McInerny v. St. Luke's Hosp. Ass'n of Duluth

• Citation: 141 N.W. 837,122 Minn. 10
• Parties: McINERNY v. ST. LUKE'S HOSPITAL ASS'N OF DULUTH.
• Decision Date: 29 May 1913
• Court: Supreme Court of Minnesota (US)

122 Minn. 10

141 N.W. 837

McINERNY

v.ST. LUKE'S HOSPITAL ASS'N OF DULUTH.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

May 29, 1913.

Appeal from District Court, St. Louis County; Wm. A. Cant, Judge.

Action by Mary E. McInerny against the St. Luke's Hospital Association of Duluth. Verdict for plaintiff. From an order denying a motion for judgment or a new trial, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Syllabus by the Court

Section 1813, R. L. 1905, imposing upon all persons and corporations owning or operating dangerous machinery the duty to cover or guard the dangerous parts thereof, so far as practicable, applies to charitable associations owning and operating such machinery, as well as to all other persons or corporations similarly situated.

The duty thus imposed is absolute and nondelegable, and a failure to discharge the same renders the charitable association liable to its servants and employés who are injured in consequence of the neglect.

If public policy requires that such associations be excluded from the operation of the statute, it should be so declared by the Legislature, and not by the dictum of the courts. Baldwin & Baldwin, of Duluth, for appellant.

John Jenswold, Jr., and C. R. Magney, both of Duluth, for respondent.

BROWN, C. J.

Defendant is a corporation organized in the year 1883, under the provisions of title 3, chapter 34, Gen. Stat. 1878, now section 3102 et seq., R. L. 1905. The articles of association declare that the general purpose of the corporation ‘is to establish and maintain at Duluth, Minnesota, a hospital which shall be free to persons needing care and medical or surgical treatment and who are indigent and have no means with which to pay for such care and treatment, and also to furnish care at reasonable rates to such as desire it and are to pay for the same; the association is purely eleemosynary, no member thereof to receive any pecuniary profit from his or her membership, and all sums received by the association from any source to be applied to the purposes of the association.’

Subsequent to the organization of the association buildings were acquired and equipped for hospital purposes, and the association entered upon and has since continued the discharge of the powers and duties conferred by its incorporation. It has accumulated property of considerable value, principally from donations made to it by charitably disposed persons. It receives and cares for indigent patients, and others who are able to pay for the accommodations given them; the great majority of its patients, being of ability to pay, are charged for services rendered. Its expenses are paid out of receipts from patients and donations received. There was installed in one of its buildings a laundry department, equipped with necessary machinery and utensils, including an ironing mangle. This mangle was of the ordinary type of such devices for ironing household linen, and was supplied with the usual heated rollers. The rollers were not guarded as required by section 1813, R. L. 1905, though it appears that it was practicable to so guard the same. Plaintiff was in the employ of defendant as housekeeper, with general supervision and charge of the household affairs of the hospital. On October 21, 1910, while plaintiff was engaged in ironing some window curtains, in doing which she operated the mangle, one of her hands was caught between the heated rollers thereof, and burned to such an extent as to necessitate the amputation of the greater part thereof. She thereafter brought this action to recover for such injury, charging in her complaint that the same was caused by reason of the negligent failure of defendant to guard the mangle rollers as required by law, and negligence in failing to keep and maintain the mangle in a safe and suitable condition for use. She had a verdict in the court below, and defendant appealed from an order denying its alternative motion for judgment or a new trial.

[1] It is contended that plaintiff failed to show a right to action against defendant for the reasons: (1) That at the time plaintiff was injured she was engaged in work outside of and beyond the scope of her employment, and was guilty of contributory negligence in attempting to operate the mangle; and (2) that, since defendant is a charitable corporation, it is not liable in damages for the negligence charged. Our examination of the record leads to the conclusion that the evidence fully justified the jury in finding that plaintiff was at the time of her injury within the general scope of her employment, and that she was not guilty of contributory negligence. The facts bring the case within the rule of Carlin v. Kennedy, 97 Minn. 141, 106 N. W. 340. We therefore pass that branch of the case, and come directly to the question whether defendant is responsible to its servants and employés for injuries resulting from its negligence. This is the principal and controlling issue in the case. And in considering the question it may be conceded for the purposes of the case that defendant is a charitable corporation, within the doctrine of many of the courts under which such associations are held immune from liability from their negligence. It conducts its affairs without profit to its members, and cares for without charge all indigent persons applying for treatment at the hospital. The fact that a fixed charge is made to those who are able to pay does not necessarily deprive the corporation of its eleemosynary character. Downes v. Harper Hospital, 101 Mich. 555, 60 N. W. 42,25 L. R. A. 602, 45 Am. St. Rep. 427.

We have made no attempt to discover the origin of the rule of nonliability applied by many of the courts to such associations, nor to trace the development of the law upon the subject. The rule probably originated in a purpose to foster and encourage such associations, for the benefit of the poor, and at a time when they were purely and wholly charitable, and supported exclusively by donations from the philanthrophist and charitably disposed person. Associations of that character are necessarily purely charitable, performing a public function in caring for and extending aid, treatment, and comfort to the indigent and poor. It was undoubtedly thought wise to treat them as agencies of the government, and to extend them immunity from the charge of negligence, precisely as though created and operated by the...