McKee v. Laurion

• Decision Date: 30 January 2013
• Docket Number: No. A11–1154.,A11–1154.
• Parties: David McKEE, M.D., Respondent, v. Dennis K. LAURION, Appellant.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

825 N.W.2d 725

David McKEE, M.D., Respondent,

v.Dennis K. LAURION, Appellant.

No. A11–1154.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Jan. 30, 2013.

Syllabus by the Court

Six allegedly defamatory statements posted online by the appellant criticizing the respondent doctor for what the appellant perceived as rude and insensitive behavior are not actionable because either (1) there is no genuine issue of material fact as to the statements' falsity or (2) the statements do not convey a defamatory meaning as a matter of law.Marshall H. Tanick, Teresa J. Ayling, Hellmuth & Johnson, PLLC, Edina, Minnesota, for respondent.

John D. Kelly, David L. Tilden, Hanft Fride, P.A., Duluth, Minnesota, for appellant.

OPINION

PAGE, Justice.

This case presents the narrow question of whether the court of appeals erred in concluding that six allegedly defamatory statements made by appellant Dennis Laurion regarding an encounter with respondent David McKee, M.D., survive summary judgment. We hold that none of the six statements is actionable either (1) because there is no genuine issue of material fact as to the falsity of the statements or (2) because the statements are not capable of conveying a defamatory meaning that would harm respondent's reputation and lower him in the estimation of the community. Therefore, we reverse.

On April 17, 2010, Kenneth Laurion, the father of Dennis Laurion (Laurion), was admitted to St. Luke's Hospital in Duluth after suffering a hemorrhagic stroke. On April 19, Kenneth Laurion was transferred from the intensive care unit (ICU) of St. Luke's to a private room. The attending physician arranged for Dr. McKee, a neurologist, to examine Kenneth Laurion. Dr. McKee had never met Kenneth Laurion before he examined him on April 19.

Three family members were present in Kenneth Laurion's hospital room when Dr. McKee's examination began: Laurion, his mother, and his wife. The examination lasted no longer than 20 minutes, during which time Dr. McKee made certain statements and acted in a manner that, as a whole, the Laurions perceived as rude and insensitive. After Kenneth Laurion had been discharged from the hospital, Laurion posted the following statements regarding Dr. McKee on various “rate-your-doctor” websites:

My father spent 2 days in ICU after a hemorrhagic stroke. He saw a speech therapist and a physical therapist for evaluation. About 10 minutes after my father transferred from ICU to a ward room, Dr. McKee walked into a family visit with my dad. He seemed upset that my father had been moved. Never having met my father or his family, Dr. McKee said, “When you weren't in ICU, I had to spend time finding out if you transferred or died.” When we gaped at him, he said, “Well, 44% of hemorrhagic strokes die within 30 days. I guess this is the better option.” My father mentioned that he'd been seen by a physical therapist and speech therapist. Dr. McKee said, “Therapists? You don't need therapy.” He pulled my father to a sitting position and asked him to get out of bed and walk.[ ] When my father said his gown was just hanging from his neck without a back, Dr. McKee said, “That doesn't matter.” My wife said, “It matters to us; let us go into the hall.” Five minutes later, Dr. McKee strode out of the room. He did not talk to my mother or myself. When I mentioned Dr. McKee's name to a friend who is a nurse, she said, “Dr. McKee is a real tool!”

Laurion also sent letters to a variety of medically-affiliated institutions complaining about Dr. McKee's conduct. The letters included substantially the same statements communicated in the online postings. According to Laurion, his purpose in sending the letters was to get somebody to tell Dr. McKee (1) that he exhibited “poor behavior” and (2) that the recipients “don't like getting letters like this.”

After learning of Laurion's online postings from another patient, Dr. McKee commenced this action against Laurion, asserting claims for defamation per se and interference with business. Dr. McKee's complaint alleged that 11 statements from Laurion's online postings and letters were defamatory. After some discovery, Laurion moved for summary judgment seeking dismissal of Dr. McKee's lawsuit. The district court granted Laurion's motion and dismissed Dr. McKee's claims with prejudice, concluding that, as a whole, the statements lacked defamatory meaning and that, individually, the statements were either protected opinion, substantially true, or too vague to convey a defamatory meaning.

The court of appeals affirmed the district court's dismissal of the interference with business claim, but reversed the district court with respect to six of the allegedly defamatory statements posted online by Laurion. McKee v. Laurion, No. A11–1154, 2012 WL 177371, at *6–7 (Minn.App. Jan. 23, 2012). As to those six statements, the court concluded that (1) the statements were factual assertions and not opinions, (2) there were genuine issues of material fact as to the statements' falsity, and (3) the statements tended to harm Dr. McKee's reputation. Id. at *2–6. The actionable statements identified by the court of appeals are as follows:

• Statement 1: Dr. McKee said he had to “spend time finding out if you [Kenneth Laurion] were transferred or died.”

• Statement 2: Dr. McKee said, “44% of hemorrhagic strokes die within 30 days. I guess this is the better option.”

• Statement 3: Dr. McKee said, “You [Kenneth Laurion] don't need therapy.”

• Statement 4: Dr. McKee said, “[I]t doesn't matter” that the patient's gown did not cover his backside.

• Statement 5: Dr. McKee left the room without talking to the patient's family.

• Statement 6: A nurse ¹ told Laurion that Dr. McKee was “a real tool!” ²

Id. at *6.

We review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo. Riverview Muir Doran, LLC v. JADT Dev. Grp., LLC, 790 N.W.2d 167, 170 (Minn.2010). Our task is to determine whether genuine issues of material fact exist and whether the district court correctly applied the law. Id. We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom summary judgment was granted. Fabio v. Bellomo, 504 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Minn.1993). No genuine issue for trial exists when “ ‘the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party.’ ” DLH, Inc. v. Russ, 566 N.W.2d 60, 69 (Minn.1997) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986)).

To establish the elements of a defamation claim in Minnesota, a plaintiff must prove that: (1) the defamatory statement was “communicated to someone other than the plaintiff”; (2) the statement is false; (3) the statement tends to “harm the plaintiff'sreputation and to lower [the plaintiff] in the estimation of the community,” Bahr v. Boise Cascade Corp., 766 N.W.2d 910, 919–20 (Minn.2009); and (4) “the recipient of the false statement reasonably understands it to refer to a specific individual.” State v. Crawley, 819 N.W.2d 94, 104 (Minn.2012).

Statements 1, 2, & 4

Truth is a complete defense to a defamation action and “true statements, however disparaging, are not actionable.” Stuempges v. Parke, Davis & Co., 297 N.W.2d 252, 255 (Minn.1980). As a general rule, the truth or falsity of a statement is a question for the jury. Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 389 N.W.2d 876, 889 (Minn.1986). If the statement is true in substance, minor inaccuracies of expression or detail are immaterial. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 516, 111 S.Ct. 2419, 115 L.Ed.2d 447 (1991) (explaining that the common law approach to falsity in the context of libel “overlooks minor inaccuracies and concentrates upon substantial truth”); see also Clancy v. Daily News Corp., 202 Minn. 1, 11, 277 N.W. 264, 269 (1938) (characterizing the question of truth as “[w]hether the publications were substantially true”); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 581A cmt. f (1977) (“Slight inaccuracies of expression are immaterial provided that the defamatory charge is true in substance.”). “Minor inaccuracies do not amount to falsity so long as ‘the substance, the gist, the sting, of the libelous charge [is] justified.’ ” Masson, 501 U.S. at 517, 111 S.Ct. 2419 (quoting Heuer v. Kee, 15 Cal.App.2d 710, 59 P.2d 1063, 1064 (1936)). A statement is substantially true if it would have the same effect on the mind of the reader or listener as that which the pleaded truth would have produced. Id. The plaintiff has the burden of proving falsity in order to establish a successful defamation claim. Crawley, 819 N.W.2d at 104.

Viewing the evidence here in a light most favorable to Dr. McKee, we conclude that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to the falsity of Statements 1, 2, and 4. As to Statement 1 (Dr. McKee said he had to “spend time finding out if you transferred or died.”), Dr. McKee described his account of the statement in his deposition testimony:

I made a jocular comment ... to the effect of I had looked for [Kenneth Laurion] up in the intensive care unit and was glad to find that, when he wasn't there, that he had been moved to a regular hospital bed, because you only go one of two ways when you leave the intensive care unit; you either have improved to the point where you're someplace like this or you leave because you've died.

In light of the substantial similarity between Statement 1 and Dr. McKee's account, we conclude that any differences between the two versions are nothing more than “minor inaccuracies” that cannot serve as a basis for satisfying the falsity element of a defamation claim. Masson, 501 U.S. at 516, 111 S.Ct. 2419. Here, the “gist” or “sting” of Laurion's and Dr. McKee's versions are the same. Id. at 517, 111 S.Ct. 2419. Both communicate the notion that patients in the intensive care unit who have suffered a hemorrhagic stroke leave the intensive care unit either because they have been transferred to a regular room or the...