with the lien sufficient for identification. 1 Hill's Code, § 1667. The property sought to be charged with the lien in this instance is described in the lien notice as "that certain two-story brick building, situated on lots numbered 14, 15, 16, and 17 in block 670 of the Everett Land Company's addition to the city of Everett, Snohomish county, Washington, aforesaid, which building is known as the 'Slack Building,' and fronts on Hewitt avenue, in said city, and is about 120 feet front, and extending back from said avenue 80 feet in depth"; and the lien is claimed upon the land thus described, as well as the building situated thereon. It appears from the evidence that there is no such plat or addition to Everett as the Everett Land Company's addition, but the evidence discloses that the land company, on December 21, 1891, filed for record in the auditor's office a plat of the "Everett Land Company's First Addition to Everett." The appellant, however, never erected any building in that addition, and there is no such property therein as that described in respondent's notice of lien, there being no block No. 670 and no such street as Hewitt avenue noted on said plat. The evidence further discloses that on February 6, 1892, the said land company and W. J. Rucker and Bethel J. Rucker filed for record a duly-acknowledged plat, designated as a "Plat of Everett." On this latter plat, and nowhere else in the city, we find Hewitt avenue and block 670, containing lots numbered as those set forth in the notice of lien; and it is admitted that a two-story brick building belonging to and constructed by the appellant, of the dimensions indicated in the notice of lien, is situated on said lots and block.

A mechanic's lien is purely a creature of the statute, and can be maintained only by a substantial compliance with all of the statutory requirements. Phil. Mech. Liens (3d Ed.) § 345. A lien claimant is required to record his claim for the purpose of giving notice to all persons interested, or who may become interested, in the property to be affected by the lien, of the amount of his claim, and of all the facts upon which it is based. And whatever facts are required by the statute to be stated in the lien notice must be stated; otherwise the notice is wholly ineffectual, and no lien is thereby created or preserved.

The particular objections to the claim of lien urged by the appellant are (1) that it does not describe any property owned by the defendant Slack with sufficient certainty for identification; (2) that it does not state the name of the owner or reputed owner; (3) that it does not state the name of the person by whom the plaintiff was employed, and does not state the name of the contractor and subcontractors, showing the contractual relations between the defendant Slack and the plaintiff; and (4) that it does not state the terms and conditions of the contract under which the plaintiff performed labor and furnished material.

The statute does not require a precise and minute description of the property against which a lien is claimed to be set forth in the recorded claim or notice of lien. All that is required is a description sufficient for identification, and it matters not what particular words are used if the property is thereby identified with reasonable certainty. Any description that identifies is sufficient, though not accurate. Phil Mech. Liens (3d Ed.) § 379. If, by rejecting what is false in a description, enough remains to identify the property attempted to be described, the description is sufficient under the statute; and, that being so, if by rejecting the words "of the Everett Land Company's addition to the city of Everett," contained in the description under consideration, the remaining portion is sufficient to identify the property, the description is not insufficient. Disregarding these words, we have the statement that the property...