McIntire v. Forbes
Citation | 322 Or. 426,909 P.2d 846 |
Decision Date | 19 January 1996 |
Docket Number | No. S42561,S42561 |
Parties | Don McINTIRE and Thomas P. Dennehy, Petitioners, v. Donald E. FORBES, Director of the Oregon Department of Transportation, and Jim Hill, State Treasurer, Respondents, and Tri-County Metropolitan Transportation District of Oregon and Donald Dale Sloyer, Intervenors. |
Court | Oregon Supreme Court |
Gregory W. Byrne, of Byrne & Barrow, Portland, argued the cause and filed the briefs, for petitioners and filed a motion for intervenor Donald Dale Sloyer in support of petitioners.
Michael D. Reynolds, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the cause, for respondents. With him on the brief were Theodore R. Kulongoski, Attorney General, and Virginia L. Linder, Solicitor General.
Charles F. Hinkle, Portland, argued the cause and filed the brief, for intervenor Tri-County Metropolitan Transp. Dist.
Edward H. Trompke, Portland, filed the brief on behalf of amicus curiae Robert Tiernan.
Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of the light rail funding provisions of Senate Bill 1156 (SB 1156 or the Act), enacted by the Oregon legislature in special session in August 1995. They assert that sections 1 to 17 of the Act (the substantive provisions relating to light rail funding) are invalid for a number of reasons. We conclude that sections 1 to 17 of the Act are invalid because the legislative act in which they are contained violates the "one-subject" requirement of Article IV, section 20, of the Oregon Constitution.
Intervenor 1 raises certain threshold issues. Concerning jurisdiction, intervenor asserts that the statutory grant to this court of exclusive and original jurisdiction does not, by its terms, extend to a challenge made under Article IV, section 20.
Section 18 of SB 1156, the jurisdictional provision at issue, provides:
We analyze the scope of a statutory grant of jurisdiction in the same manner as we analyze other statutes. We first examine the text and context of the provision to try to ascertain the intent of the legislature and, if the intent is clear from that inquiry, then we proceed no further. PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or. 606, 610-11, 859 P.2d 1143 (1993). We begin with the text, as the best evidence of the legislature's intent. Id. at 610, 859 P.2d 1143.
Intervenor asserts that jurisdiction to determine the constitutionality "of any provision of sections 1 to 18" means that the court may not consider other provisions of the Act 2 in any way and, therefore, that the court may not consider constitutional contentions based on the title of the Act or on other provisions of the Act, to wit, the challenges brought here pursuant to Article IV, section 20.
Contrary to intervenor's position, the text of section 18 contemplates an unlimited range of state constitutional challenges to sections 1 to 17. The grant of jurisdiction is extended to determine "the constitutionality" of any provision of sections 1 to 18. (Emphasis added.) Use of the definite article connotes a single, all-encompassing inquiry into the measure's constitutionality. Moreover, at three different times, section 18 speaks of the types of claims that may be brought to determine constitutionality, including but not as being limited to challenges to the light rail lottery bonds. The text of section 18 thus is inclusive, not exclusive, with no limits stated.
An inquiry into the context of the jurisdictional provision in section 18 also is instructive. Under this court's methodology, such an inquiry includes review of other sections of the same Act. See State ex rel. Hall v. Riggs, 319 Or. 282, 287-89, 877 P.2d 56 (1994) (illustrating principle). Section 1(1)(h) of the Act provides:
(Emphasis added.)
The import of that section is that the legislature intended that all kinds of state constitutional challenges to the substantive light rail funding provisions be resolved promptly and finally, in order to facilitate the acquisition of federal funds. See also id. at § 18 ( ). 3
The text and context of section 18 manifest a clear legislative intent to facilitate the prompt and complete resolution by this court of all potential constitutional challenges to the light rail funding provisions of the Act. We conclude that this court has jurisdiction to consider petitioners' constitutional challenges to the light rail funding provisions of the Act, based on Article IV, section 20. 4
Intervenor also questions petitioners' standing to bring this action and the justiciability of this case.
Section 18(2) of SB 1156 provides in part:
"Any interested person may petition the Supreme Court for a determination of the constitutionality of any provision of sections 1 to 18 of this Act * * *."
The question of petitioners' standing to bring this action is a matter of statutory interpretation, to construe and apply the term "any interested person." As with the determination of the scope of this court's statutory original jurisdiction, we first examine the text and context of section 18(2) to ascertain the legislature's intent in its grant of standing.
The text does not define the term "any interested person" or "interested." This court typically will give words of common usage their "plain, natural, and ordinary meaning." PGE, 317 Or. at 611, 859 P.2d 1143. "Interested" is pertinently defined as "having a share or concern in some affair or project: liable to be affected or prejudiced." Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary, 1178 (1993).
Analysis of text also includes reference to well-established legal meanings for terms that the legislature has used. See Ester v. City of Monmouth, 322 Or. 1, 9, 903 P.2d 344 (1995) ( ). "Interested" also can be a word with a well-established legal meaning. With respect to actions brought by taxpayers in Oregon to challenge legislation that involves expenditures of public funds, this court has held that a taxpayer is "beneficially interested" in the matter and has standing, if the taxpayer can show that her or his tax burden will be or is likely to be increased by operation of the law. See State ex rel. Kane v. Goldschmidt, 308 Or. 573, 578-79, 783 [322 Or. 432] P.2d 988 (1989) (taxpayer had standing to bring a mandamus action challenging a law that authorized the state to enter into certain financing agreements); see also Savage v. Munn, 317 Or. 283, 289, 856 P.2d 298 (1993) ( ). The term "any interested person," which appears in the Act before us, is not the same as the term "beneficially interested," which this court construed in Kane. However, the term "any interested person" is at least as broad as (if not broader than) the term "beneficially interested."
The context of the standing provision in SB 1156 supports at least as broad a definition as the one that the foregoing cases apply to the term "beneficially interested" person. Just as with the preceding inquiry into the context of the grant of jurisdictional authority, the...
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