McKee v. McKee, 07-CA-59191

Citation568 So.2d 262
Decision Date11 July 1990
Docket NumberNo. 07-CA-59191,07-CA-59191
PartiesMargaret B. McKEE v. John B. McKEE, Jr.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Mississippi

Charles M. Merkel, Jr., Merkel & Cocke, Clarksdale, for appellant.

Kay Farese (Luckett) Turner, Memphis, Tenn., for appellee.

Before HAWKINS, P.J., and PRATHER and BLASS, JJ.

PRATHER, Justice, for the Court:

Margaret McKee brought this action in the Chancery Court of Coahoma County seeking an equitable division of the property and assets of a partnership comprised of her and her brother, John McKee. The chancery court ordered the distribution of the various partnership assets, which Margaret now appeals, alleging as error the following:

(1) THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO INTERPRET THE CONTRACT SO AS TO ALLOCATE TO MARGARET MCKEE A "KLONDIKE PLACE" CONTAINING 973 ACRES.

(2) THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO AWARD MARGARET MCKEE THE FAIR RENTAL VALUE OF HER ONE-HALF INTEREST IN THE JOINTLY OWNED FARM EQUIPMENT WHICH JOHN MCKEE HAD EMPLOYED FOR HIS OWN PERSONAL USE.

(3) THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY REFUSING TO EXERCISE JURISDICTION OVER THE PARTNERSHIP PROPERTIES LOCATED IN THE COUNTRY OF PARAGUAY.

The factual background of this dispute originated when John B. McKee, a Coahoma County farmer, deeded various agricultural properties to his two minor children, John, Jr. and Margaret, in the late 1940's. John, Jr. (hereinafter "John") began managing the resulting partnership, known as "J & M McKee", upon his return from military service. John, Sr. died in 1966, and Frances McKee, John and Margaret's mother, died in 1970. At all times thereafter, John managed all of the various estate interests as an equal partnership with Margaret. During this period of time, the parties also equally owned a corporation known as Taylor Gin Company. 1

Although the majority of the partnership's property and other assets were based in Coahoma County, Mississippi, Margaret lived in Memphis, Tennessee, where she worked as a newspaper journalist. She played no active role in the day to day operations of the partnership, although she received regular reports concerning the parties' interests. She also possessed minimal familiarity with the properties in question, and drew a regular monthly sum from the partnership account, allowing her to share the profits and accumulation in the partners' equity account.

By 1982, the partnership had acquired property and assets not only in Mississippi, but also in South Carolina, Florida, Arkansas, and the country of Paraguay, South America. By mid-1982, the partners were in serious disagreement over the proper management of the partnership, and John informed Margaret that the 1983 crop year would be the last year during which the properties would be operated as a partnership.

By June 1983, the situation had still not improved, and John informed Margaret at that time that the properties would have to be divided by the end of December 1983, because he would not farm them thereafter. The conflict between brother and sister was apparently so intense that all communications from that point forward were to be made through an intermediary, Ed Hamlet, an attorney from Memphis, Tennessee. Hamlet was a college classmate of John McKee's, who in more recent years had served as the attorney for all the partnership and corporate entities, as well as the tax attorney for John and Margaret McKee, individually. This method of communication extended to written materials, as well as telephone inquiries. Not surprisingly, the parties were unable to agree over the proper division of the partnership's property.

On February 10, 1984, in the Chancery Court of Coahoma County, Mississippi, Margaret filed against her brother John a Complaint for Dissolution of Partnerships, Partnership's Accountings, and for a Division of Assets of Partnership, and for a preliminary injunction regarding division of farm equipment. The complaint alleged that during 1983, differences had arisen between the parties concerning the management of the partnership and that they had mutually resolved to terminate the partnerships and dissolve the corporations following the 1983 crop year and to distribute the assets. The complaint further noted that during late December, 1983, the parties had reached agreement concerning the partial division of certain agricultural real properties which resulted in the execution of documents embodying this agreement on January 9, 1984.

The complaint stated that the parties had been unable to agree to terms of a final accounting and an appropriate partition of other jointly-owned real estate holdings and final distribution of partnership assets, and accordingly, the complaint ultimately sought a proper accounting of all partnership and corporate activities from their inception, a partition of all involved real estate, and distribution of all remaining assets of the partnerships and corporations as dictated by the accounting. The complaint also sought a mandatory injunction, requiring the immediate delivery of half of the partners' jointly-owned farming equipment, so as to enable Margaret to farm her allocable portion of the properties for the 1984 crop year.

In lieu of a hearing, the parties, through their attorneys, met and conferred, and a temporary order was entered on February 17, 1984, setting forth the procedure by which all jointly-owned farm equipment would be inventoried, appraised, and divided, and half of this equipment would be delivered to Margaret. The February 27th order further specifically directed that one "Case 2390 Tractor should not be operated by either party until the appraisal of the particular equipment is finalized."

The trial court entered an order on April 25, 1984, in which it set down for hearing on May 8, 1984, all disputes arising between the parties under the previous orders of the court or under agreements made by the parties, including any remaining property disputes and other issues arising out of the parties' own agreement, dated January 9, 1984. The intent of the trial court was to interpret any and all agreements and to resolve all disputed issues arising therefrom.

At the May 7 and 8, 1984, hearing testimony was taken relative to an interpretation of the parties' January 9th partial division agreement, particularly insofar as it pertained to the "Klondike property" awarded by the agreement to Margaret McKee, the "Chism property" awarded by the agreement to John McKee, and another 9.6-acre portion of Margaret's "Klondike Place" now being claimed by John. On May 8, at the conclusion of a segment of a bifurcated hearing, the trial court, in an oral bench opinion, awarded 60 acres of land referred to in the testimony of John McKee as the "Chism property" and the 9.6 acres of land referred to in John's testimony as the "Compress Site" to John, which Margaret now claims on appeal effectively removed 69.6 acres of real property from her interest in the "Klondike Place."

The hearing then resumed, and the court considered a controversy arising from John's claim that two brand new Case 2390 tractors situated in Friar's Point, Mississippi, had been earmarked by him for future use in the South Carolina farming operation, and accordingly, were to go to him under the terms of the January 9 agreement, which had given him the South Carolina property, plus equipment. As to this point, the court held that the two new tractors in question were not allocable to the South Carolina property, but simply constituted a part of the undivided and jointly-owned equipment of the parties, which was subject to inventory, appraisal, division, and equal distribution, pursuant to the terms of the court's order of February 27, 1984.

The May 8 hearing was then adjourned, with other issues to be dealt with at the time of subsequent hearings. On May 18, 1984, Margaret filed a motion to reconsider the oral bench opinion, insofar as it pertained to the 69.6 acres, and on August 31, 1984, she filed a pre-trial memorandum of authorities going to the question of the Mississippi court's jurisdiction over the partnership's property located in the country of Paraguay.

When Margaret received one of the "new" Case 2390 tractors, she discovered that during the pendency of the litigation over her entitlement to the tractor, John had utilized the tractor for the farming operations to the extent of some 154 hours. On September 4, 1984, at a subsequent hearing, the court heard testimony concerning Margaret's claim to the fair rental value of all hours put on her 2390 tractor and equipment by John during the pendency of her action to compel the delivery of the tractor and other equipment. The trial court declined to award any rental value to Margaret for the 2390 tractor or for any other equipment.

On October 9, 1985, the Chancery Court of Coahoma County withdrew its previous order of March 7, 1985, and substituted in lieu thereof an order incorporating prior bench opinions and further findings of the court to be dispositive of the issues heard to that point. This order included the award of the 69.6 acres of land which Margaret claimed should be in her "Klondike Place" to John, and the denial of Margaret's claim for fair rental value of her share of the equipment used by John prior to its delivery to her.

Finally, on April 1, 1987, Margaret filed a motion to clarify the court's prior position with respect to the Paraguayan property. In this motion, Margaret alleged that, despite repeated specific prayers for relief in the form of a partition or distribution of all real estate interests jointly-owned by the parties, including the property located in the country of Paraguay, and despite the filing of briefs on this point, the court had never held hearings on the question nor entered any order relative to Paraguayan property. On May 18, 1987, the court, without a hearing, specifically ruled that it lacked jurisdiction over the partnership's jointly-owned...

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