McKee v. Rudolph

• Decision Date: 05 April 1926
• Docket Number: No. 4316.,4316.
• Citation: 12 F.2d 148
• Parties: McKEE et al. v. RUDOLPH et al., District Com'rs.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

12 F.2d 148 (1926)

McKEE et al. v. RUDOLPH et al., District Com'rs.

No. 4316.

Court of Appeals of District of Columbia.

Submitted March 1, 1926.

Decided April 5, 1926.

E. F. Colladay, B. B. Pettus, and C. C. Cooper, Jr., all of Washington, D. C., for appellants.

F. H. Stephens and R. L. Williams, both of Washington, D. C., for appellees.

Before MARTIN, Chief Justice, VAN ORSDEL, Associate Justice, and BLAND, Judge of the United States Court of Customs Appeals.

MARTIN, Chief Justice.

In the lower court the appellants, as plaintiffs, filed a bill in equity, praying for an injunction to restrain the commissioners of the District of Columbia from enforcing the provisions of a certain Act of Congress approved May 17, 1924 (43 Stat. 120), upon the ground that the act is unconstitutional and void, and constitutes an invasion of appellants' property and contract rights without due process of law. The lower court dismissed the bill for want of jurisdiction. Hence this appeal.

It is alleged in the bill that appellants conduct and operate a hotel in the District of Columbia for the accommodation of transient and permanent guests, charging rates which vary according to the conditions of the business and the cost of the many and varied items entering into the expenses of the establishment; that on May 17, 1924, the Congress of the United States passed an act, entitled "An act to extend for the period of one year the provisions of Title II of the Food Control and the District of Columbia Rents Act, approved October 22, 1919, as amended"; that by this enactment hotel proprietors, such as the appellants, are required to post in a conspicuous place in each guest room a card or sign plainly stating the price per day of such room, and the price of meals if the hotel is conducted on the American plan; that a copy of such rates for each room shall be filed with the commissioners of the District of Columbia; that the rates charged for rooms shall not be advanced in less than 30 days from the date of the approval of the said commissioners of the written application therefor, and in the event an advance in rates is granted the same requirements with reference to the posting of notices and filing copies thereof shall apply; that any person, firm, or corporation who shall violate any of the provisions of the act, or who shall charge any guest a rate in excess of the posted rates, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof fined not less than $10 nor more than $100 for each offense; and that the commissioners of the District of Columbia are charged with the enforcement of the act.

It is alleged in the bill that the act in question is unconstitutional and unwarranted, and its enforcement would result in irreparable injury to appellants, by depriving them of their property rights and liberty of contract without due process of law; but that the commissioners of the District of Columbia nevertheless intend to enforce its provisions, and will do so unless prevented by decree of this court. It appears by a supplemental bill that since the filing of the original bill the commissioners have caused the arrest of appellants on a warrant issued upon the filing of an information in the police court of the District of Columbia, charging them with violating the act by failing to post in a conspicuous place in each room of their hotel a card or sign as required thereby, and failing to file a copy of such rates with the commissioners of the District of Columbia, and that said criminal proceedings have been continued by agreement of counsel pending the determination of the present equity suit. The appellants prayed as aforesaid for an injunction to restrain the commissioners from attempting in any wise to enforce the provisions of the act.

We think that the lower court was right in dismissing this bill. The appellants, as defendants in the police court, are entitled to rely upon the identical claims which they present in this suit, and to have them passed upon according to the same principles as here. Moreover, they have the right to apply for a review by this court of the judgment of the police court, should it be adverse to them. They have therefore a plain, adequate, and complete remedy at law for the protection of the rights claimed by them. Under such circumstances, equity will not take jurisdiction to enjoin a threatened prosecution for the violation of a criminal statute, nor to stay criminal proceedings already commenced. In re Sawyer, 124 U. S. 200, 8 S. Ct. 482, 31 L. Ed. 402; Rudolph v. Lockwood, 55 App. D. C. 101, 2 F.(2d) 319. The same rule applies to prosecutions for the violation of municipal ordinances. Cave v. Rudolph, 53 App. D. C. 12, 287 F. 989, and cases cited.

Appellants claim that equity should intervene in this instance in order to prevent a multiplicity of suits or prosecutions. It appears, however, that only a single prosecution has been commenced, to serve as a test case under the statute, and that proceedings therein have been suspended to await the result of this suit. It cannot, therefore, be claimed that appellants have been or are likely to be needlessly harassed by a multiplicity of prosecutions. Nor is it important that the present suit in equity was begun before the commencement of the prosecution aforesaid, since appellants cannot lose any of their rights by defending at law, instead of suing in equity. Stress is laid by appellants upon the claim that the act of Congress in question constitutes an invasion of their property rights, and that this fact furnishes a ground for equitable action. The act, however, does not deprive appellants of any property rights, but simply regulates the conduct of their business as hotel keepers; and, moreover, its constitutionality may be speedily and effectually tried at law.

It is contended by a...